The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance by Abbarno, Aaron
h 
THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Aaron Joseph Abbarno 
B.A. in History, University of Pittsburgh, 2003 
M.A. in International Relations and Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
The Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Pittsburgh 
2013 
 
 ii 
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH 
THE DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation was presented 
 
by 
 
 
Aaron Joseph Abbarno 
 
 
 
It was defended on 
October 18, 2013 
and approved by 
Jon Hurwitz, Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
Alberta Sbragia, Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
James L. Gibson, Professor, Government, University of Washington in St. Louis 
 Dissertation Advisor: Steven E. Finkel, Professor, Political Science, University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
 iii 
Copyright © by Aaron Joseph Abbarno 
2013 
 iv 
 
Effective and enduring democratic government requires broad public support for basic 
democratic orientations. Chief among these are political participation and political tolerance, 
which traditionally have been viewed as closely linked: virtually everyone agrees that democracy 
works best when people actively engage in political life and when they do not exclude others 
from doing the same. However, empirical evidence to date challenges the idea that political 
tolerance and civic engagement are positively, or even directly, related.  
What are the behavioral consequences of political tolerance? Using novel experiments 
that randomly assign subjects to tolerate the rights of groups they strongly dislike, this 
dissertation finds that political tolerance directly stimulates participation in specific modes of 
civic engagement. I argue that tolerance for political minorities is a highly unpopular position 
that orients citizens toward disagreement and dissent and reduces conflict aversion among the 
politically tolerant relative to the intolerant. Through this mechanism, upholding the rights of 
groups that society prefers to repress independently raises the likelihood of participation in social 
modes of action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens is high (e.g. 
protests), but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and 
conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting).  
My evidence is based on two methodological innovations. First, I employ a “self-
persuasion” experiment in which subjects develop original arguments to convince a discussion 
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partner to either permit (tolerate) or ban (not tolerate) public demonstrations by the subject’s 
most disliked group. Second, I directly observe subjects’ post-test participation using overt 
measures of subjects’ political behavior rather than survey items to measure only their behavioral 
intentions. Tracing the effects of randomized tolerance on subjects’ overt political behavior 
reveals, in support of my hypotheses, that practicing tolerance directly stimulates collective-
contentious activism (in this case, signing one’s name to a petition to challenge the status quo), 
but has no effect on individual action (i.e. making an anonymous donation). I further corroborate 
these findings by applying nonparametric matching techniques to cross-national survey data 
from the U.S. and Europe, and through cross-national survey experiments that test my model in 
the U.S. and Hungary. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the broad questions and conceptual frameworks addressed in this 
dissertation, as well as the specific empirical and theoretical conundrums that motivate further 
analysis. This chapter also outlines the contents of each subsequent chapter and summarizes 
their contributions to the literature.  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A key contribution of public opinion research to the study of comparative politics is the 
observation that effective and enduring democratic government requires broad public support for 
basic democratic values. A liberal democratic citizen is one who “believes in individual liberty 
and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at 
the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert 
rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic 
democratic institutions and processes” (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992: 332). When mass publics 
on balance exhibit such beliefs, they fulfill important cultural and attitudinal prerequisites to 
liberal democracy (Griffith 1956; Sullivan and Transue 1999).  
 2 
The claim that public consensus over democratic values can enhance quality in 
democratic regimes at least partly depends on the assumption that citizens who embrace these 
norms in principle are also willing to apply them in practice. Over the past two decades, this 
observation has become an important theme in research on how democratic attitudes shape 
democratic activism across countries. Political behavior scholars increasingly investigate the 
consequences of support for democratic values for the individual citizens who hold them. Can 
beliefs in democratic principles explain voting or other forms of civic engagement? Do 
circumstances exist under which support for democratic norms directly stimulates political 
action?  
Scholars generally disagree over the degree to which values can influence political 
judgments and behavior, and the relationship between democratic values and overt political 
behavior is likely “far from obvious, simple, and direct” (Gibson and Bingham 1985: 161). How 
support for democratic orientations matters for political behavior remains a core and unresolved 
issue in political science research (Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999).  
This dissertation further explores the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations 
by examining the individual-level relationship between political tolerance and political 
participation in the United States and Europe. These orientations traditionally have been viewed 
as closely linked foundations of liberal democracy – virtually everyone agrees that democracy 
works best when people actively engage in their society’s political life and do not exclude others 
from doing the same. And more participatory individuals traditionally have been viewed as more 
tolerant citizens, and vice versa. This is highly desirable from the perspective of democratic 
theory. When citizens who are committed to civil libertarian norms in principle and are willing to 
apply them in practice also regularly participate in politics, they hamstring repressive public 
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policy (McClosky 1964) and broaden opportunities for political expression for people with views 
outside the mainstream (Gibson 1992b). Hence the classic assumption that tolerant activists 
“serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the Creed” of liberal 
democracy (McClosky 1964: 374).  
Empirical evidence to date generally does not support this assumption, however. While 
the earliest tolerance research consistently reports positive associations between individuals’ 
level of political involvement and their level of political tolerance, subsequent lines of research 
indict that relationship as spurious and point to problems of causal indeterminacy. In the first 
place, it is possible that tolerance and participation are not at all directly related. Individuals may 
possess a host of demographic and personality traits (e.g. high education; low psychological 
insecurity) that render them, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. It may not be the case 
that participating in politics increases one’s tolerance for nonconformity, or conversely that 
“putting up” with odious groups facilitates active political engagement, because these 
characteristics of good democrats derive from more primordial contributors to a general 
“democratic personality” (Sniderman 1975). Alternatively, more recent studies suggest that 
tolerance and participation may indeed be related, but as conflicting, rather than complementary, 
orientations: tolerance for minority rights is a weak and pliable attitude that conflicts with other 
democratic beliefs and usually does not yield attitude-consistent behavior (Gibson 1998; Marcus 
et al. 1995; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996). Forbearance also 
promotes ambivalent political preferences and can lead tolerant individuals to abstain from 
political activity in general (Mutz 2001, 2005). Tolerant individuals may therefore endure 
nonconformity at the expense of vibrant civic engagement; tolerance may fundamentally work 
against participatory democracy in plural societies.  
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These divergent accounts reveal that certain fundamental questions remain unanswered. 
Are individuals who “put up” with ideas and interests they oppose more likely to be the activist 
custodians of liberal democracy that normative theory requires? Or does practicing tolerance 
toward odious groups breed the sort of ambivalence and confusion over democratic 
commitments that stifle political action even among the most dedicated liberal democrats?  Are 
these relationships correlational or causal and in what direction do they flow? In short, what are 
the behavioral consequences of political tolerance?   
I advance a new theoretical perspective and methodological framework to help address 
these questions. Existing accounts give scant attention to the possibility that tolerance may 
positively influence participation rather than, or in addition to, the reverse. And certain 
limitations in extant explanations suggest it is worthwhile to investigate tolerance as a driver of 
civic engagement. On one hand, the positive relationship between tolerance and participation is 
either assumed to be spurious due to omitted variable bias (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1982) or a 
consequence of “learning effects” whereby the give-and-take inherent in political activism 
instructs citizens in the value of civil liberties and thereby generates tolerance (e.g. Pateman 
1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). But it is well-known that people who (learn to) value 
civil liberties in the abstract often remain unwilling to afford political rights to their political 
opponents in practice (e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960). Even the most recent field experimental 
evidence shows that scholastic curricula designed specifically to impart civil libertarian norms 
fail to generate support for actual political rights and civil liberties (Green et al. 2011). On the 
other hand, the negative effects of tolerance on participation have been more often conjectured 
than tested (but see Mutz 2001, 2005; Marcus et al. 1995), and this model of the relationship may 
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be theoretically underspecified to the extent that it does not fully clarify what types of 
participation political tolerance should influence.  
I examine the effects of tolerance on participation by tying it to different avenues of 
political action. It is widely accepted in political science that different modes of engagement (e.g. 
protest, voting) present unique costs for participants, which individuals require diverse sets of 
resources and motivations to overcome. Tolerant and intolerant individuals may differ in terms 
of the individual-level resources and motivations that determine which actions they can take, but 
I propose that practicing tolerance or intolerance toward an unpopular minority group also 
conditions which actions they are willing to take. In particular, political tolerance may be directly 
and positively consequential for “high-cost,” contentious forms of political action.  
My central claim is that affording rights of free expression to groups with which one 
disagrees strengthens citizens’ perception that they are free to communicate their own political 
views. That is, they will perceive less social disapproval for voicing their views, and perceive 
less potential for the government to repress expression of these views (Gibson 1992b). In the 
context of heated civil liberties disputes – such as the controversy surrounding Westboro Baptist 
Church rallies at recent U.S. military funerals, the French burqa ban, or the Ground Zero 
“mosque” dispute – support for the political liberty of widely reviled others is a highly 
disagreeable and socially risky, minority position that stands at odds with majority intolerance. I 
propose that tolerant citizens who incur nontrivial social costs to protect the expressive rights of 
unpopular others are as a consequence less likely to perceive social costs as a barrier to their own 
political activism. Psychological theories of consistency provide a plausible explanatory lever for 
this effect, as individuals tend to align their beliefs with their actions (e.g. Festinger 1957) and to 
behave consistently across similar types of situations (e.g. Furr and Funder 2003). Through these 
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mechanisms, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress independently raises 
the likelihood of participation in social modes of action in which the risk of disagreement and 
conflict with other citizens and government authorities is high (e.g. protest, boycotts, petitions, 
rallies), but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict 
are unlikely (e.g. voting, donating).  
Political science currently lacks an appropriate methodology for examining the direct 
effects of tolerance judgments on participation and its attitudinal drivers. Spuriousness due to 
omitted variable bias is the central challenge: extant approaches cannot easily distinguish the 
behavioral consequences of tolerant and intolerant judgments from behavioral patterns that owe 
instead to preexisting differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. Methodological 
innovations, like randomized experiments and “matching” techniques for strengthening the 
inferences that can be drawn from observational data, can help to clarify to what extent tolerance 
as an applied value can influence political behavior independently of such factors. I utilize 
nonparametric matching methods to scrutinize patterns of participation among tolerant and 
intolerant citizens in the U.S. and Europe, and trace the direct effects of tolerance judgments on 
citizen activism through original experiments that randomly assign subjects to manifest 
(in)tolerance and permit me to directly observe its subsequent influence on overt political 
behavior.  
These new data and methodological innovations considerably strengthen the causal 
inferences that can be made about the behavioral effects of political tolerance. And, consistent 
with my theoretical perspective, these inferences paint a very different portrait of tolerance, its 
consequences for civic engagement, and whether tolerant activists may actually be hailed as 
“carriers of the creed” of liberal democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that 
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tolerance directly stimulates participation in specific kinds of political action. Tolerant 
individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in contentious and collective 
acts – and this disparity is attributable in no small part to the practice of tolerance itself. In other 
words, extending expressive rights to heinous groups drives tolerant individuals to exercise their 
own rights to political expression.  
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
In one sense, this dissertation argues an old point: Tolerance matters. Forbearance in the 
face of nonconformity has long been conceptualized as the lynchpin of plural societies and a key 
to democratic competition. Tolerance promotes the free exchange of new and diverse ideas, 
encourages individuality and autonomy, and allows society to progress by helping individuals to 
discover the good and bad aspects of different ways of life.  But this dissertation does not aim to 
defend or justify political tolerance from a normative perspective. Rather, it evaluates 
empirically how countenancing ideas and interests one opposes affects individuals who tolerate 
and draws from this evidence some conclusions about whether and how it might be thought 
“good” to tolerate. In doing so, it offers several contributions.  
Most basically, it begins to unveil whether, and in what ways, extending basic procedural 
rights and civil liberties to offensive groups affects individuals who tolerate. Although tolerance 
is often considered the most important democratic value, its consequences for individuals are 
poorly understood. This is so because empirical tolerance research has focused primarily on its 
sources, nature, and distribution in mass publics. Only a few studies have examined its micro-
level effects, either on political participation (Gibson and Bingham 1985; Gibson 1987; Marcus 
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et al. 1995) or on other attitudes that may influence participation (Gibson 1992b, 2002). This 
study explicitly models tolerance as an independent variable and speaks directly to the question 
of whether it shapes political action potential. 
Moreover, nearly all extant studies rely on cross-sectional data that render the directions 
of these relationships difficult to decipher, or on (quasi-) experimental procedures that obscure 
causal inferences regarding possible downstream effects of political tolerance judgments. My 
evidence is based partly on cross-national survey data to which I apply nonparametric matching 
techniques in order to isolate and improve inferences about the independent effects of tolerance 
using observational data. In addition, I offer two methodological innovations to help assess the 
direct effects of tolerance on participation. First, I introduce a “self-persuasion” experiment in 
which subjects develop original arguments to convince a discussion partner to either permit 
(tolerate) or ban (not tolerate) public demonstrations by the subject’s least-liked group. This 
procedure more fully simulates the actual application of (in)tolerance insofar as subjects 
cultivate, express, and defend tolerant or intolerant positions via their own unique reasoning. 
Second, I directly observe subjects’ post-judgment participation using overt measures of 
subjects’ political behavior rather than survey items to measure only their behavioral intentions. 
Together, these procedures offer unobtrusive measures of participation which can be traced 
directly to individuals’ applied decision to uphold or restrict their political enemy’s rights. 
More broadly, findings from this study speak to major theoretical questions and 
normative problems associated with political tolerance in modern democracies. Much empirical 
tolerance research suggests that tolerance is of little consequence to democratic politics and 
government. Most people are intolerant of ideas and interests they oppose; yet widespread mass 
intolerance neither catalyzes repressive public policy (e.g. Gibson 1989) nor stifles political 
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competition (Petersen et al. 2011). Tolerance may be a good in and of itself, but an important 
intellectual tradition in political science research maintains that it is not a necessary condition for 
liberal democracy. At the same time, tolerance increasingly faces objectives in normative 
scholarship based on the belief that it carries pernicious consequences for individuals and 
societies. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, tolerance has been labeled “repressive” (e.g. 
Brown 2006) or at best “inadequate and obsolete” (e.g. Ramadan 2010) by Marxist and New Left 
intellectuals who demand equal respect and recognition for diverse groups, rather than “mere” 
tolerance. Meanwhile, the cultural right maintains that tolerance constitutes an “insidious attack” 
on moral, cultural, and religious traditions (e.g. Caldwell 2009). These critiques are now central 
to real political debates. In France, for instance, many proponents of the ban on burqas 
challenged tolerance for religious expression on grounds that it erodes women’s equality. 
Religious conservatives in the Netherlands and Sweden have also come under attack for 
opposing these states’ commitment to equal rights for LGBT minorities (e.g. Mudde 2010).  
Few compelling defenses of tolerance seem available: the liberal democratic value to 
which we normally attribute every virtue is deemed unnecessary in democratic theory and 
unfortunate in many areas of political philosophy. It is therefore useful to assess empirically 
whether tolerance is consequential in ways that suggests it is worthwhile. Indeed, such evidence 
may also be useful to governments and NGOs who dedicate much effort and resources to civic 
education and democratization programs that “teach” tolerance and participation where they are 
in shortest supply (Finkel 2003, 2006). These efforts currently proceed without a clear 
understanding of how tolerance affects liberal (and illiberal) democratic citizens. 
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1.3 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
In the remainder of this chapter, I summarize the arguments and objectives of each subsequent 
chapter and briefly contextualize their contributions in terms of the broader theoretical, 
normative, and methodological questions at the center of this dissertation. The literature review 
in Chapter Two provides a more detailed profile of these issues and explicates the specific puzzle 
of whether and how tolerance and participation are related.  
1.3.1 Does tolerance matter? Theoretical challenges in Chapters 2 and 3 
Political science generally lacks a theoretical framework for understanding democratic values as 
drivers of actual political judgments and actions (Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999). This is 
particularly true of political tolerance, for which a generation of research reports that despite 
widespread support for abstract civil libertarian norms in principle, most citizens are, in practice, 
unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups they strongly dislike (e.g. 
Prothro and Grigg 1960). This well established inconsistency suggests that values, as such, have 
little purchase over actual political judgments and has been used as evidence to attack the 
suitability of democratic rule by suggesting that democratic publics are hostile to a core 
democratic obligation.  
One outgrowth of this view is the “elitist theory” of democracy, which maintains that 
widespread intolerance is largely innocuous – and mass political tolerance unnecessary – for 
liberal democratic government. Early empiricists essentially “assumed away” the consequences 
of (in)tolerance because 1) the intolerant masses tend not to participate and are politically 
negligible relative to the small subset of tolerant activists who influence policy through regular 
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civic engagement (McClosky 1964); 2) the intolerant masses cannot agree on which group is 
most threatening to society, and therefore cannot mobilize concerted calls for political repression 
(Sullivan et al. 1982); and 3) strong institutions exist to protect minority rights in the event that 
repressive public policies are passed. Mass public opinion is important to the degree to which it 
can be shaped and mobilized by elites, but citizens’ beliefs are generally not directly 
consequential for politics (Gibson 1992b: 339). Put somewhat more dramatically and precisely: 
mass political tolerance does not matter for public policy or political competition. 
In response, Gibson (1992b) originated an important defense of political tolerance and its 
relevance on grounds that this attitude matters deeply for political culture. In particular, 
widespread mass intolerance fosters a “culture of conformity” in which citizens grow wary of 
their ability to express political views that might conflict with majority opinion. Individuals who 
live in intolerant communities or households are more likely to avoid political discussion, to self-
censor their own political expression, and to question their freedom to participate in politics 
without government retaliation. Political intolerance matters because it could inhibit citizens’ 
development of “the attitudes toward political participation, disagreement, and political 
competition that are so beneficial for democratic politics” (Gibson 2006: 23 – 4). By implication, 
political tolerance matters because it broadens the opportunities for self-expression for those with 
views outside the political mainstream. Indeed, Gibson maintains that “tolerance matters because 
it is connected to a set of beliefs about the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression” 
(343).  
In Chapter Three, I largely follow Gibson in arguing that the political consequences of 
tolerance and intolerance are best understood at the individual-level and I seek to advance his 
arguments about the relationship between political tolerance, political freedom, and political 
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expression. In particular, I push his arguments in two directions – between individuals and across 
countries – by tying them to the “social costs” of political participation.  
Extant explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship, which I review in Chapter 
Two, give meager attention to the fact that different modes of participation vary in terms of the 
costs and risks they pose to participants and that individuals therefore require specific sets of 
resources and attitudinal dispositions to facilitate their engagement. Crucial among the latter are 
positive orientations toward risk-taking, argumentation, and conflict in one’s own life. I maintain 
that extending rights to groups that society prefers to repress also presents non-trivial risks to 
tolerant individuals because supporting basic rights for widely reviled groups that may be 
perceived as a threat to political and societal stability and generally invites social disapproval. 
Therefore, I propose that citizens who incur substantial risk to defend the rights and 
liberties of society’s unpopular minorities should be less likely to associate risks with their own 
political activism. I draw on social psychological theories of cognitive and behavioral 
consistency to generate causal propositions from Gibson’s inference that “tolerance is associated 
with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” 
(1992b: 343). Tolerance is not merely a correlate of, but also a direct contributor to, perceptions 
of freedom and related attitudes toward risk and dissent. In turn, tolerance should more likely 
influence high-cost forms of political activism, such as protest, petitioning, and rallies, which 
involve a greater risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government 
authorities, than low-cost avenues of engagement such as voting and donating.  
However, I acknowledge that the costs of participation may also depend on the broader 
socio-political context in which activism takes place. In particular, countries with a recent history 
of authoritarian rule continue to differ substantially from established western democracies in 
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terms of their citizens’ perceptions, levels and breadth of political activism. Chapter Three 
therefore devotes considerable attention to potential differences across the United States and 
Western Europe, on one hand, and post-communist East Central Europe, on the other.  
Ultimately, Chapter Three proposes that tolerance does matter, but not in ways that 
conventional theories suggest. I challenge the causal ordering of the theory of democratic 
learning as it applies to the tolerance-participation relationship, and I build a case for the role 
tolerance plays in determining how much liberty people believe they have available to them and, 
more importantly, to what degree they are willing to exercise that liberty for themselves. 
Tolerance can be crucial to whether and how citizens participate in politics; this has downstream 
consequences for public policy as well as political culture. 
1.3.2 Causal inference in the study of tolerance: Methodological challenges in chapters 4, 
5, and 6 
The specific puzzle at the core of this dissertation is whether tolerance stimulates, suppresses, or 
is unrelated to political participation. Two perspectives can be gleaned from the literature, which 
I review in Chapter Two. While a classic view posits positive correlations between political 
tolerance and political activism, recent studies conjecture that tolerance may exert a suppressive 
effect on political engagement. And a several studies suggest that any relationship between 
tolerance and participation is spurious due to unobserved factors that influence both democratic 
orientations simultaneously. An important methodological challenge therefore hinders scholars’ 
ability to adjudicate between these accounts of tolerance and participation. These accounts 
remain entangled because the effects of tolerant and intolerant attitudes are difficult to separate, 
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empirically, from influence of other factors that drive participation among individuals who 
possess and express these attitudes.  
I address these challenges in two ways. First, Chapter Four examines the balance of 
evidence for divergent perspectives of tolerance and participation using the Neyman-Rubin 
“potential outcomes” causal framework and drawing inferences from observational data. 
Specifically, I apply nonparametric matching techniques to cross-national survey data from the 
United States and Europe to better isolate the effects of tolerance judgments from effects that are 
attributable to other individual-level traits that condition both tolerance and political engagement. 
This evidence furnishes preliminary support for the propositions outlined in Chapter Three; 
however, these findings remain open to several objections that cannot properly be addressed 
using observational data alone.  
Ideally, students of political tolerance and its consequences would employ experiments 
that assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and, through random assignment, 
eliminate differences in antecedents across groups. Random assignment would allow researchers 
to observe whether and in what ways attitudinal tolerance and intolerance independently affect 
political outcomes. Chapter Five thoroughly discusses this claim and argues that extant 
experimental approaches to manipulating tolerance and intolerance contain certain properties that 
may obscure causal inferences regarding the downstream effects of (in)tolerance. It then 
introduces a novel experimental approach called the “self-persuasion” experiment, theoretically 
grounds it in social psychological research, contrasts it with extant experimental approaches in 
political tolerance, and tests its effects on attitudinal tolerance and intolerance within the 
potential outcomes framework. The findings indicate potent effects of the manipulation on both 
political tolerance and intolerance. The magnitude of attitude change is particularly strong and 
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significant among initially tolerant respondents assigned to practice intolerance and initially 
intolerant respondents assigned to practice tolerance. Given that previous work has largely 
struggled to convert intolerance to tolerance, the self-persuasion experiment offers an important 
advancement in our ability to randomly assign subjects to manifest (in)tolerance and to study 
their downstream effects on other political outcomes.  
Finally, I employ the self-persuasion methodology in Chapter Six to examine the direct 
effects of tolerance on political participation and the attitudinal dispositions that may facilitate it. 
Using original survey-experiments in the United States and Hungary, I first randomly assign 
subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance via the self-persuasion procedure and then trace the 
direct effects of this manipulation on subjects’ overt political participation. Following the 
manipulation, I present respondents with an opportunity to either sign a petition or make a 
donation to a non-profit group to advance a political cause they deem important. Technologies 
embedded within the online survey permit me to directly observe whether subjects did in fact 
deliver the petition or make a financial contribution. These unobtrusive measures of political 
engagement eliminate measurement error endemic in survey responses, while the experimental 
design mitigates concerns over ambiguous directionality of the relationship between tolerance 
and participation. 
1.3.3 Tolerance as a virtue, tolerance as a vice: Responding to normative challenges in 
chapter 7 
The concluding chapter reviews the main results and defines the contributions of the dissertation 
for political science. However, evidence of the behavioral consequences of political tolerance 
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also permits an empirical response to several normative critiques of tolerance, which are often 
made on consequentialist grounds. 
Theorists from very diverse intellectual traditions appear to agree that tolerance carries 
pernicious ramifications for individual citizens and for broader society alike. For the Marxist left, 
for instance, tolerance is “repressive” because it preserves and fortifies minority groups’ 
subordinate social status (e.g. Marcuse 1965; Brown 2006). The culturally conservative right 
maintains that tolerance masks an insidious and far-reaching attack on traditional moral, social, 
and religious values (e.g. Caldwell 2009; Yildiz 2011). The post-modernist left contends that 
tolerance does not go nearly far enough because it rests on old assumptions about socio-cultural 
pluralism rather than multiculturalism, which mandates that we move beyond liberalism and 
tolerance altogether (e.g. Galeotti 2002; Ramadan 2010). Even Millian liberals contend that 
tolerance violates neutrality, a core precept of liberal governance, and may weaken individuals’ 
autonomy and commitment to their own principles and beliefs (Oberdiek 2001). The sweeping 
normative criticisms and divergent empirical accounts of the effects of political tolerance provide 
ample reason to scrutinize its consequences more carefully – especially its influence on citizens’ 
political action potential. 
Empirical evidence from Chapters Four and Six demonstrate that tolerance is positively 
consequential in at least two ways. First, it appears to increase citizens’ confidence in their own 
rights by bolstering support for dissent from the majority as a democratic good and by decreasing 
the costs associated with contentious and collective action that challenges the status quo. Second, 
it appears to contribute directly to citizens’ participation in such collective and contentious 
action. Even if tolerance is normatively “antiquated,” it resonates with the still very modern, and 
very desirable, forms of participatory democracy on which successful governance relies. I 
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evaluate these conclusions in light of the contributions and limitations of my own work, and 
draw from this discussion suggestions for future research. 
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2.0  POLITICAL TOLERANCE, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 
This chapter reviews and synthesizes selected literatures on political tolerance and political 
participation in modern democracies. It reveals lacunae in studies of applied tolerance and civic 
engagement and provides normative and methodological justifications for redressing them. 
Three major points emerge. First, scholars disagree over how political tolerance and political 
participation are connected, whether they are complementary or conflicting orientations and, 
ultimately, whether participatory democracy and plural society are compatible. Second, 
innovative design and statistical controls are necessary to adjudicate between these competing 
explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship.  Third, advancing new accounts of the 
relationship requires greater attention to the dependent variable, particularly the various ways 
in which people participate in politics.  
2.1 DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
In social science research, political tolerance is conventionally understood as the willingness to 
extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups one strongly dislikes, or which 
espouse ideas and pursue interests that one opposes (Sullivan et al. 1982: 2). The equivalent 
word in political philosophy is “toleration.” I use these terms interchangeably throughout this 
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dissertation. It is worth noting, however, that philosophers traditionally distinguish between 
“tolerance” as an abstract, attitudinal disposition to admit the validity of different viewpoints, 
and “toleration” as active, behavioral resistance against the impulse to repress unsavory ideas 
(Murphy 1997). A similar distinction is central to empirical research: Prothro and Grigg (1960) 
had great influence by demonstrating that Americans who claimed to hold universal civil 
liberties in the highest regard in fact gave little regard to the rights and liberties of groups they 
found particularly odious. This remains perhaps the single most robust finding in political 
tolerance research: despite widespread support for abstract civil liberties in principle, in practice, 
most citizens in most countries are unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties 
to political minorities they dislike (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and 
Rohrschneider 2003). 
Tolerance exists in the space between indifference and acceptance (Oberdiek 2001); one 
cannot tolerate an idea one supports or a group towards which one is positively predisposed. 
Tolerance instead requires an “objective precondition.” To advance an analogy, one would not 
test a host’s hospitality by seeing how a close friend is treated but by how strangers – even 
enemies – are treated (see Miller 1990). For this reason, tolerance is now conventionally 
measured using a survey-based, “content controlled” methodology through which respondents 
first identify their own “least-liked group” and then respond to a battery of questions regarding 
their willingness to afford this group certain basic rights – such as the right to hold a 
demonstration, make a speech, run for public office, teach in public high schools, or exist as a 
political entity (Sullivan et al. 1979, 1982).
1
  
                                                 
1
 Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms “least liked” group and “most disliked” group 
interchangeably when discussing content controlled measurement of political tolerance. 
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Before Sullivan et al. (1979) introduced this approach, tolerance researchers relied on a 
measurement strategy based on Stouffer’s (1955) study of Americans’ attitudes toward leftist 
groups during the McCarthy Era. A contemporary version of this methodology continues to be 
employed in the General Social Survey (GSS) and its global variant, the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). Survey respondents are asked whether they would tolerate a variety 
of activities by groups presumed to be widely unpopular – such as communists, atheists against 
all religion and churches, LGBT minorities, militarists who oppose elections and invite the 
military to run the country, and racists. I refer to this measurement strategy as the “Stouffer” or 
“GSS” measurement of political tolerance. GSS and content controlled measures of tolerance do 
not tend to correlate strongly. But Gibson (1992a) reports that “substantive conclusions about the 
origins of intolerance are insensitive to the index employed” and argues that “tolerance research 
can profitably utilize either measurement approach” (560). The literature I review below relies 
on either or both content controlled and GSS measures of political tolerance.  
2.2 POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 
Fifty-five years of empirical research has provided a robust model of the political, social, and 
psychological determinants of political tolerance (e.g. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982; 
Gibson 1992a; Marcus et al. 1995). This model travels well across advanced industrialized 
democracies (e.g. Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Roberts 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley 
and Rohrschneider 2003) and can explain sizeable variation in citizens’ tolerance attitudes in the 
developing democracies of Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2001, 2003) and post-communist 
Europe (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt Paxton 2007; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson 2002).  
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Individuals are generally more tolerant when they perceive their disliked groups as less 
threatening, when they more strongly support democratic processes and institutions, and when 
they are less dogmatic and psychologically insecure. Recent contributions reveal that attitudinal 
tolerance increases with exposure to diverse ideas in heterogeneous social networks (Mutz 2001, 
2005; Ikeda and Richey 2009) and may be conditional on several additional factors, including 
the strength of individuals’ commitment to their social group (Gibson and Gouws 2000), tangible 
territorial threat (Hutchinson and Gibler 2007), multicultural values (Weldon 2006; van der Noll, 
Poppe and Verkuyten 2010) and characteristics of the act, as well as the group, at the center of a 
civil liberties dispute (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Petersen et al. 2011).
2
  
One basic conclusion of this sprawling literature is that most people in most democracies 
are, in fact, intolerant: they are unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to 
groups they strongly dislike. This finding – an empirical regularity across both time and context 
– undermines the assumption that public support for democratic values is necessary for stable 
and effective liberal democracy. How can liberal democracy prosper where most citizens are 
hostile to a core liberal democratic obligation? 
The “elitist theory” of democracy provides the conventional solution to this paradox. 
Widespread intolerance may be relatively inconsequential for at least four reasons. First, the 
intolerant masses tend to abstain from political participation. To the extent that intolerant citizens 
are politically apathetic, their antidemocratic views are politically negligible (McClosky 1964; 
                                                 
2
 Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) demonstrate that the public considers some acts of political 
expression so offensive – like burning the American flag – that a majority will oppose it 
irrespective of their attitudes toward the actor. Peteresen et al. (2011) find that intolerance is 
applied most readily to groups that respondents believe have violent and anti-democratic 
tendencies; Danish survey respondents are generally willing to tolerate groups they strongly 
dislike, provided that these groups are not violent or anti-democratic.  
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Prothro and Grigg 1960). Second, and by contrast, political activists and policy-making elites 
tend to be far more tolerant than rank-and-file citizens (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1993; but see Shamir 
1991). These elites sustain liberal systems because they support civil libertarian norms in 
principle and are prepared to apply them in practice; tolerant activists “serve as the major 
repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the creed” of liberal democracy 
(McClosky 1964: 374). Third, in most contexts, strong institutions exist to protect minority rights 
in the event that activists and elites abdicate the liberal democratic creed (Gibson and Gouws 
2003). Finally, repressive public policy is an unlikely response to intolerant mass opinion in any 
case, because intolerance is “pluralistic” (Sullivan et al. 1982). That is, citizens generally cannot 
agree on whose rights merit repression. Where these conditions hold, mass intolerance could be 
largely inconsequential – and widespread tolerance largely unnecessary – for effective 
democratic government and liberal public policy. 
 However, empirical research challenges at least two of these conditions. Gibson (1986) 
and Sniderman et al. (1989) largely disconfirm the theory of pluralistic intolerance by 
discrediting its underlying assumption that tolerance is ideologically bound. Tolerance could be 
pluralistic where leftist ideologues prefer to repress rightist groups and vice versa; however, 
intolerant individuals are just as likely to target groups on the left as they are to target groups on 
the right (Sniderman et al. 1989). Although this raises the possibility that citizens may focus their 
intolerance on a single nonconformist group irrespective of its ideology, Gibson (1988, 1989a) 
finds no evidence that mass, “focused intolerance” carries pernicious policy effects (political 
repression largely stems from elite intolerance [Gibson 1988]). Mass political intolerance may 
“set broad constraints on the behavior of policy-making elites” (1988: 29), but does not exert a 
direct influence on policies’ repressiveness – even when it is focused on a single group, such as 
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Communists during the McCarthy Era (Gibson 1988) or student activists during the Vietnam 
War era (Gibson 1989a).  Moreover, case studies of intolerance in emerging democracies 
validate the reasonable objection that courts and other institutions vary in their strength or 
mandate to protect minority rights from political influence (Gibson and Gouws 2003). The elitist 
theory and its notion that mass intolerance may be politically innocuous thus seem to hinge on 
differential patterns of political participation among tolerant and intolerant citizens – with highly 
engaged tolerant activists on one hand, and apathetic intolerant abstainers on the other. 
There is a certain normative opaqueness in the elitist theory’s prescriptions for (read: 
against) widespread political engagement among ordinary citizens. Pateman (1975), for instance, 
notes that participation may carry salutary benefits for mass political tolerance such that the more 
rank-and-file citizens participate in politics, the better they understand why the free exchange of 
ideas is important, and hence they will grow more tolerant over time. The point at which one 
argues that ordinary intolerant citizens may become more tolerant via participation is the point at 
which the theory of democratic elitism ends and the theory of democratic learning begins. This 
perspective does not make strong claims about the relative merits of participation among tolerant 
and intolerant individuals, but rather calls for greater opportunities for all citizens to engage in 
politics so that they may learn to value those norms, like tolerance, that render liberal democracy 
more effective. In this sense, it is very much the antithesis of the elitist theory. Although it is 
more an explanatory, social scientific theory, than a prescriptive, normative one, democratic 
learning fits squarely with John Stuart Mill’s 1861 essay on Democratic Participation and 
Political Education – and ideas dating back to Aristotle – which maintains that more active 
individuals are better developed citizens than more passive individuals. Much of the empirical 
literature on the tolerance-participation relationship takes the theory of democratic learning as its 
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point of departure: by and large, empiricists’ central preoccupation has been participation as a 
cause, rather than a consequence, of political tolerance. But this work generally seeks to explain 
the level and distribution of tolerance across countries at diverse stages of democratization (e.g. 
Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007) without examining the 
relative merits of tolerance and without tying it to specific political outcomes of interest. The 
theory of democratic learning implicitly acknowledges the importance of tolerance to liberal 
democracy, but does not go beyond the elitist theory by making claims about precisely how it 
matters for democratic politics. 
Scholars by now generally accept that mass political intolerance will not spur political 
repression because public policy does not depend directly on public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 
2000; Stimson 1991). But it does not follow that (in)tolerance is politically irrelevant. Gibson 
(1992b, 2008) therefore pioneered the view that intolerance nevertheless remains highly 
consequential for political culture because widespread mass intolerance limits the freedom to 
self-expression that ordinary people perceive as available to them. Intolerance “contributes to a 
culture of conformity…in which political liberty is limited by intolerance of ordinary citizens” 
(1992b: 339). By implication and by contrast, political tolerance lays the groundwork for an 
expressive society whose members are confident in their political rights and willing, from time to 
time, to assert these rights against the state. Gibson (1992b: 343) demonstrates that “Tolerance of 
others is associated with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own 
political expression”; he asserts that “Tolerance matters because it is connected to a set of beliefs 
about the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression.” These claims have not been widely 
tested. However, they provide important foundations for empirical studies of whether political 
tolerance may in fact spur political participation.  
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The claim that tolerance yields positive benefits for political culture does not exclude the 
possibility that it matters little for public policy. But it contradicts arguments by political 
philosophers from very diverse intellectual traditions, who maintain that tolerance carries 
pernicious consequences for individual citizens and society at large. For the Marxist left, for 
instance, tolerance is “repressive” because it preserves and fortifies minority groups’ subordinate 
social status (e.g. Marcuse 1965; Brown 2006). From this vantage point, governing elites are 
self-serving: they act as a repressive force that refuses recognition to weak groups, keeps strong 
groups in power, and the uninformed public tolerates this intolerance (Wolff, Moore Jr. and 
Marcuse 1965). Brown (2006) echoes this view to argue that tolerance hides “inequality and 
regulation” of political subjects. She believes tolerance represents an act of unwarranted moral 
superiority that, “posing as both universal value and impartial practice, designates certain beliefs 
as civilized and others as barbaric” (7). The culturally conservative right maintains that tolerance 
masks an insidious attack on traditional moral, social, and religious values (e.g. Caldwell 2009; 
Yildiz 2011), such that “in the name of universal liberalism…tolerance [has become] a higher 
priority than any of the traditional preoccupations of state and society – order, liberty, fairness, 
and intelligibility – and came to be pursued at their expense (Caldwell 2009). The New, or Post-
Modernist, Left contends instead that tolerance does not go nearly far enough (e.g. Galeotti 
2002; Griffin 2010; Ramadan 2010). The New Left would move beyond tolerance toward values 
of recognition and respect for difference: “[A]ppeals for the tolerance of others are no longer 
relevant…[because] when we are on equal terms, it is no longer a matter of conceding tolerance, 
but of rising above that and educating ourselves to respect others” (Ramadan 2010: 48). Even 
Millian liberals contend that tolerance violates neutrality, a core precept of liberal governance, 
and may weaken individuals’ autonomy and commitment to their own principles and beliefs 
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(Oberdiek 2001). Their concern is that “we lose that which gives our life meaning and substance. 
We will become jaded and rootless. Tolerance…undermine[s] the solidarity that comes with 
utter commitment to one’s religion, ethnic community, sexuality, and so on” (Oberdiek 2001: 
31). 
The consequences of political tolerance therefore constitute an important theme in 
democratic theory and in several lines of political philosophy. But empirical research has not 
fully sorted through different claims about whether and how tolerance matters. Whereas a 
voluminous literature investigates the determinants, nature, and distribution of tolerance attitudes 
in democratic publics, far less is known about the  political effects of tolerance. This is 
particularly true for the question of whether and how tolerance and participation are linked. Few 
direct tests of this relationship exist, and problems of spuriousness and causal ambiguity persist 
in extant analyses. Whether, and in what ways, tolerant citizens act as participatory custodians of 
liberal democracy in intolerant societies thus remain open questions in the literature. 
As this chapter will clarify, there is little scholarly consensus on the relationship between 
political tolerance and political participation. The literature suggests two broadly divergent 
accounts of the tolerance-behavior linkage. According to what may be called the “syndrome 
account,” a positive association between tolerance and political activity may be explained by 
preexisting differences across tolerant and intolerant individuals. That is, individuals may 
possess a host of demographic and personality traits (e.g. higher education, lower psychological 
insecurity) that render them, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. Much empirical work 
to date falls into this explanatory category since, as noted above, a central question since 
Stouffer’s (1955) original study has been whether participation among ordinary citizens can 
increase tolerance among the mass public. This perspective also challenges the possibility that 
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tolerance is a cause, rather than a consequence, of political activism. By contrast, under what I 
will call the “tradeoff account,” a negative causal association exists between tolerance and 
participation due to differences across tolerant and intolerant attitudes. That is, attitudinal 
properties that tend to suppress political action potential characterize tolerance (e.g. ambivalence, 
inconsistency, and pliability), while intolerance boasts attitudinal properties that tend to catalyze 
political action (e.g. high intensity, consistency, rigidity).  
These broad perspectives point to additional difficulties for the theory of democratic 
elitism (which assumes tolerant activists and intolerant abstainers), undermine support for the 
theory of democratic learning, and question the notion that tolerant activists serve to enhance a 
political culture of self-expression: in brief, the balance of available evidence suggests that 
tolerant citizens may not also be more participatory citizens. And while only a few empirical 
studies investigate tolerance as a predictor of less frequent activism, it remains possible that 
tolerance for others may fundamentally work against participatory democracy in plural societies 
in a manner that supports philosophers’ concern with the detrimental effects of toleration. These 
conjectures compel greater attention to the tolerance-participation relationship; particularly the 
effects of political tolerance on political participation. Therefore, my central objective in the 
remainder of this chapter is to cull clues from the political tolerance literature about the nature of 
its relationship to political participation, and how to conceptualize and model this democratic 
value as a determinant of democratic activism.
3
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 This chapter does not provide a comprehensive intellectual history of the study of 
democratic values in general or political tolerance in particular; high quality summaries already 
exist (e.g. Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999). Nor does it address the political participation 
literature in great detail; I rely heavily on that literature to develop my theory, in the next 
chapter. 
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The sweeping normative criticisms and divergent empirical accounts of the effects of 
political tolerance, which I detail in the next section of this chapter, provide ample reason to 
scrutinize its consequences more carefully – especially its influence on citizens’ political action 
potential. However, I will also lay out the central methodological challenge that hinders scholars’ 
ability to adjudicate between the two accounts of tolerance and participation. These explanations 
remain entangled largely because of spuriousness due to “unobservables”: it is difficult to 
distinguish behavioral effects that are attributable to tolerance judgments per se from effects that 
owe instead to differences across individuals who choose (not) to tolerate. To make this claim 
somewhat more intuitive, I demonstrate, in the fourth section of this chapter, that many of the 
most robust, individual-level predictors of political tolerance may also shape a person’s decisions 
about whether and how to participate in politics.  
2.3 TWO EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
A central tenet of the elitist theory of democracy is that widespread mass intolerance will not 
necessarily threaten democratic viability where the intolerant majority abstains and the tolerant 
majority engages in political activity. Similarly, the salutary effects of tolerance for political 
culture (Gibson 1992b) may manifest themselves in individuals who are less willing to censor 
their own political expression and, presumably, are more willing to participate in politics. 
However, at least two broad perspectives on tolerance and participation can be gleaned from the 
empirical literature, and neither strongly supports the notion of a more participatory tolerant 
citizenry.   
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According to the first view, tolerant citizens may be no more or less likely to participate 
in politics than intolerant citizens. If a positive association between tolerance and political action 
exists, it is only because individuals possess a number of characteristics that simultaneously 
increase their tolerance for nonconformity and their potential for political action. For instance, 
open-minded thinking renders people more willing to accept disagreeable views as valid 
(Sullivan et al. 1982) and more flexible in situations that require collaboration and compromise 
(Gibson 1987), while higher education strengthens citizens’ grasp of democratic norms (Bobo 
and Licari 1989; but see Green et al. 2011) and also increases their engagement in the political 
process (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Positive correlations between tolerance and levels 
of political activism (McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955) should wash out at low levels of education 
and high levels of dogmatism (Sullivan et al. 1982). The relationship is thus doubly conditional. 
It requires the right constellation of individual-level traits, which in turn can develop only in 
contexts where democratic values and institutions are sufficiently rooted in society.  
From this perspective, tolerant individuals are not necessarily more likely to participate in 
politics than intolerant individuals, and neither tolerance nor participation exerts much 
meaningful influence on the other. This view calls into question two challenges to the elitist 
theory of democracy – the first positing that mass tolerance will increase as ordinary citizens are 
afforded more opportunities to participate (e.g. Pateman 1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003); 
the second suggesting that tolerance helps legitimate and perhaps also encourage greater 
participation (Gibson 1992b). In order to answer questions such as whether participation causes 
tolerance, whether tolerance causes participation, or whether some positive feedback loop exists 
whereby these orientations are mutually constitutive, one must first rule out the claim that any 
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positive relationship is spurious due to unobserved differences between tolerant and intolerant 
individuals.  
By contrast, and for quite different reasons, the second view posits that tolerant 
individuals may in fact be less likely to engage in politics than intolerant individuals. Disparities 
in the attitudinal attributes of tolerance and intolerance account for this difference. Tolerance is a 
weak, pliable, and internally inconsistent position (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003; 
Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001) that breeds ambivalence and abstention from political 
activity (Mutz 2005). Intolerance is instead strong, and can be justified with myriad democratic 
beliefs that render it rigid and increase the probability that intolerant individuals will act on 
behalf of their beliefs (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995).  
Attitudes that are held with greater intensity tend to correlate strongly with intentions to 
act in a manner consistent with those attitudes (Petty and Krosnick 1995), which suggests greater 
activity among the intolerant than the tolerant. Not only is tolerance generally weaker than 
intolerance in this regard, but Gibson (1998) also reports that even strong tolerant attitudes are 
susceptible to persuasion to intolerance through counterarguments. Although we still lack 
evidence concerning the strength – hence, behavioral potential – of this “converted intolerance” 
among initially tolerant individuals, the factors that render tolerance pliable are also known to 
decrease the likelihood of political action. Tolerance is pliable to the extent that it is embedded 
within a broader set of democratic beliefs, like equality (Sniderman et al. 1996), and specific 
social goals, like anti-racism (Bleich 2011).
4
 These values and beliefs offer legitimate 
alternatives to tolerance and can be rendered accessible to individuals through counterarguments 
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 Even so, it is important to note that strong tolerant attitudes are generally pliable, regardless of 
their level of crystallization (Gibson 1998). 
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(Gibson 1998). In this sense, tolerance is more dissonant than intolerance. Such value-conflict 
and ambivalence can decrease participatory potential (e.g. Guge and Meffert 1998; Levine 
2001). Mutz (2005), for instance, shows that tolerating diverse political views in one’s social 
network leads to ambivalent political preferences that in turn decrease political activity. 
Moreover, these attitudinal properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” in 
polities as diverse as the United States and Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 
1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003). Therefore, this view conjectures a causal 
relationship between tolerance and participation with few contextual caveats: a direct, negative 
effect of tolerance on civic engagement owing to attitudinal, rather than individual-level, 
asymmetry should therefore hold across countries.  
Hence, two basic and competing propositions emerge from the literature. While the 
classic view posits that greater tolerance and regular participation constitute a syndrome of pro-
democratic orientations (the syndrome account), the modern view holds that greater tolerance 
and regular participation constitute a tradeoff between pro-democratic orientations (the tradeoff 
account). The syndrome account has its foundation in the regular finding that intolerance is far 
more widespread than tolerance, and subsequent debates over what factors – especially education 
and participation – might serve to increase tolerance among future generations of citizens. The 
tradeoff account can be assembled from two newer literatures: studies of the “asymmetry” of 
tolerant and intolerant attitudes – which propose that tolerant attitudes are less likely to compel 
tolerant actions (i.e. actions to uphold the rights of disliked groups) than intolerance will drive 
people to restrict groups’ rights (e.g. Gibson 1998) – and studies of tolerance and political action 
in heterogeneous discussion networks, which find that exposure to diverse political opinions 
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increases tolerance and decreases political participation (Mutz 2005). I address each literature in 
turn, below. 
2.3.1 Evidence for the syndrome account 
Early tolerance research reports positive associations between political tolerance and political 
participation. Comparing responses of community leaders with those of ordinary citizens, 
Stouffer (1955) finds strong relationships between political involvement and support for 
democratic norms. On nearly every question relating to tolerance, community leaders 
demonstrated greater support for civil liberties than the public at large. On an overall scale of 
tolerance, Stouffer reports that about 60 percent of the community leaders could be classified as 
“more tolerant” compared to only 31 percent of ordinary Americans.  
Prothro and Grigg (1960) and McClosky (1964) further argued that intolerant citizens are 
relatively inactive citizens. Prothro and Grigg reassured that “Many people express undemocratic 
principles in response to questioning but are too apathetic to act on their undemocratic opinions 
in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the 
most undemocratic principles are those who are least likely to act” (1960: 293-4). Similarly, 
McClosky (1964) concluded that “Democratic viability is, to begin with, saved by the fact that 
those who are most confused about democratic ideas are also more likely to be politically 
apathetic and without significant influence. Their role in the nation’s decision-making process is 
so small that their ‘misguided’ opinions or non-opinions have little practical consequence for 
stability. If they contribute little to the vitality of the system, neither are they likely to do much 
harm” (376). 
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These arguments offered a glint of hope for democratic societies given an otherwise 
dismal portrait of democratic publics. Prothro and Grigg (1960) had great influence by 
demonstrating that Americans who claimed to hold universal civil liberties in the highest regard 
in fact gave little regard to the rights and liberties of particularly odious groups. This 
inconsistency challenges the suitability of democratic rule by suggesting that democratic publics 
would be hostile to a core democratic obligation.
5
 The elitist theory of democracy emerged in 
part due to these findings (see also: Schumpeter 1943; Converse 1964; Sartori 1987), but so did 
concern with whether and how publics might grow more tolerant over time. The positive 
association between tolerance and participation suggested to some that political tolerance could 
be learned and would increase among individuals who regularly participate in politics. 
This argument is couched in terms of “democratic learning” theory, which suggests that 
citizens become increasingly tolerant as they are more regularly exposed to the give-and-take of 
real democratic politics (e.g. Pateman 1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Political 
participation not only provides such exposure, but should also teach citizens about the value of 
different points of view, the importance of bargaining and compromise, and the utility of civil 
liberties – especially freedom of speech and association (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982: 
196). Insofar as the tolerance-participation relationship has been tested empirically, tolerance has 
been most often conceptualized as a learned value – one to which citizens grow more committed 
as they more regularly participate in politics.  
At least at high levels of policymaking, participation in politics seems to achieve these 
ends. Sullivan et al. (1993) show that debating and generating public policy as a member of 
parliament socializes adults into greater support for the norms of democracy, like tolerance, over 
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 It also suggested that values, as such, have little purchase over actual political judgments.  
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and above the demographic and personality traits that lead individuals to self-select into 
professional political life (and tolerance). These effects, however, are most likely indirect – 
mediated through the enhanced ability to “conduct a realistic assessment of extremist 
groups…[which] may in turn lead to lower levels of perceived threat” (Sullivan et al. 1993: 71). 
Policymakers work closely with strongly opinionated political enemies; this permits elites to 
more readily uncouple feelings of threat from desires to repress the rights and liberties of 
political groups they deem dangerous to society.  
However, this sort of political participation is not available to, much less perceived as 
desirable by, most ordinary citizens (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Sullivan et al. (1993) 
qualify that political participation must be both regular and meaningful: “Sporadic participation 
in electoral politics is not sufficient to promote individual growth or attitudes of tolerance. 
Indeed, the relationship between participation among members of the general public varies from 
context to context and is seldom very strong” (73). To be sure, scholars have struggled to 
substantiate even the basic claim that regular participation per se contributes to greater tolerance 
among ordinary citizens.  
Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) examined tolerance among community leaders and 
ordinary citizens approximately 20 years after Stouffer’s (1955) survey. Their results 
corroborated Stouffer’s findings, with 83 percent of community leaders but only 56 percent of 
ordinary Americans in the Nunn et al. sample emerging as “more tolerant.” The authors 
established an important caveat, however: significant differences between the two groups vanish 
when controls are introduced for education, gender, region, news media exposure, city size, and 
occupation. Jackman (1972) similarly concluded that differences in tolerance between active and 
inactive citizens would wash away after controlling for differences in education.  
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Sullivan et al. (1982) build on this framework and conclude that the relationship between 
participation and tolerance is probably spurious: “political activists tend to be more tolerant 
because they differ from non-activists in other relevant characteristics” (201). In particular, 
education, political information, and dogmatism are important moderating variables in the 
participation-tolerance relationship. To begin, the authors replicate previous research by 
demonstrating that individuals who are more participatory (i.e. those who engaged in at least five 
of the following political actions: contributed money, worked in a campaign, attended meetings 
or rallies, contacted public officials, belonged to political organizations, or voted) are 
substantially more tolerant than the rest of the sample, with 37 percent classifiable as “more 
tolerant” compared to only 12 percent and 17 percent of the low and middle participation 
categories, respectively.
6
  
However, they also report that relationships between education and tolerance are stronger 
than those between participation and tolerance, that levels of tolerance increase more rapidly and 
more steadily moving from the lowest level of education to the highest level of education, and 
that the relationship between dogmatism and tolerance is characterized by similar patterns and 
strength. These patterns seem to overwhelm the influence of participation on political tolerance 
(Sullivan et al. 1982: 197 – 200). The authors’ extended, multivariate analysis finds “that 
political involvement has only minimal impact on political tolerance – the same as political 
ideology – and is not statistically significant” (219). Nor does political involvement influence 
other major predictors of tolerance, such as perceived sociotropic threat or support for the 
general norms of democracy (220). Political involvement therefore appears to lack even indirect 
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 Note that these findings are based on Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus’ (1979) content-controlled 
measurement strategy; hence, their analysis provides an even more conservative test of the 
bivariate relationship between tolerance and participation.  
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effects on political tolerance. The authors conclude that “The greater tolerance of activists seems 
not to reflect participation itself but rather other characteristics of these people. Hence, increased 
participation, in conventional forms of political activity, will probably not make citizens 
significantly more tolerant” (201). 
These conclusions form the core of the syndrome account of tolerance and participation. 
Any positive association between these two democratic orientations is attributable to other 
individual-level factors that render people, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. Such 
confounders present difficulties both for individual-level studies of democratic learning, which 
posit that participation increases mass political tolerance, and also for the proposition that 
tolerance may instead positively influence participation.  
Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003), for instance, seek to identify heterogeneous effects on 
mass tolerance across different modes of participation in politics; they argue that ordinary 
citizens learn to value civil liberties when they themselves engage in protest actions that expose 
them to the “rough-and-tumble” of democratic politics. The authors report that protest 
participation increases political tolerance among individuals in longstanding democracies, 
controlling for the influence of education, psychological conformity (to proxy for dogmatism), 
support for free speech as an abstract value (to proxy for support for broader democratic values 
and procedures), and interest in politics. They deserve much credit for both their cross-national 
study of a largely U.S.-based subject, and also for introducing nuances of the political 
participation literature into their theoretical model (I follow them in both regards in this 
dissertation). Nevertheless, the authors’ analysis and findings remain open to criticism. In 
particular, their study does not adequately account for the central “syndrome” objection: the 
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effects of participation on tolerance may not be attributable to activism per se, but may instead 
owe to underlying factors that could promote both protest behavior and political tolerance.  
Peffley and Rohrschneider introduce “protest activities” (e.g. legal and illegal 
demonstrations, nationwide strikes, and occupation of buildings), as opposed to more 
conventional political actions, as their central explanatory element. But they omit several 
variables from their model that have been shown to increase political tolerance and which may 
also lead individuals to self-select into contentious political activity. For instance, Brehm and 
Rahn (1997) and Benson and Rochon (2004) report on one hand that interpersonal trust is a 
strong predictor of protest behavior insofar as it increases the perception that protest participation 
is safe and worthwhile, reduces uncertainty that there will be a stable base for the movement and 
that it will be likely to succeed. On the other hand, Gibson and Gouws (2000) have shown that, 
to the extent that individuals trust others in general, they may be less likely to develop the 
particularistic group attachments that can give rise to more visceral out-group antipathy, stronger 
perceptions of threat, and greater intolerance. The relationship between tolerance and contentious 
participation that Peffley and Rohrschneider identify may nevertheless remain spurious due to 
one or more unobserved factors for which neither their statistical model nor identification 
strategy accounts. 
Endogeneity also remains problematic in this study and similar analyses by Marquart-
Pyatt and Paxton (2007) and Guérin, Petry and Crête (2004), which model tolerance as a 
consequence of democratic learning through participation. First, tolerance is among the most 
difficult democratic values to learn (e.g. Gibson and Duch 1993). Sullivan et al. (1993) 
emphasize that such learning is only likely to occur through participation if activism is regular 
and intense – as it is commonly among policymakers, but not among rank-and-file citizens. 
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Recent evidence from a field experiment designed to increase tolerance through specialized 
educational curricula (shaped specifically to increase knowledge about the nature and value of 
civil liberties) reports no direct effects of this training on support for the actual political rights 
and civil liberties of others (Green et al. 2011). These curricula did increase knowledge about 
civil libertarian principles; learning did occur. But this learning did not translate into tolerance. 
This finding, then, lends further support to the fact that even citizens who (learn) to value civil 
liberties in the abstract are often unwilling to afford these liberties and political rights to their 
most disliked groups in practice (e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960).  
Second, Gibson (1992b) finds that tolerance is connected in individuals’ minds to the 
perception that they are free to express their own political views (however unpopular these may 
be) and is tied, at least as a bivariate association, to less frequent self-censorship in political 
expression. Assuming a positive relationship between tolerance and participation is not spurious 
requires allowing for the possibility that tolerant attitudes can influence political behavior rather 
than the reverse. Indeed, the standardized coefficients in Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) 
illustrate that participation has only a weak effect tolerance – especially outside the U.S. – while 
Guérin, Petry and Crête (2004) conclude that the relationship between tolerance and protest 
activities may in fact be reciprocal (390).
7
 
Even fully accounting for syndrome-type confounders, the theory of democratic learning 
does not confront the possibility that tolerance may more powerfully influence participation than 
vice versa, or that some positive feedback loop exists whereby these democratic orientations are 
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 Guérin, Petry, and Crête do not resolve the question of reciprocal causality; their claims – while 
certainly plausible – are based on a poor modeling strategy in which tolerance is first regressed 
onto participation and then participation onto tolerance using similar predictors in both multiple 
regressions with OLS estimators. Proper, multiple-wave panel data designed to test reciprocal 
causality between tolerance and participation are not currently available.  
 39 
mutually dependent. But no study to date has properly addressed the problem of unobserved 
confounders behind the tolerance-participation association. The syndrome account therefore 
should not be dismissed.  
However, an alternate model of the tolerance participation is also available – one in 
which tolerance helps to predict participation, rather than the reverse, because of its attitudinal 
attributes instead of the individual-level traits particular to tolerant individuals. These models, 
which I collectively call the “tradeoff account” of tolerance and participation, derive from two 
bodies of recent empirical work. The first reveals that tolerance and intolerance are not opposite 
poles on the same attitudinal continuum, but are rather characterized by unique psychometric 
properties that imply different consequences for political behavior. The second ties tolerance to 
heterogeneous political discussion networks and less overall political participation. I address 
each literature below. 
2.3.2 Evidence for the tradeoff account 
Recent research suggests that tolerance may in fact decrease political participation. In 
particular, citizens may base their choice to engage in politics not only on notions of duty to their 
democratic society, but also on particular sensitivities within their personal social networks. 
Mutz (2001, 2005) reports that individuals whose social networks are characterized by greater 
diversity of political opinion – that is, whose members hold views and preferences about politics 
that diverge from their own – more readily acknowledge that disagreeable opinions can be valid 
and are, hence, more attitudinally tolerant. However, this increase in tolerance may come at a 
cost to vibrant civic engagement. The same cross-pressures that lead one to entertain greater 
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opinion diversity may also generate conditions that suppress political action potential (Mutz 
2002, 2005).  
Increasing exposure to different political views generates ambivalence about one’s own 
convictions, which in turn has been associated with less certain political judgments (Guge and 
Meffert 1998), delayed formation of voting intentions, and unstable candidate evaluations 
(Lavine 2001). Moreover, Mutz (2005) argues that individuals who tolerate greater diversity of 
opinion will experience discomfort if they manifest their own preferences through political 
action, because they risk disrupting social harmony in their own networks. It is common for 
“those with high levels of cross-cutting exposure in their networks to put off political decisions 
as long as possible or indefinitely, thus making their political participation unlikely” (Mutz 2005: 
108). The fact that individuals in such networks are “socially accountable” to diversely 
opinionated constituencies generates ambivalence regarding political preferences, which further 
suppresses political action potential. Although individuals acquire sensitivity toward 
disagreeable views through discussion and deliberation, they are not necessarily more likely to 
participate in politics thereafter.  
Certain properties of attitudinal tolerance may also directly constrain political action 
potential among tolerant individuals. Investigations into the nature and pliability of tolerance 
attitudes reveal considerable asymmetry between tolerance and intolerance. Tolerance and 
intolerance are no longer understood merely as opposite poles on the same attitudinal continuum; 
they are rather separate attitudes with distinct underlying properties (Gibson 2006). For instance, 
intolerance is generally a more intensely felt position than tolerance. Intolerance is highly 
responsive to “sociotropic threat,” which makes political intolerance, in Gibson’s (2006) words, 
“a social, not individual attitude…Intolerance increases not necessarily when people feel their 
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own security is at risk, but rather when they perceive a threat to the larger system or group (or 
normative community) of which they are a part” (25). Such commitments are deeply sensed and 
more easily intuited than principled commitment to liberal democratic norms like tolerance in the 
face of such threats. Moreover, tolerance is generally out of sync with other cherished 
democratic values. For many people, it is psychologically easier to reconcile intolerance (i.e. 
repressing a threat to democracy) with support for the democratic system; public order and 
security are legitimate concerns for political stability, for instance, especially in fragile new 
democracies. It is also easier to square political intolerance with liberal social norms to which 
many (western) publics now subscribe – anti-racism, women’s rights, secularism, etc. 
(Sniderman et al. 1996). Tolerance, by contrast, generally conflicts with these value 
commitments. Indeed, Gibson (1998) reports that individuals who cannot align their tolerance 
judgments with their broader beliefs about democratic institutions and processes are more 
persuaded to abandon their tolerance for intolerance (837).
8
 This asymmetry between tolerance 
and intolerance has been evinced in contexts as diverse as the United States and Canada (Gibson 
1996; Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 
2003).  
The unequal psychometric properties of tolerance and intolerance suggest that these 
attitudes will carry different consequences for political behavior. Strong attitudes tend to be 
stronger predictors of behavior than weak attitudes (Petty and Krosnick 1995). Attitudinal 
tolerance, which is not only weaker than intolerance, but also more ambivalent and inconsistent 
with other democratic beliefs (Sniderman et al. 1996) should produce less attitude-consistent 
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 Gibson also reports that tolerant attitudes are more readily convertible into intolerant attitudes 
in general: irrespective of their level of internal crystallization (1998: 837). 
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behavior than intolerance (Gibson 1998; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001). More pointedly, 
this means that tolerance may not only lead individuals to disengage from political participation 
in general (Mutz 2005), but it may also be unlikely to drive political action on behalf of groups 
whose rights society prefers to repress. Attitudinal intolerance – which is strong, internally 
consistent, and rigid – is by contrast more likely to produce attitude-consistent behavior. 
Intolerant attitudes will more likely lead individuals to take direct action to repress the rights of 
nonconformist minority groups than tolerance will compel action to protect those groups’ rights 
(Marcus et al. 1995). 
Beyond this, tolerance is often understood as a “laissez faire” judgment (McClosky and 
Brill 1983).
9
 Gibson (1987) describes the low rate of activism among tolerant individuals during 
a real civil liberties dispute in Houston, as highly regular: the tolerant course of action is to do 
nothing. This has intuitive appeal for Marcus et al. (1995) who posit that people who are 
intolerant of a group and its beliefs “…will act to limit or restrain the group’s rights. In essence, 
people hate the group, do not want it to spread its message, so do what they can to keep the 
group from espousing its hated doctrine. Tolerance, however, is different. The behavioral 
component of tolerance is often considered inherently passive: we will not take steps to prevent 
the group from doing what it is legally allowed to do” (205). 
Marcus et al. (1995) take important steps toward evidencing this claim. Using a survey-
experimental design, the authors first measure respondents’ tolerance toward a hypothetical, but 
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 This view certainly pre-dates empirical tolerance research. As George Washington’s oft-quoted 
letter to the Hebrew Congregation at Newport in August 1790 makes plain, “the Government of 
the United States…gives to bigotry no sanction [but] to persecution no assistance.” 
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vile group (e.g. a fictitious organization of white supremacists),
10
 given varying levels of 
threatening or reassuring information that the researchers randomly provide about that group. 
Respondents are coded as “tolerant” when they would allow this particular group to hold public 
rallies, and “intolerant” if they would not allow rallies by this group. Subjects were then asked 
about their intent to act on behalf of, or in opposition to, the hypothetical group’s right to hold a 
rally. Based on their responses to the tolerance question, subjects imagined that “a local judge 
issued an order forbidding (tolerant response)/allowing (intolerant response) that group to hold 
a public rally in your community” and were asked “How likely do you think you would be to… 
1) vote against the judge in the next election; 2) join a peaceful demonstration supporting/against 
their right to hold a public rally; 3) join an effort to appeal that decision and try to reverse it; 4) 
sign a petition objecting to the judge’s decision. The authors summed responses to these items to 
create a behavioral intentions scale.  
A one-way between groups analysis of variance showed that intolerant respondents 
expressed significantly greater intention to act to restrict the group’s rights than tolerant 
respondents did intention to defend the group’s rights (Marcus et al.1995: 191). Intolerant 
individuals are more likely to act in accordance with their beliefs as the intensity of their 
intolerance increases. Tolerant action, by contrast, is conditional on intense commitment to 
democratic principles and tolerance, and assurance that the noxious group does not pose a real 
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 Marcus et al. retain the content-controlled measurement approach by generating fictitious 
counterparts for each of the real life groups that respondents could select as their least-liked 
group. For instance, respondents who selected the “Ku Klux Klan” as their least-liked group 
confronted a civil liberties scenario involving the fictitious “White Supremacist Faction” which 
was described as “an extremist group that evolved from the Ku Klux Klan of the 1980s.” Of 
course, this direct reference to the actual group in the fictitious group’s description probably 
weakens the experiment’s internal validity in the very manner that using hypothetical groups was 
meant to prevent in the first place (p. 68).  
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threat to the community (204-5). As the authors hypothesized, it takes much more to compel the 
tolerant citizen to act. 
These results suggest that tolerance may directly suppress political action, though I 
suspect that omitted variable bias plays a nontrivial role in shaping the authors’ findings. The 
central behavioral intentions question invites respondents to oppose a local judge who issued the 
order to permit or ban the hypothetical demonstration. This question therefore introduces 
“political trust” as a potential confounder. Judges and courts in general enjoy high levels of 
public legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson 1992) - greater than that afforded any other office in the 
United States (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Individuals who support a heinous group’s right 
to demonstrate – or, as McClosky (1964: 376) might put it, individuals who are least confused 
about democratic ideas – may also be more likely to accept the legitimacy of a court-issued ban 
on that group’s rally. Intolerant individuals who reject tolerance on principle may more quickly 
and more strongly question the legitimacy of institutions or political actors who put their 
community at risk. This is necessarily an empirical question, but one that cannot be resolved 
with the authors’ data. Moreover, the authors omit important predictors of political action 
propensity in general – such as past political participation, education, political interest, and other 
key determinants of civic voluntarism (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Finally, 
behavioral intentions measures are by no means always strong predictors of actual political 
behavior (Aronson 1999; Cooper 2007).  
Evidence from survey-based case studies of tolerant and intolerant individuals’ self-
reported action on their beliefs demonstrates the importance of such factors. Gibson and 
Bingham (1985) and Gibson (1987) surveyed citizens involved in real civil liberties disputes 
over the proposed march by Neo Nazis in Skokie, IL and a planned demonstration by the Ku 
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Klux Klan in a gay community in Houston, TX, respectively. In both cases, intolerant individuals 
were generally more likely to take action to oppose these right-wing groups’ speech and 
assembly rights than tolerant individuals were to take action to protect those rights. Yet the 
percentage of “activists” on either side of the dispute was rather small. In Houston, only four 
percent (10 of 235) of members of the Houston Gay Political Caucus reported that they took any 
action to support the KKK’s right to demonstrate. A higher proportion of intolerant individuals – 
16 percent – mobilized to stop the KKK from demonstrating. Similarly, Gibson and Bingham 
(1985) found that the percentage of “tolerant activists” was small compared to the number of 
intolerant participants.  
For both tolerant and intolerant individuals, (in)tolerant behavior emerged as a function 
of issue salience, a general propensity toward activism (predicted by high education and low 
dogmatism), and expectation of violence at the rally (Gibson 1987). Intolerant activists in 
Houston were also less trustful individuals, which may suggest that omitted variable bias is 
indeed problematic for the Marcus et al. (1995) study. Importantly, Gibson (1987) identified 
certain “contradictions” in his data. He notes that “Though open-mindedness, activism, and 
education typically contribute to political tolerance, when subjects have intolerant opinions, 
these variables facilitate the translation of opinions into intolerant action” (1987: 444). This 
appears consistent with the tradeoff account. However, dogmatic thinkers were found to be more 
likely to oppose the demonstration, but also less likely to take action against it. Gibson alludes to 
the syndrome account when he concludes that “dogmatism is associated with intolerance, but 
also with inaction. Those who are dogmatic thinkers are probably too rigid to be able to work 
with others in political causes. Thus, dogmatism promotes the political paralysis of the 
politically intolerant” (Gibson 1987: 444 – 5, emphasis in original). These tensions in Gibson’s 
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data suggest additional need to adjudicate between tradeoff and syndrome accounts of tolerance 
and participation.  
The “tradeoff account” of tolerance and participation suggests that certain properties of 
tolerance work against political activism, while the rather distinct features of intolerance promote 
it. Tolerance is a more conflicted, pliable, and ambivalent attitude than intolerance, and is hence 
characterized by less attitude-behavior consistency. Moreover, tolerance for others is the 
lynchpin of diverse political discussion networks; but tolerant individuals also tend to forego 
civic engagement to preserve harmony in these networks.  
But the direct effects of tolerance on participation remain cloudy. We have seen that 
Marcus et al. (1995) attempt to isolate the effects of tolerance on activism, but they do not 
effectively control for those individual-level factors that Gibson (1987) and others (Sullivan et al. 
1982) find to drive one to tolerate and also take action (e.g. low dogmatism, high education). 
Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) design is characterized by similar shortcomings. These 
objections form the core of the “syndrome account” of tolerance and participation. Ultimately, 
these divergent syndrome and tradeoff explanations suggest that the most basic question remains 
unresolved: What are the consequences of political tolerance for political participation? The next 
section argues that difficult empirical and methodological problems must be resolved before we 
can redress this question. 
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2.4 METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES IN STUDYING THE BEHAVIORAL 
EFFECTS OF TOLERANCE 
Clarifying whether and how judgments about the civil liberties of others matter for one’s own 
political participation requires careful attention to the difficulties of causal inference. 
Empirically, extant research does not separate the behavioral effects of tolerant and intolerant 
attitudes from effects that owe instead to differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. 
This interconnectedness is particularly pernicious because, as I argue below, many of the same 
factors that contribute to political (in)tolerance also help to determine how likely individuals are 
to participate in politics and society. To demonstrate this claim, I summarize the effects of 
several variables on both political tolerance and political participation in the following sections. 
Psychological Insecurity  
Psychological insecurity - manifest mainly in low self-esteem, authoritarianism, and a 
tendency toward dogmatic thinking - is a major predictor of political intolerance. Individuals 
who are insecure and who interpret the world in bipolar terms of good and evil tend to be 
intolerant of nonconformity because their rigid thought processes render uncertainty difficult to 
confront, and increase the likelihood that perceived threat will activate intolerant attitudes 
(Feldman and Stenner 1997).  Stouffer (1955) initially found that individuals who support rigid 
categorization as well as authoritarian and conformist childrearing values tend to be intolerant 
toward communists and atheists. More generally, Stenner (2005) demonstrates that various kinds 
of intolerance originate from authoritarianism and intolerance is reinforced by a perceived 
“normative” or societal threat that consists of diverse goals and values. Hinckley (2010) has also 
demonstrated that psychological insecurity manifest through authoritarianism inhibits social 
learning and the acquisition of democratic values such as political tolerance. Finally, Gibson and 
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Duch (1993: 292) add that “Insecurity may also be connected to diminished cognitive skills, and 
virtually everyone is in agreement that tolerance is extremely demanding cognitively (e.g. 
McClosky and Brill 1983).”  
Psychological insecurity has also been tied to political participation. Sniderman (1975) 
catalogues myriad ways in which high self-esteem (i.e. low psychological insecurity) serves to 
facilitate political involvement. Compared to individuals with low self-esteem, those with high 
self-esteem are more attentive to political communications, better able to understand political 
messages, more knowledgeable about politics, and ultimately “more likely to have internalized 
the modal values of the political culture” (Sniderman 1975). Beyond these indirect influences on 
political action potential, high self-esteem exerts a direct effect on participation because it better 
prepares individuals for involvement in political life. Sniderman argues that “to become involved 
in politics is to become involved with others…Political life is social life. What is more, it is a 
species of social life that demands a considerable measure of self-consciousness and 
assertiveness. It throws a man into close contact with other men, including men who are 
unfamiliar to him, differ considerably from him, whose motives may be hostile or – much more 
frequently – unfathomable.” (1975: 261-2). Sniderman reports that individuals with high self-
esteem are more participatory than individuals with low self-esteem, and that these differences 
are largely driven by disparities in interpersonal competence.  
Similarly, psychologically insecure individuals who manifest low self-esteem, dogmatism 
or authoritarianism may be less likely to engage in specific types of political behavior. Gibson 
(1987: 444) reports that dogmatic thinking increases intolerance, but decreases the likelihood of 
action on behalf of those beliefs because rigid thinking limits one’s ability to work well with 
others in pursuit of political objectives. Moreover, psychological insecurity may increase one’s 
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desire to avoid conflict with others and thereby limit in face-to-face and contentious actions, 
such as political discussion and protest (Ulbig and Funk 1999). Thus there is ample reason to 
expect that psychological insecurity may at least partially account for any positive relationship 
found between tolerance and participation. 
Support for General Democratic Values 
Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), Sullivan et al. (1985), Gibson (2002) and many 
others have found that commitments to abstract democratic norms and procedures – e.g. a 
general commitment to civil liberties, support for multiparty competition and pluralistic media – 
are fairly strong predictors of citizens’ willingness to extend rights and liberties toward their 
least-liked political group. Support for such abstract democratic principles has been tied both 
directly and indirectly to political participation in emerging and longstanding democratic 
societies. Examining mass opposition to the Soviet Putsch of 1991, Gibson (1997) concludes that 
active resistance to the coup through protest was a function of support for democratic institutions 
and processes, and that this effect operated independently of several common causes of protest 
participation – including the perceived success of protest opposition, the perceived importance of 
one’s own contribution to the protest effort, and other selective incentives and concrete costs 
behind taking action. Similarly, Smith (2009) finds that support for representative government 
tends to increase protest activity among Bolivians. 
Beyond broad system support and legitimacy, specific democratic values have also been 
tied to political activism. Benson and Rochon (2004) report that generalized social trust – a well-
accepted element of democratic political culture (e.g. Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993) – facilitates 
protest participation insofar as it acts as an exogenous influence on key determinants of the 
choice to act, including the expectation of low expected costs and high expected benefits of 
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participation. Brehm and Rahn (1997) also find that civic engagement and interpersonal trust are 
in a tight reciprocal relationship.  
Democracy promotion programs have also been shown to influence political participation 
by “teaching” democratic values where they are undersupplied (Finkel 2003). In a series of 
studies, Finkel and colleagues report that individuals who are exposed to civic education 
workshops in developing democracies in Africa and Latin America become the “de facto experts 
on democratic processes within their social networks” (Finkel and Smith 2010: 420) and as a 
result increase their own participation in politics and that of their close contacts (Finkel and 
Smith 2010; Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012). These patterns again point to 
spuriousness as a central impediment to isolating   the effects of tolerance on participation, as 
both may depend upon support for broader democratic norms and procedures.   
Threat Perceptions 
It is nearly axiomatic that individuals who perceive greater threat from their political 
opponents are also less likely to tolerate them. The threat that drives intolerance is sociotropic, 
not egocentric: intolerance is a response to perceived challenges to the society and its way of life, 
but not anticipated peril to the individual. Moreover, sociotropic threat perceptions are largely 
exogenous to other determinants of tolerance attitudes. Hence, citizens who believe that a group 
poses danger to their society and its mores will be less likely to tolerate it, even if they are open-
minded thinkers who generally embrace democratic norms and processes.  
According to Gibson (2006), that “sociotropic threat is a stronger driver of intolerance 
than egocentric threat…says something about the nature of political intolerance. Political 
intolerance is a social, not individual, attitude” (25). It also says something about the 
participatory potential of intolerant individuals. Self-interest fails to predict attitudes in many 
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issue areas (Sears and Funk 1990; Stoker 1994). But threats to social group interests have a 
stronger effect on behavior than attitudes. This may be the result of policy proposals that directly 
spur political activity by highlighting the potential for loss (Campbell 2003; Hansen 1985; 
Walker 1991), or political environments that indirectly encourage activism when they “trigger 
feelings of anxiety that in turn motivate people to more closely monitor political affairs” (Pantoja 
and Segura 2003). Marcus et al. (2000) posit a theory of “affective intelligence” in which people 
expressing feelings of anxiety during political campaigns display greater interest in the contest, 
care more about the political outcome, and more actively follow media coverage of the 
campaign. In short, a context where individuals perceive threat will induce anxious people to 
engage in activities that raise their overall levels of political awareness and, indirectly, their 
political participation. To the extent that threat perceptions also strongly influence tolerance, it 
becomes difficult to rule out that a relationship between tolerance and civic engagement cannot 
be attributed to underlying concerns about groups at the center of civil liberties disputes. 
Demographic Factors  
Education is among the most cited demographic factors believed to increase attitudes of 
tolerance among the mass public. Bobo and Licari (1989) find evidence for their rather 
straightforward argument is that education increases cognitive sophistication Stouffer (1955) was 
optimistic that tolerance would increase over time, in part because of the increasing years of 
education younger cohorts were receiving. Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) replication study 
reported slightly stronger effects of education on tolerance Davis’ (1975) study noted that 
increasing levels of education contributed 4 percent to the overall change of 22 percent in 
tolerance between Stouffer’s survey in 1954 and Nunn, Crockett and Williams’ replication in 
1971. Others have argued that education also increases the consistency of application of general 
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democratic principles in concrete situations. Prothro and Grigg (1960) argued that education 
“provides greater acquaintance with the logical implications of broad democratic principles” 
(291). Lawrence (1976) found that the highly educated were more likely to apply general norms 
of tolerance to groups they disliked.  
However other evidence challenges the notion that education carries salutary effects for 
political tolerance. Some argue that schooling and the educational process are ineffective at 
passing on democratic values (Bowles and Gintis 1976). Zellman and Sears (1971) conclude that 
political socialization of attitudes toward the specific civil liberty of free speech does occur in 
late childhood, but that school children are taught the abstract principle only in slogan form. 
Even stronger evidence is provided by Green et al. (2011), who test the effect of scholastic 
curricula designed to teach the value of civil libertarian norms explicitly by randomly assigning 
school students to receive this instruction or a control curricula which does not emphasize civil 
liberties. They find that exposure to the curriculum indeed increased individuals’ knowledge but 
that this knowledge had no effect on actual support for civil liberties.  
Scholars have found more consistent evidence that education increases political action 
potential. Education and its augmenting effect on cognitive sophistication and the inculcation of 
cultural mores tends is a primary “resource” enabling participation in political life (Teixeira 
1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). These effects are 
direct and indirect. In school, students acquire communication and organization skills, as well as 
perhaps an interest in politics. Level of education has a strong influence on the type of 
occupation one will have, which in turn determines the type of civic skills one will use and hone, 
the type of social networks in which one will mingle, and the degree of free time one will have at 
her disposal (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  
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These effects, moreover, have been demonstrated across most political contexts. Even 
basic education – such as literacy and numeracy skills – increases the likelihood that one will 
engage in politics through many of the modes of action available to them (on Senegal, see 
Kuenzi 2006). Indeed, this has been the major conclusion of research on civic education in 
developing democracies (Finkel 2003, 2006; Finkel, Sabbatini and Bevis 2000; Finkel and Smith 
2010; Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012), which consistently reports upticks in political 
engagement among those individuals who attend brief but intensive civic education workshops. 
Overall, the balance of evidence suggests that education serves to increase both tolerance and 
participation and may therefore account for any relationship between these two democratic 
orientations.  
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The conclusions to be drawn from extant research on tolerance and participation do not quite 
satisfy the normative prescription that tolerant citizens should also be more participatory citizens. 
If a positive association between these two democratic orientations exists, it is only because 
individuals possess a number of demographic and personality traits that render them 
simultaneously more tolerant and more participatory. Alternatively, tolerance itself may suppress 
political action potential.  
Neither account supports the elitist theory of democracy, which posits that tolerant 
activists shield liberal democracy from intolerant majorities and weaken their contributions to 
public policy outcomes via more regular participation. And the tradeoff account bodes especially 
ill for liberal political culture. Gibson (1992b: 350) warns that “without a culture that legitimizes 
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political opposition, those outside the centrist mainstream have few political systems. Ultimately, 
the political system loses its democratic vitality.” Widespread mass intolerant opinion corrodes 
this culture, and the tradeoff account suggests that tolerance lacks the potential to stimulate – and 
may even suppress – the sort of activism that could repair it. Moreover, scholars positing a 
positive relationship between tolerance and participation give little attention to the possibility 
that tolerance shapes participation rather than the reverse. The democratic learning theory does 
not squarely confront the fact that it tolerance is extremely difficult to learn, or evidence that 
citizens who learn to embrace democratic norms in principle may never actually apply them to 
odious groups in practice.  
But the behavioral consequences of political tolerance remain obscure. The overlap in 
factors that generate tolerance and contribute to political action potential poses a difficult 
challenge to identifying the effects of political tolerance judgments on civic engagement. 
Consistent with the syndrome account, the standard determinants of tolerance tend to increase 
participation while the classic drivers of intolerance reduce civic engagement. But in line with 
the tradeoff account, the main predictor of intolerance – sociotropic threat perceptions – may 
also tend to compel political action.  
On one hand, specialized methodological techniques are needed to better separate the 
effects of tolerance judgments per se on participation from effects that may owe instead to 
factors that drive individuals to (not) tolerate in the first place. In other words, we must isolate 
tolerance decisions in order to determine whether tolerance affects behavior over and above the 
major predictors of civic engagement. Chapter Four of this dissertation applies nonparametric 
matching techniques to survey data to approximate this with observational data. And Chapters 
Five and Six introduce and apply an innovative experiment that enhances our ability to draw 
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scientifically valid causal inferences about the downstream effects of tolerance and intolerance 
for political participation. 
On the other hand, it is also important to push theoretically beyond the syndrome and 
tradeoff accounts of political participation. Both offer insights into how tolerance does or does 
not matter for the likelihood that individuals will engage in politics. But neither generally 
predicts how people choose to participate. Different modes of civic engagement require unique 
resources and motivations; tolerant and intolerant citizens may not only differ in terms of the 
resources that determine which actions they can take, but also on attitudinal dimensions that 
condition which actions they are willing to take. Hence, Chapter Three culls from the political 
participation literature propositions about whether and in what ways tolerance for political 
minorities stimulates, suppresses, or is largely irrelevant to political action potential. 
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3.0  THE COSTS-CONSISTENCY THEORY OF TOLERANCE AND 
PARTICIPATION 
This chapter proposes an alternative theory of whether and how political tolerance matters for 
political participation. It begins with the well-established proposition that different modes of 
participation pose unique barriers to action and individuals require diverse sets of resources, 
motivations, interests, and dispositions to overcome them. It then elaborates how practicing 
tolerance can influence these barriers to action independently of the classic predictors of civic 
engagement. The central claim is that tolerance renders individuals more likely to engage in 
contentious and collective forms of action, but has comparatively little effect on the propensity to 
participate in conventional, individual modes of civic engagement. It argues that applied 
tolerance judgments cultivate individuals’ perceptions of freedom and support for dissent, and 
reduce conflict aversion among tolerant individuals relative to intolerant individuals. Through 
this mechanism, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress independently 
raises the likelihood of participation in social modes of action in which the risk of disagreement 
and conflict with other citizens is high, but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in 
which disagreement and dissent are unlikely. Finally, this chapter also proposes caveats based 
on the political context in which political participation takes place. In particular, it suggests 
substantial differences in the tolerance-participation relationship across countries at diverse 
stages of democratization.  
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is little scholarly consensus over whether and how political tolerance and political 
participation are linked. The previous chapter gleaned two distinct perspectives from the 
literature; both run counter to the classic ideal of tolerant activists as custodians of liberal 
democracy. According to the “tradeoff account,” tolerance has the ability to suppress political 
action potential (Mutz 2005). According to the “syndrome account,” tolerance and participation 
are not at all directly related democratic orientations (Jackman 1975; Sullivan et al. 1982).  
Divergent explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship remain entangled for at 
least two reasons. On one hand, it is particularly difficult to rule out spuriousness because many 
of the personality and demographic attributes that shape toleration also tend to influence 
participation. The methodological challenge is how to distinguish behavioral consequences of 
tolerant and intolerant judgments from effects that owe to other characteristics of tolerant and 
intolerant individuals. I address this issue in Chapters Five and Six. On the other hand, past 
“tradeoff” investigations into the tolerance-participation may obscure heterogeneous effects of 
tolerance across different modes of action because political participation is not a unidimensional 
concept (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), while 
democratic learning accounts struggle to overcome “syndrome” style objections and have not 
fully examined the possibility that tolerance may generate participation, rather than the reverse. 
The theoretical challenge is how to connect what we know about the nature of tolerance 
judgments to what we know about the nature of different forms of political engagement to 
conceptualize toleration as a contributor to participation.  
Toward that end, Gibson (1992b) provides an important point of departure. Gibson 
suggests that tolerance for political expression by unpopular minorities may itself influence how 
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individuals calculate the potential costs associated with their own political activism. He reports 
that tolerance and intolerance are closely tied to perceptions of what he calls “political freedom”: 
the belief that one may express her views – particularly anti-majoritarian views – without fear of 
government retribution or constraint. Not only do tolerant individuals perceive greater political 
freedom than intolerant individuals, but they are also less likely to self-censor their own political 
expression. Gibson maintains that “tolerance is associated with the belief that there are few 
significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” (1992b: 343, emphasis added); 
however, the microfoundations of this relationship remain understudied.   
This chapter connects tolerance and participation in terms of the social costs they pose to 
individuals as political actors. I will argue that tolerance is often a riskier and less socially 
desirable decision than intolerance, and will build a case for why individuals who bear nontrivial 
social costs to enable political expression by widely disliked others will be less likely to perceive 
social barriers to their own political action. I will draw on social psychological theories of 
consistency to argue that tolerance can facilitate engagement in “public” modes of action, which 
are cooperative and contentious in nature, but may have little influence on “private” forms of 
participation, which are not. Two microfoundations of this connection are possible. 
First, individuals’ behavioral consistency across one situation to another is associated 
with similarities in those situations (Furr and Funder 2003) and may account for a direct effect of 
tolerance on participation. Tolerant citizens likely confront disagreement, conflict, and other 
social costs when they uphold the rights of groups that are generally reviled and perceived as 
dangerous to political stability or social integrity. Like tolerance, public activism is also a high-
cost enterprise: individuals who join protests, attend rallies, or sign petitions, challenge the status 
quo through non-anonymous or face-to-face means and expose themselves to the possibility of 
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disagreement, criticism, and conflict. Private actions, like voting or donating, come with few 
such costs. To the extent that the social costs of tolerance are similar to the social costs of public 
participation, practicing tolerance may increase the tolerant individuals’ propensity for 
contentious and collective action.  
Second, cognitive consistency may account for an indirect effect of tolerance on public 
participation. Tolerance is known to be a more internally conflicted position than intolerance 
because tolerant individuals usually also embrace alternate values like equality, beliefs like anti-
racism, or concerns with public order and security that may “trump” tolerance (Gibson 1998). On 
its own, value-conflict of this sort may impede political action potential (e.g. Peffley, Knigge and 
Hurwitz 2001). However, such inconsistency also has the potential to produce a distressing 
psychological state that individuals are motivated to rectify by aligning their beliefs with their 
actions (Festinger 1957; Cooper and Fazio 1984; Cooper 2007). To the extent that tolerance is a 
more dissonant position than intolerance (Gibson 2006), tolerant individuals may develop or 
enhance corollary attitudes – such as perceived political freedom, support for dissent, and risk 
acceptance – that are consonant with the application of democratic principles to unsavory groups 
and which, in turn, facilitate contentious activism. Unlike more conventional forms of action, the 
social costs of public, contentious activism are generally not mitigated by resources like 
education or income, but rather by positive orientations toward risk (Kam 2011) and conflict 
(Hayes et al. 2005; Ulbig and Funk 1999). People who are generally acceptant of risk and 
conflict will attribute less weight to the costs of collective and contentious action when deciding 
whether to engage in politics than individuals who are risk and conflict averse. As a by-product 
of retrieving cognitive consistency after extending rights to highly unpopular groups, tolerance 
may yield psychic benefits that indirectly raise the likelihood of participation in public modes of 
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action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government 
authorities is high (e.g. protests, boycotts, rallies, petitioning). But it may do little to facilitate 
individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting, 
donating) and whose costs to action can be overcome largely by material resources and political 
interest – over which tolerance carries little plausible influence.  
Whether effects of tolerance on participation exist, and whether these may be 
characterized as “direct” effects” due to behavioral consistency across situations or as “indirect 
effects” facilitated by attitudinal by-products of preserving cognitive consistency, are the 
empirical questions I address in Chapters Four and Six. This chapter’s central theoretical claim is 
that individuals who incur nontrivial costs to protect the expressive rights of others will be less 
likely to perceive costs in their own political expression. I aim to establish this claim in three 
steps. The next section provides a framework for my arguments; I discuss varieties of 
participatory acts, differentiate them by the “social costs” they pose to potential participants, and 
identify factors scholars believe facilitate engagement in different modes of participation. I then 
merge findings from recent research into the social psychological determinants of participation 
with Gibson’s account of tolerance and perceived freedom and elements of consistency theories 
in social psychology to generate expectations about the micro-level relationship between 
tolerance and political action. Finally, I consider what macro-level factors could also shape how 
individuals perceive barriers to action across different types of democracies and establish 
predictions concerning whether and where tolerance may stimulate, suppress, or have no effect 
on political participation. I conclude by discussing the particular case countries on which I will 
base the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
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3.2 A POINT OF DEPARTURE: MODES OF PARTICIPATION AND THEIR 
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS 
There are several means through which individuals can communicate their interests, preferences, 
or demands to policymakers. Scholars generally accept that these acts are not interchangeable. 
Rather, they are “different in terms of the motivations of the acts, different in terms of the 
processes that bring people to activity, different in terms of the consequences of the acts” (Verba, 
Nie and Kim 1971: 10).  
Different forms of political action therefore attract citizens with unique motivations and 
disparate sets of resources, skills and mobilization networks. And individuals tend to prefer 
certain forms of actions over others, sometimes with little or no overlap (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Dalton 2008). One important reason for this grouping is that political expression requires more 
than strong issue preferences; it also obliges citizens to face down certain barriers to action that 
each form of expression entails. In particular, how citizens choose to act (i.e. which barriers they 
deem surmountable) may depend on whether individuals believe that conflict and cooperation 
are bearable costs of action.  
According to Verba, Nie and Kim (1971: 14), “The conflict dimension [of participation] 
refers to the extent to which individuals are opposed by counterparticipants (sic). The 
cooperative dimension refers to the extent to which they work along with others.” These factors 
generally enhance the difficulty of performing certain political actions because they introduce 
additional considerations into individuals’ decisions about whether and how to participate in 
politics. Whereas political interest and free time may compel someone to vote, protesting 
requires more than this: participants will potentially encounter heated debate with counter-
protesters, may face arrest, and can expect no guarantee of anonymity. Indeed, conflict in 
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participation is enhanced when activities involve the public expression of beliefs, as opposed to 
when such expression is private (Ulbig and Funk 1999; Verba and Nie 1972). As Milbrath notes, 
“Some political acts are taken in full public view with exposure to the possibility of criticism and 
acclamation, while other actions are essential private” (1965: 10). The public expression of 
beliefs provides more opportunity for conflict with other citizens who hold countervailing 
viewpoints and with government authorities that represent the status quo.  
For simplicity, I hereafter differentiate between “public” contentious-collective modes of 
action and “private,” individual acts. This is both intuitive and consistent with the literature. 
According to canonical accounts, private modes of participation include those actions a citizen 
may pursue on her own, with little contact and hence little conflict with others. For instance, one 
need not struggle with government authorities or disclose to other citizens that they donate 
money to a political cause. Although donating money may involve some associational 
connections that encourage such gifts, the act itself may be kept largely private. Contacting 
elected officials shares similar features; though it may become litigious when citizens oppose the 
status quo. Web politics – or joining causes on the internet – involves minimal conflict with 
other actors and is cooperative only through a virtual network of collaborators to whom one may 
forward political content or help support a political objective. Voting is the quintessential private 
political action; casting a secret ballot requires no cooperation and is non-conflictive.  
Public actions by contrast, involve some face-to-face contact and cooperation and are 
more likely to involve conflict with counter-participants or government authorities. Volunteering 
for political campaigns or organizations entails participation in highly coordinated activities that 
may become conflictive if, for instance, one canvasses neighborhoods of hostile swing voters. 
Petitioning is commonly understood as a “protest act,” and requires cooperation in pursuit of a 
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cause that is contentious by virtue of the fact that it seeks to alter the status quo. Boycotts and 
rallies require much coordination among participants and, depending on their particular objective 
or location, may incite conflict with other citizens or the authorities. Protest demonstrations are 
the quintessential public political action in that they are highly cooperative and necessarily 
contentious.  
Differentiating between public, contentious-collective actions and private, individual 
actions is useful because these dimensions reflect unequal social costs of performing different 
political acts (Verba, Nie and Kim 1971, 1978). They also suggest a host of socio-demographic 
and social psychological prerequisites for participation, i.e. factors necessary to bear such costs. 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) famously catalogued and analyzed the former in their “civic 
voluntarism model” (CVM) of political activism. The CVM acknowledges that participatory acts 
pose unique hurdles and identifies the resources, skills, and motivations are required to overcome 
these barriers. For instance, education and political interest contribute to the tendency to vote, 
but these are far less relevant than income to patterns of financial donations to political causes. 
Far greater civic skills (e.g. public speaking and letter writing), stronger interest, and often 
vibrant associational networks are required to mobilize citizens into public participation through 
volunteering, boycotts, and protests, precisely because such activities demand much more from 
individual participants.  
The main conclusion from this account is that people participate in higher-order, public 
modes of action because they have assets at their disposal that enable political action, because 
they are sufficiently interested in political matters, and because they are in a better position to be 
called into action (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Still, cooperation with others and conflict 
with counter-participants and government authorities (e.g. the police) are uniquely daunting 
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barriers to action. In rational choice terminology, the potential for public exposure, arguments, 
and even loss of freedom constitute significant “costs” that individuals must weigh against the 
potential benefits of civic engagement, such as the chance to improve one’s personal finances, 
collaborate and socialize with others, performing one’s civic duty, and influencing collective 
policy outcomes (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  
Recent models of non-voting participation highlight an important role for social 
psychological factors in determining how individuals will evaluate these costs. In particular, risk 
aversion (the unwillingness to put oneself in a position to incur loss) and conflict avoidance can 
play a central role in shaping whether individuals participate through public political actions. 
Kam (2011) advances a “psychophysical return model” in which “decision makers weigh the 
subjectively perceived risks of an action against the subjectively perceived returns from the 
action” to determine the optimal avenue for civic engagement (817).11 Her findings establish a 
general relationship between risk attitudes and political participation: risk acceptant individuals 
are more likely to participate across a variety of acts, especially public, contentious or collective 
activities. By contrast, risk tends to be unrelated to voting, the quintessential private action, and 
negatively related to financial contributions (826-7) – an isolated, individual action.  
In a similar vein, Ulbig and Funk (1999) tie contentious political action to “conflict 
avoidance”: a measure of individuals’ desire to avoid interpersonal conflict, which is strongly 
related to a willingness to do things that differentiate oneself from others, including expressing 
                                                 
11
 Kam’s account and, for that matter, the account I develop in this chapter, may be distinguished 
from both hard and “soft” rational choice models of participation in that risk acceptance does not 
act as a unique factor that counterbalances costs in the participation function. (To put it more 
visually, there would be no “R” term on the right-hand side of the participation calculus). Rather, 
risk acceptance constitutes a weight on costs {C} on the left-hand side of the equation, such that 
C is smaller for risk-acceptant individuals than for risk-averse individuals, presumably 
independently of the concrete benefits or selective incentives associated with participation.   
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dissenting opinions (e.g. Maslach et al. 1987; Whitney et al. 1994). Ulbig and Funk find that 
conflict avoidant individuals are less likely to participate in contentious, public actions relative to 
more conflict-acceptant individuals. Hayes et al. (2005) similarly found that individuals who are 
more tolerant of argumentation approach conflict with less hesitation and often look forward to 
the opportunity to express their own position when it differs from a discussion partner’s view. 
Gottweis (2007) further suggests that individuals who are more tolerant of argumentation are 
also more likely to participate in the political process.  
It is important to recognize that, although these factors have been tied closely to 
personality traits, they do not themselves constitute immutable characteristics of individuals. 
Psychologists recognize that risk assessments are strongly related to attitudes toward uncertainty, 
but they ultimately tend to vary according to the perceived negative consequences of a specific 
situation (e.g. Mandrik and Bao 2005). Rohrmann (2005: 1) maintains that “there is no 
convincing evidence that [risk aversion] is a general trait (rather than a state, or a domain-
specific attitude, e.g. distinct for physical, financial, or social risks people may encounter).” 
Perhaps for these reasons, Kam (2011) finds that effects of risk aversion on participation that are 
independent of personality traits that shape attitudes toward uncertainty but also influence 
participation, such as Openness (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), and Extraversion, which 
strongly relates to public activism (Gerber et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011). Moreover, 
argumentation, and its related construct of “tolerance for disagreement” (McCroskey 1998) are 
able to be acquired over time, through exposure to countervailing opinions and unpleasant 
situations.  
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3.2.1 Summary 
Political participation scholars acknowledge several avenues of civic engagement. These modes 
of action are not interchangeable, in particular because they differ in terms of the social costs 
they pose to potential participants. Public political actions – like protest, boycotts, rallies, and 
petitioning – involve high social costs, such as cooperation with other citizens and potential 
conflict with counter-participants and government authorities. Private political actions – like 
voting, donating, and contacting – do not. Although socio-demographic and resource-based 
models of participation explain private political activism, citizens require certain social 
psychological dispositions to overcome the high social costs of public political activism. In 
particular, low risk aversion and conflict avoidance lead individuals to view collaboration and 
conflict as less costly, and hence predict engagement through public, contentious and collective 
actions. This more nuanced view of civic engagement raises important questions about the 
tolerance-participation relationship. Does tolerance serve to raise or lower barriers to political 
participation? Which barriers might it influence and to which forms of political action might it 
therefore be relevant? And how might tolerance be consequential over and above the 
constellation of individual-level traits that lead one to tolerate in the first place?   
3.3 POLITICAL TOLERANCE, CONSISTENCY, AND BARRIERS TO CIVIC 
ENGAGEMENT 
How citizens choose to participate in politics depends upon how they perceive the costs of a 
particular political action. How does tolerance for nonconformity influence this process?  
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According to the syndrome account, the individual-level factors that lead citizens to 
tolerate should also lower the barriers to their participation. But this would seem to apply only to 
private modes of political action, and then only in the weakest sense. Resources and motivations 
like education and political interest contribute to the tendency to vote, but are far less relevant 
than income to patterns of financial donation to political causes (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995). Apart from education, resources appear inconsequential for tolerance, while political 
interest does not preclude interest in repressing minority rights. In general, however, private 
forms of action present such low social barriers to action that differences between tolerant and 
intolerant individuals should be muted or insignificant.  
Vibrant associational involvement may increase tolerance (Iglič 2010; Marquart-Pyatt 
and Paxton 2007), but according to tradeoff accounts, it will also suppress political behavior. 
Mutz (2005) argues that individuals whose interpersonal networks entail greater diversity of 
opinion will experience discomfort if they manifest their own preferences through political 
action because they risk disrupting social harmony in their networks. It is common for “those 
with high levels of cross-cutting exposure in their networks to put off political decisions for as 
long as possible or indefinitely, thus making their political participation unlikely (Mutz 2005: 
108). Moreover, the major points of attitudinal asymmetry at the core of the tradeoff hypothesis 
are known to influence private modes of behavior. For instance, ambivalence – which is related 
to the fact that tolerance is an internally conflicted position (Gibson 1998; Sniderman et al. 1996) 
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– is associated with delayed formation of voting intentions and unstable candidate evaluations 
(Lavine 2001). Indeed, Mutz’s (2005) strongest evidence relates to voting behavior.12  
The syndrome and tradeoff accounts – wherein tolerance is unrelated or negatively 
related to participation, respectively – appear largely divided over whether tolerance affects 
conventional, private modes of participation. I argue that practicing tolerance may actually help 
to facilitate engagement in more costly public actions. This is because, like public forms of 
activism, tolerance is also a costly enterprise; tolerance may directly shape contentious activism 
because they share similar costs, or it may indirectly facilitate public activism by strengthening 
attitudes that lower the perceived costs associated with contentious and collective avenues of 
civic engagement. I call this the “Costs-Consistency Theory” of tolerance and participation.  
 
3.3.1 The social costs of political tolerance 
Tolerance requires that citizens “uncouple” perceptions of threat from decisions about how to 
allocate liberty to unsavory groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). These threat perceptions stem most 
directly from characteristics of the group whose rights are contested – groups that presumably 
endanger society and social norms. But to the extent that tolerance is the minority position 
among opponents of a target group, the intolerant majority also poses certain risks: tolerant 
citizens will likely confront disagreement, conflict, and other social disapproval when they 
protect the rights of groups that most of society prefers to repress. 
                                                 
12
 Mutz (2001, 2005) also supports her theory with an index of overall activism that includes two 
public actions –working for a campaign and wearing a campaign button or sticker – but she does 
not provide results by individual mode of participation.  
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Consider first that tolerance is a highly disagreeable and unpopular judgment. It is the 
minority position among people who strongly dislike a disputed group, and who are threatened 
by its ideas. Intolerance is instead a more natural first response to a dangerous political minority 
(e.g. Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Brill 1983; Kuklinski et al. 1991); it is the majority 
opinion among people who dislike an offensive political minority. Second, upholding the rights 
of a group that so many fellow citizens find abhorrent is also a “risky” position for the tolerant 
individual. In the extreme, it poses “material risks,” such as supporting a hotly contested public 
demonstration that might lead to property damage or violence. More commonly, it poses risks to 
the “normative community” (Stenner 2005): adherence to abstract civil libertarian principles can 
violate broadly accepted social norms such as anti-racism, women’s rights, secularism, (Bleich 
2011; Mudde 2010; Sniderman et al. 1996). Tolerance also poses “social risks” such that the 
tolerant individual’s principled forbearance may be misconstrued as acceptance and respect for a 
vile group (e.g. white supremacists), or overt support for its beliefs.  
Such dimensions of conflict and risk are often reflected in experimental vignettes that 
vary situational features of civil liberties disputes to render tolerance increasingly difficult (e.g. 
Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). The normative literature also reflects these ideas. 
The tolerant individual may not only come into conflict with intolerant opponents of a group 
who would repress the group’s rights, but insofar as tolerance is premised on the negative 
judgment of a group (e.g. Muslim women are permitted to wear headscarves in France, though 
this is widely viewed as an affront to French norms of secularism and as a threat to 
“Frenchness”), the tolerant individual also offends “anti-tolerance accommodationists” who 
would urge respect and understanding rather than “mere” toleration (Furedi 2012; Galeotti 2002; 
Ramadan 2010).  
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Toleration might therefore be understood as an unpopular act of dissent from intolerant 
majority opinion and a socially risky position that may expose individuals to social disapproval 
and other non-trivial costs. Intolerance, by contrast, is consonant with majority opinion and 
exposes individuals to few social costs. It is possible that tolerance contributes to public activism 
because tolerance implies disagreement and dissent, whereas intolerance presupposes 
fundamental limitations on difference and dispute that render conflict less desirable. But this 
could still reflect a spurious relationship: tolerant individuals might already be more supportive 
of dissent and be more risk acceptant than intolerant individuals and therefore participate 
because of these predispositions. Instead, social psychological theories of consistency suggests 
two mechanisms through which the act of toleration could either directly lead to participation 
through public means, or indirectly promote civic engagement by strengthening attitudes that 
moderate the perceived social costs associated with public avenues of participation. 
3.3.2 Consistency theories and tolerance as a contributor to public activism 
First, behavioral consistency across similar situations could account for a direct effect of 
tolerance on public modes of political engagement. The psychological literature indicates that 
situations are important determinants of what people do – situations, for instance, that have been 
characterized in terms of the demands they make on actors (Shoda et al. 1993), the emotions they 
elicit from actors (Pervin 1977; Tomkins 1962), and the behaviors deemed appropriate of actors 
in these situations (Price and Bouffard 1974). Importantly, situations that are similar on one or 
more of these dimensions tend to compel similar rates and types of behavior from the actors that 
encounter them. Shoda, Mischel and Wright (1993, 1994) found evidence for a relationship 
between behavioral consistency and situational similarity, with similarity defined by the degree 
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to which situations were rated as making similar demands on children’s psychological 
competencies. Furr and Funder (2003) report that similar situations – regardless of whether 
similarity is defined subjectively by participants or objectively by researchers – tend to elicit 
similar behavior among individuals across over 60 types of behaviors. Cross-situational 
consistency in behavior is well-documented even though people may not be consciously aware 
of a situation’s contextual elements or of these elements’ effects on their behavior.  
Extending rights of free expression to broadly disliked groups and exercising one’s own 
expressive rights through public means pose similar social costs to individuals. To the extent that 
tolerant individuals can effectively manage the high costs of enabling broadly disliked others’ 
participation, they may be more willing to face down the costs to their own political participation 
– especially collective-contentious “public” actions which tend, like tolerance, to expose 
participants to disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities. Private 
political actions, like voting or donating, are not associated with costs of this sort; rather, barriers 
to this type of activism can be surmounted given sufficient free time, interest in politics, 
education and income (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Therefore, while it is possible 
that tolerant and intolerant individuals differ in terms of the resources and motivations that 
determine which private political actions they can take, practicing tolerance exposes individuals 
to high social costs, which in turn conditions their willingness to engage in contentious and 
collective activities whose barriers to action standard resources gnerally cannot overcome alone. 
Therefore, 
Proposition 1: Tolerant individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in 
public modes of political action 
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Second, theories of cognitive consistency point to a mechanism through which practicing 
tolerance could indirectly move citizens to engage in more contentious and collective political 
actions. One of the most frequently demonstrated phenomena in social psychology is that people 
who act in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes experience a motivational state that 
causes them to alter those actions or attitudes (Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). This is based on 
the principle of cognitive consistency, and assumes that an aversive, drive-like state is aroused 
when people either experience inconsistency between their beliefs or inconsistency between their 
attitudes and behavior (Gawronski 2012). Attitude or behavior change follows as a means of 
restoring this consistency (Scher and Cooper 1989; Cooper 2007). 
Tolerance judgments imply inconsistency by definition: given its “objective 
precondition,” tolerance is the result of how individuals weight and ultimately choose between 
conflicting attitudes toward civil liberties and toward political minorities they find offensive 
(Sullivan and Transue 1999: 643). And scholars accept that tolerance is a more internally 
dissonant position than intolerance (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003) because political 
tolerance attitudes are “more highly integrated” with similar, alternative attitudes (Gibson and 
Gouws 2003: 142-5). Toleration thus readily comes into conflict with other legitimate – and 
often more viscerally felt – values (Sniderman et al. 1996), beliefs (Bleich 2011), and social 
norms (Mudde 2010).  
Although one line of social psychology research shows that this type of value-conflict 
and ambivalence may, on its own, impede the translation of attitudes into action (e.g. Petty and 
Krosnick 1995; Mutz 2005; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001), research in the cognitive 
consistency tradition (e.g. Festinger 1957; Cooper and Fazio 1984; Cooper 2007) would suggest 
that tolerant individuals would be motivated to rectify such inconsistencies by aligning other 
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beliefs with their tolerance decision. In particular, tolerant individuals should develop attitudes 
that are logically related to the tolerance decision to minimize doubts they would otherwise 
experience (e.g. Regan and Kilduff 1988). This “behavior justification strategy” (e.g. Frey and 
Mills 1965) of consistency restoration provides an indirect pathway through which tolerance may 
influence public political participation: in short, tolerance can be justified with attitudes that in 
turn facilitate participation in contentious and collective, public actions.   
Some evidence already indicates that attitude change follows political tolerance. Using 
two-wave longitudinal data, Gibson (2002) demonstrates that Russian adults who extended 
tolerance toward their most disliked groups in the first wave of the survey were less likely to feel 
threatened by this same group two years later – even controlling for respondents’ prior levels of 
threat and changes in economic outlook. Other research suggests that tolerance reflects 
individuals’ ability to “uncouple” threat from decisions about how to allocate liberty to different 
groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). That is, tolerance requires individuals to compartmentalize the 
risks of tolerance, separate them from and perhaps render them subordinate to other relevant 
considerations, such as the merits of liberal democratic norms in principle and the value of 
applying them in practice. In this sense, tolerance may render individuals less averse to risks and 
other social costs in their own decision-making.  
Moreover, extant research suggests that tolerance “…is connected to a set of beliefs about 
the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression” (1992b: 339); cognitive consistency 
maintenance may help account for this relationship. Gibson unveils bivariate associations 
between tolerance and self-expression, such that tolerant individuals 1) perceive themselves as 
“more free” than intolerant individuals in that they tend to believe the government will not 
restrict or otherwise infringe upon their right to dissent, and 2) are less likely than intolerant 
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individuals to “self-censor” their political expression when they hold unpopular views that may 
lead to disagreements with others. To clarify, consider Gibson’s original survey data in Tables 1 
and 2, which reveal these associations in both the liberal democratic American context (Gibson 
1992b, 2008) and the illiberal Russian context (Gibson 1998, 2002).  
 
Table 1 Perceptions of Available Freedom in the United States and Russia 
   
Percentages
†
 
 
      
 U.S.  
1987 
U.S.  
2006 
Russia  
1996 
Russia  
1998 
Russia  
2000 
Believe government would allow:      
       
 Speeches criticizing government actions 64.5 68.9 48.9 (16.2) 44.8 (14.9) 49.3 (15.1) 
 Public meetings opposing government 54.8 58.9 32.3 (19.5) 35.1 (16.3) 34.9 (16.7) 
 Protest marches opposing government 59.1 66.7 29.8 (24.5) 35.9 (16.4) 25.2 (17.4) 
       
 Tolerance and political freedom‡ 0.49* 0.34* 0.11* 0.12* 0.11* 
 Observations 1218 995 1959 1635 1330 
†
Percentages reflect respondents who believe government would “probably” or “definitely” allow dissenting behavior. Those who “don’t 
know” whether the government would allow them to engage in the activity might be legitimately included with those believing that they would 
not be allowed to do so. Since uncertain respondents in the U.S. never exceed 2.5 percent of any sample, they are simply excluded. For Russian 
data, they appear in parentheses. 
‡ Entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between content-controlled tolerance index and average perceived freedom; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
 
 
Beyond mere rights consciousness, perceived political freedom reflects confidence in 
one’s rights to free expression. Large percentages of the population in both countries are 
skeptical about their expressive rights, though Russians perceive far less freedom as available to 
them than Americans (Gibson argues that “those who ‘don’t know’ whether the government 
would allow them to engage in the activity might be legitimately included with those believing 
that they would not be allowed to do so”). The significant bivariate associations in the 
highlighted, penultimate row of Table 1 suggest that tolerant Americans tend to perceive greater 
liberty for themselves than their intolerant counterparts. Significant associations between 
tolerance and perceived freedom are also apparent in Russia, though the correlations are weak.  
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Table 2 Self-Censored Expression in the United States and Russia 
   
Percentages
†
 
 
  
U.S.  
1987 
 
U.S.  
2006 
 
Russia  
1996 
 
Russia  
1998 
 
Russia  
2000 
Unwilling talk about politics because:      
       
 They might create enemies 39.8 n/a 33.4 (19.1) 32.6 (17.6) 45.1 (14.9) 
 Their views might not be understood 23.7 n/a 24.8 (21.8) 25.1 (19.1) 25.5  (  9.4) 
 People might think poorly of them 15.4 n/a 37.9 (19.5) 44.6 (15.6) 44.7 (14.9) 
 The government might find out 7.5 n/a 16.1 (20.3) 17.2 (19.9) 17.2 (17.3) 
       
 Tolerance and self-censorship‡ -0.21* n/a -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* 
 Observations 1218 n/a 1959 1635 1330 
†
Percentages reflect respondents who would restrict their own speech for specific reasons. Those who don’t know whether they would censor 
themselves might be included with those who would under some circumstances. There are extremely few such individuals in the U.S. sample 
and they have been excluded. For Russian data, they appear in parentheses.  
‡ Entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between content-controlled tolerance index and average “self-censorship”; *p ≤ 0.05 
 
 
Table 2 demonstrates a similar pattern among tolerant and intolerant individuals with 
regard to “self-censorship” – or, the willingness to talk about politics when one holds highly 
unpopular views. Among Americans higher tolerance for nonconformity – as measured by the 
willingness to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to one’s most disliked political 
opponent – is connected to a willingness to express one’s own political views, however 
unpopular they may be.  
Gibson infers from these associations
13
 that “[t]olerance is associated with the belief that 
there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” (1992b: 343, 
emphasis added).  Gibson’s evidence is based on bivariate associations, so he interprets it with 
caution: “Whether tolerance flows from some sort of norm of reciprocity (because I am able to 
express my views, others should be allowed to express theirs) or individuals are projecting their 
own tolerance onto others cannot be determined” (1992b: 343). He reiterates this restraint in a 
                                                 
13
Specifically, those represented in the first columns of Tables 1 and 2 
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follow-up study, noting that “the nature of the causal relationship between [intolerance and 
perceived political freedom] cannot be dissected – perhaps because they perceive themselves as 
not having freedom, it is easier to justify denying freedom to others – but a close connection 
exists between perceptions that the government should deny civil liberties to disliked groups and 
that it does deny civil liberties to groups to which one is favorably predisposed” (Gibson 2008: 
106 – 7). 
Cognitive consistency provides a mechanism through which tolerance may be 
conceptualized as an actual driver, not merely a correlate, of perceived political freedom. To the 
extent that tolerance is a riskier and more dissonant position than intolerance, practicing 
tolerance may catalyze individuals to strengthen or develop new attitudes that help justify 
toleration. They may not only “compartmentalize” the social risks of tolerance (e.g. Sullivan et 
al. 1993), but tolerant individuals may also rationalize their tolerance with the belief that dissent 
from majority opinion is useful to democracy, with the belief that government will not punish 
dissenting opinion, and with less overall aversion to conflict and risk in their own decision-
making. In short, to maintain cognitive consistency, tolerant individuals may validate the 
application of civil libertarian principles to unpopular groups by bolstering pro-democratic 
orientations:  
Proposition 2:  Practicing tolerance carries positive psychic benefits for individuals in the form 
of decreased risk aversion, increased support for dissent, and increased perceptions of political 
freedom.  
 
As I demonstrated in section 3.2, scholars of political participation have recognized these 
attitudes as fundamental determinants of contentious and collective action. Through a cognitive 
consistency mechanism, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress may thus 
indirectly raise the likelihood of participation in public modes of action in which the risk of 
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disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities is high (e.g. protest, 
boycotts, rallies, petitioning), but do little to facilitate individual modes of action in which 
disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting, donating). Individuals who incur nontrivial 
costs to protect the expressive rights of others may be less likely to perceive costs in their own 
political expression. 
Behavioral and cognitive consistency theories provide unique microfoundations for the 
positive, causal effect of tolerance on participation proposed in this dissertation – a rather 
different portrait of the tolerance-participation relationship than the syndrome and tradeoff 
accounts offer. According to the former, tolerance should be largely irrelevant to how citizens 
weight the costs associated with different avenues of participation; according to the latter, 
tolerance may lead citizens to attribute greater weight to the overall costs of participation. But 
tolerant and intolerant individuals do not differ only in terms of the resources or associational 
networks that determine which actions they can take; practicing tolerance or intolerance may 
also directly and/or indirectly condition which actions they are willing to take. Tolerance is a 
minority position through which one incurs substantial costs to defend the rights of offensive 
others. To the extent that tolerant individuals face disagreement, dissent, and conflict to ensure 
offensive groups’ right to free speech and assembly, they may be more likely to confront similar 
social costs associated with exercising these same rights for themselves (Proposition 1). And to 
the extent that toleration yields stronger perceptions of political freedom, support for dissent, and 
risk acceptance (Proposition 2) – attitudes which mitigate the social costs of public activism – it 
may indirectly facilitate contentious and collective political engagement. 
This “costs-consistency theory” rests upon novel microfoundations. In terms of its 
predictions for political behavior, however, it occupies the space between the syndrome and 
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tradeoff accounts. It is therefore possible that these three perspectives are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive at the individual-level. Tolerance may lower the perceived costs of public 
forms of action while increasing (tradeoff account) or remaining fundamentally irrelevant to 
(syndrome account) the costs individuals associate with private forms of action. Empirical 
analysis is required to assess the balance of evidence for each account. At the system-level, 
however, these models may not apply to all political contexts equally well. The following section 
considers the generalizability of each theoretical perspective, and develops expectations about 
their applicability across countries. 
3.4 TOLERANCE, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT 
A simple idea underlies the perspective developed above. The choice to uphold a political 
minority’s rights interacts with the social costs of political engagement to shape how individuals 
participate in politics. But the costs individuals associate with civic engagement – costs that 
determine an action’s difficulty – may themselves be contingent upon the broader political 
context. It is possible, for instance, that the distinction between high-cost public actions and low-
cost private actions may be less relevant in illiberal polities where real constraints on political 
opposition exist. Similarly, individuals may be unable to “uncouple” threat from civil libertarian 
quandaries where that threat is more real than perceived and toleration may likewise carry few of 
the psychic benefits discussed above which facilitate participation. More basically, whether 
individuals will draw any connections between democratic orientations like tolerance and civic 
engagement depends in the first place on the availability of these values in the public.  
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These contingencies have footing in theories of political socialization, which I discuss in 
this section with respect especially to post-communist democracies. Empirical research generally 
suggests that the success of democratic government and the breadth of public support for 
democratic values are co-dependent and develop simultaneously over the course of a country’s 
experience with democracy (e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Muller and 
Seligson 1994; Whitefield and Evans 2001). Theories of “political socialization” therefore expect 
long-term differences across publics in established and new democracies: while citizens in 
longstanding democracies have learned to unconsciously support and accept liberal democratic 
norms as they are socialized into them throughout their lives, broad swaths of the population in 
new democracies have often been socialized into illiberal or anti-democratic norms (Dalton 
1994; Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001; Klingemann, Fuchs and Zielonka 2006; Mishler and 
Rose 1996). In new democracies it is possible that citizens’ “understanding of democracy [will] 
differ significantly from Western democratic principles – such as majority rule, minority rights, 
individual liberties, multi-party systems, or representative government” (Neundorf 2010: 1098). 
To this list we may add political tolerance and political participation – both of which tend to 
differ substantially across established democracies and those with a recent history of 
authoritarian rule. 
A country’s experience with authoritarian rule is therefore an important, albeit coarse, 
dimension of political context that may limit whether, where, and how political tolerance and 
political participation are connected. New democracies in general tend to differ in significant 
ways from longstanding democracies in terms of civic engagement. In particular, where 
democracy has flourished for long periods of time, democratic institutions are more deeply 
rooted and publics are more strongly committed to democratic norms of civic duty. For instance, 
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East Central Europe continues to suffer weaknesses in civil society (Howard 2004) because 
much political interaction remains grounded in informal village community structures, extended 
clans, or other less formalized types of social networks (Immerfall et al. 2010; Mondak and 
Gearing 1998). Attitudes toward the government and toward participation also remain marked by 
suspicion. Communist regimes often forced their citizens into mass engagement in state-
controlled activities and organizations (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Howard 2004; Letki 
2004), while simultaneously suppressing autonomous forms of civic engagement (Flanagan et al. 
1993). As a result, a deep general distrust in political and civic institutions emerged after 
communism (Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose 1994) 
While it is true that the term “post-communism” gradually loses its relevance with each 
passing year (Howard 2002), legacies of the communist experience still tend to promote different 
patterns of participation across East Central and Western Europe. More than twenty years later, 
researchers still find lower rates of active participation in East central Europe compared to the 
rest of the continent, as well as differences in various aspects of civic resources, interest, and the 
“density” of civil society organizations between post-communist and Western Europe (e.g. 
Haskins 2009; Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfner 2012). These resilient differences are especially 
remarkable considering that newly emerged regimes of the 1990s often compelled their citizens 
to “relearn” civic and political behavior through drastic educational reforms to facilitate revisions 
to political socialization (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Torney-Purta 2002). 
Not only is participation less widespread in new democracies (Wallace, Pichler and 
Haerpfner 2012), but evidence also suggests that overall levels of political tolerance are lower in 
these contexts than in the west. In one of the few comparisons of tolerance across Western and 
post-communist publics, Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) find that citizens in East Central 
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Europe are generally less willing to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to their least 
liked groups than citizens in the United States and Western Europe. The authors couch this 
finding in differential patterns of political socialization: “Citizens in newer democracies have 
simply had less time to internalize democratic norms and values and may not yet have learned to 
translate democratic principles into democratic practice” (2007: 90). This explanation has also 
been applied explicitly to the tolerance-participation relationship (Peffley and Rohrschneider 
2003). In short, post-authoritarian citizens should be not only less likely to grant rights and 
liberties to offensive groups, but those who do tolerate may be less likely to infer that their own 
rights and liberties are more secure as a result.  
Socialization theories therefore suggest that a relationship between democratic 
orientations is unlikely where democratic orientations are not widely embraced by the public. 
This caveat can be viewed through the lens of the syndrome account of tolerance and 
participation. The syndrome hypothesis maintains that tolerant citizens are no more or less likely 
to participate in politics than intolerant citizens; rather, any association between the two 
orientations is attributable to other characteristics of individuals that simultaneously influence 
their levels of tolerance and potential for political action. This account is doubly conditional if 
we consider political context: positive associations between tolerance and activism require the 
correct constellation of individual-level traits and these traits are only likely to develop in those 
countries where democratic values and institutions are deeply rooted in society – in longstanding, 
western democracies. Thus, the relationship between tolerance and participation in new 
democracies may be far more tenuous, such that:  
Proposition 3: Controlling for individual differences in resources, motivations, and 
psychological dispositions, tolerant citizens are no more or less likely than intolerant citizens to 
participate in politics in post-communist democracies.  
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Alternatively, political context may have a more nuanced effect on the tolerance-
participation relationship, which reflects behavioral and cognitive consistency arguments I 
develop above. Differential political socialization offers a superficial and paternalistic view of 
post-authoritarian publics that ignores the possibility that citizens in these contexts may believe 
they have good reason not to tolerate or not to participate.  
I have argued, on one hand, that citizens who defend the basic rights of others at great 
cost should, as a result, be more likely to endure the costs associated with exercising their own 
rights to public political expression. This squares with the idea that tolerance requires citizens to 
“uncouple” perceptions of threat from decisions about whether to grant liberty to disliked 
minority groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). However, tolerant individuals tend to be better “threat 
managers” than intolerant individuals only where that threat is not imminent. Israeli politicians 
who perceive a rather real threat of political disruption and state destruction from all sides, tend 
to be less tolerant than national policymakers elsewhere (Shamir 1991; Sullivan et al. 1993). 
Similarly, Hutchinson and Gibler (2007) find that the real risk of territorial threat from irredentist 
groups or state actors significantly increases intolerance. Shamir and Sullivan (1983: 916) 
qualify that “in the absence of a strong threat, belief in abstract norms will constrain responses to 
specific instances in which citizens’ tolerance is tested. If the threat is strong enough, however, it 
will override these abstract beliefs.”  
Democratic transition in some formerly repressive regimes generated considerable 
political uncertainty, facilitated corruption and crime, and aggravated ethnic and linguistic 
divisions in society (Pétry, Guerin, and Crête 2004). Such factors generate considerable threat 
and undermine civil society in ways that can fundamentally alter the risks individuals associate 
with tolerance and with their own political engagement (Howard 2004; Mondak and Gearing 
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1998). Context has the potential to alter the costs of participation with which the costs of 
tolerance are consistent. 
In extreme cases, such as South Africa in 1994 (Gibson and Gouws 2003) or Kenya in 
2007 (Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012), merely casting a secret ballot could pose 
mortal risk to participants. Citizens under communism often self-censored their political 
discussion due to fear of constant surveillance and monitoring by police forces and their secret 
informants (Mondak and Gearing 1998). In cases like Hungary under Viktor Orbán (e.g. Mudde 
and Jenne 2012) and Romania under Victor-Viorel Ponta, media freedom, opposition rights, and 
free assembly by anti-government protesters have been circumscribed as recently as this year 
(Freedom House 2013). While a “culture of suspicion” toward government and collective action 
remains in many post-communist states (Howard 2004; Mishler and Rose 1997; Wallace, Pichler 
and Haerpfner 2012), some governments thus continue to pose a “real risk” of retaliation against 
citizens who object to its actions or express views outside the mainstream.  
In these cases, the distinction between high-cost public political actions and low-cost 
private political actions loses some traction and the social psychological dispositions toward risk 
and conflict conventionally associated with public, contentious political acts in established 
democracies may become relevant predictors of private, individual political participation in the 
post-authoritarian context. If private political actions are indeed more costly in new democracies 
– such that standard resource models cannot sufficiently account for civic engagement – then 
post-authoritarian citizens who confront the difficulties of tolerance may also be more likely to 
participate in individual, private avenues of engagement than intolerant citizens:  
Proposition 4: Tolerant individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in 
private modes of political action in post-communist democracies. 
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There are additional reasons speculate that toleration breeds private, rather public 
activism in the post-communist context. Recall from Table 1 above that, compared to the United 
States, the connections between tolerance and perceived political freedom are far more tenuous 
in illiberal Russia. This may be a function of the fact that the Russian government does not in 
fact guarantee citizens’ right to dissent, or of the widespread culture of intolerance that places a 
ceiling on how much liberty people believe is available to them (Gibson 1992b), or of some 
combination of the two. Whatever the case, to the extent that risks associated with public actions 
are heightened in illiberal contexts, it is unlikely that tolerance can generate sufficient confidence 
in one’s ability to challenge government actions to facilitate contentious-collective, public 
actions.   
Tolerance may also do little to increase support for dissent where anti-majoritarian 
opinion may realistically be punished. Moreover, even where no such risk is perceived dissent 
and disagreement may not be viewed as intrinsically useful to democratic stability in fragile new 
political systems. Gibson (2002), for instance, finds that Russians who are more supportive of 
abstract democratic values tend also to be more threatened and less tolerant. Citizens in former 
socialist countries are familiar with the concepts of democracy and democratic values (Gibson, 
Duch and Tedin 1992; Whitefield and Evans 2001); however, socialization theory predicts that 
their understanding of the role of these values is likely to differ (cf. Neundorf 2010). Hence, it is 
possible that tolerance contributes to perceptions of freedom and support for dissent to a lesser 
extent in post-communist democracies than in longstanding democracies. These arguments lead 
me to speculate that if a relationship between tolerance and participation exists in the post-
communist context, it will manifest as a positive association between tolerance and private 
avenues of engagement.  
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in contrast to these context-dependent propositions, 
the “tradeoff” account of tolerance and participation does not seem to depend upon political 
context. From this perspective, tolerance is too weak, too pliable, and too dissonant a position to 
compel attitude-consistent behavior (e.g. Gibson 1998; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001) and 
generates ambivalent preferences that can lead to abstention from politics (Mutz 2005). 
Intolerance is rather strong, rigid, and consonant with other democratic beliefs and therefore may 
be more behaviorally efficacious than tolerance (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995). Importantly, 
attitudinal properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” across polities as 
diverse as the United States (Gibson 1996), Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 
1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003). The direct, negative effect on civic 
engagement owing to attitudinal-level asymmetry should therefore hold across countries. 
3.5 CASE SELECTION 
The universe of cases in this dissertation includes Western and post-communist Europe and the 
United States. Chapter Four relies on survey data from the United States and 16 European 
countries whose populations are sampled for the International Social Survey Programme – 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. These countries exhibit a wide range of experience with democracy and authoritarianism 
and are generally included in cross-national comparisons of tolerance (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and 
Paxton 2007) and participation (e.g. Wallace et al. 2012). They therefore permit a litmus test of 
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propositions 1, 3 and 4, which predict differential patterns of participation across tolerant and 
intolerant individuals and across established Western and new, post-communist democracies.  
Special attention is given to two cases in particular: the United States and Hungary. 
These cases are rarely paired for comparison; but there are important methodological and 
theoretical reasons to rely on them in this study. The American population is the traditional target 
of political tolerance research, which has its roots in the McCarthy Red Scare Era of the 1950s. 
Methodological debates over the definition and measurement of political tolerance, which 
continue to this day, have produced highly reliable explanations of the predictors of tolerance 
and instruments for its measurement that have been subjected to much validity testing (e.g. 
Gibson 1992a). The United States therefore constitutes a crucial case for this analysis, since 
researchers generally “do a much better job of explaining political tolerance in the areas of the 
globe where tolerance has been most intensively studied” (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003: 25).  
With the exception perhaps of the United Kingdom, the United States is also an 
exceptional case among western democracies in terms of its institutional protections of illiberal 
expression. As Eric Bleich’s (2012) comparative study of free speech and association 
demonstrates, the US affords uniquely broad protections for illiberal speech and assembly 
compared to most other countries in the world. While the Supreme Court of the United States 
vigorously defends the First Amendment and its libertarian principles, most countries in Europe 
– east and west – provide legal character to specific limitations on speech and assembly that is 
racist, anti-Semitic, or that otherwise may be perceived as anti-democratic.  
Among the European countries studied here, Hungary provides the other exception. 
Viktor Orbán and his “center right” Fidesz Party won a landslide victory in the parliamentary 
elections of April 2010 and many observers agree that Orbán’s victory “has put an end to the 
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liberal democracy existing in Hungary since 1990 and has smoothed the path to a populist 
autocracy” (Lendvai 2013: 207). Institutional checks and balances on the executive have 
practically disappeared in Hungary – the previous Hungarian constitution was amended ten times 
during the government’s first year in office to strengthen the authority of Fidesz. On January 1, 
2012, it was replaced by an entirely new constitution that cannot be amended save for a two-
thirds majority in any subsequent parliament. Since then, Orbán has replaced independent agency 
staff with his personal supporters (Lendvai 2013: 218) and has substituted Constitutional Court 
justices at will.  
In March 2013, Fidesz passed the “Fourth Amendment” – a 15 page document that wipes 
out more than 20 years of prior Constitutional Court precedent and which, according to US State 
Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, “could threaten the principles of institutional 
independence and checks and balances that are the hallmark of democratic governance.” The 
Fourth Amendment establishes the “National Judicial Office” (NJO), an executive agency 
through which the chief public prosecutor may select which Constitutional Court justice will 
hear which case. The head of the NJO, Tuene Hando, holds her position for nine years; she is 
president of the Budapest Labour Court and married to the principal author of the 2012 
constitution (Lendvai 2013).  
The Fourth Amendment also restricts media freedom via the newly established National 
Media and Telecommunications Agency (NMTA). The NMTA restricts the press during election 
campaigns; bans all political advertising during campaigns except for ads in the public media, 
which in any case has been purged of employees that sympathize with the opposition (Schepple 
2013). The NMTA reviews all bids for broadcast frequencies, which require that political parties 
gather signatures from all over the country for a “national party list,” which is currently 
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extremely difficulty for opposition parties to achieve. Moreover, the NMTA is equipped with the 
right to review the compliance of all public and private media coverage with vague standards of 
“balance” and “proper” news coverage, which affords Orbán and his Fidesz party virtually full 
control over media content (Freedom House 2013).  
Beyond this, Orbán has legitimized right-wing intolerance by working closely with the 
neo-fascist Jobbik Party – one of the most successful extremist parties in Europe (Mudde 2009). 
As recently as 2012, Orbán officially decorated three extreme right leading figures: journalist 
Ferenc Szaniszlo, known for his diatribes against the Jews and the Roma people who he 
compares to “monkeys”; anti-Semitic archaeologist Kornel Bakav, who blames the Jews for 
having organized the slave trade in the middle ages; and artist Petras Janos who strongly 
supports the Jobbik party and its paramilitary militia that has been implicated in several hate 
crimes against the Roma minority.  
Modern Hungary is an illiberal democracy similar to Russia’s – with regular elections but 
without a legitimate opposition. For more than three years, the Fidesz government has eroded 
constitutional freedoms and has promoted a culture of intolerance that stands in stark contrast to 
the United States. Hungary therefore provides the sort of illiberal context in which to test 
predictions regarding the tolerance-participation relationship where a real threat of government 
retaliation against dissent exists. 
3.6 LOOKING AHEAD TO THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS 
Two basic perspectives emerge from the extant literature on political tolerance and political 
participation. From the first, tolerance and participation are not directly related; they are 
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associated as a “syndrome” of pro-democratic orientations. From the second perspective, 
tolerance has attitudinal properties that are antithetical to vibrant civic engagement; they are 
related as a “tradeoff” between pro-democratic orientations.  
This chapter introduces a third alternative. Tolerance is positively consequential to some 
forms of actions, but not others. Whether and how tolerance matters for civic engagement is a 
function of the social costs of participation, as defined by the difficulty of performing a given 
political action and the broader political context in which participation occurs. This view is 
consistent with early arguments by Gibson and Bingham (1985: 162): “Whether a given 
propensity (i.e. attitude) will result in behavior…is determined partly by the ‘difficulty’ of 
performing the act. Strong propensities will only be blocked by high hurdles, whereas weak 
propensities may be blocked by relatively low hurdles. The strength of the propensity interacts 
with the situational context in producing behavior.” 
 I have argued that, in established democracies where democratic norms are deeply 
rooted, political tolerance lowers hurdles to collective and contentious public action, but does 
little to facilitate the propensity to engage in private, individual modes of behavior over and 
above the standard, resource-based predictors of civic voluntarism (Proposition 1). This is 
because the costs of tolerance and the costs of public forms of engagement are similar and people 
tend to behave consistently across similar situations. Moreover, upholding the rights of a group 
that society prefers to repress cultivates individuals’ support for dissent, risk acceptance, and 
perceptions that their own rights are protected (Proposition 2). To the extent that these attitudes 
mitigate the perceived costs of public participation, tolerance will indirectly increase contentious 
and collective action through its bolstering effect on these beliefs. To echo Sniderman et al. 
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(1989), “The more tolerant citizens are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of 
all, their own included.” 
In new democracies – in particular those of post-communist Europe – two caveats are 
possible. According to standard theories of political socialization, the influence of tolerance on 
participation is blocked because civil libertarian and participatory norms have not been 
internalized by the public. In post-authoritarian contexts, tolerance and participation may be 
unrelated as the syndrome account predicts (Proposition 3). Alternatively, given the resilient 
culture of suspicions and, in cases like Hungary, real threat of government retaliation against 
dissenting behavior, the attitudes toward risk and conflict that predict public forms of activism in 
established democracies may become important considerations for exercising even basic rights to 
vote, donate, or engage in other private actions in the post-authoritarian context. Hence, context 
vitiates the dichotomy between public and private actions such that the high costs of tolerance 
are consistent with the high-costs of private activism in illiberal democracies (Proposition 4).  
The next three chapters offer various tests of these propositions. I begin, in Chapter Four, 
with a broad evaluation of the syndrome, tradeoff, and cost-consistency theories of tolerance and 
participation. I apply coarsened exact matching procedures to cross-national survey data from the 
United States and Europe, to better isolate the effects of tolerance and participation and improve 
the strength of causal inferences that can be made about how tolerance influences civic 
engagement. Chapter Five builds a case for a randomized experimental analysis of the tolerance 
participation relationship. As a first step I introduce, develop, and test a novel approach to 
randomly assigning individuals to manifest tolerance or intolerance, such that the independent 
effects of these judgments may be assessed. Chapter Six then reprises the analysis of tolerance 
and participation using two original experiments, conducted in the United States and Hungary. 
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Using the method developed in Chapter Five, I randomly assign subjects to manifest tolerance or 
intolerance and directly observe their overt, post-test political participation. 
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4.0  CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION AMONG 
POLITICALLY TOLERANT AND INTOLERANT CITIZENS 
What are the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations? Although early classics and 
recent studies of democratic learning find positive associations between tolerance and 
participation, the “syndrome account” maintains that these effects are spurious due to omitted 
variable bias: tolerant individuals possess demographic and personality traits that render them 
simultaneously more tolerant and more participatory. The “tradeoff account” implies negative 
consequences of political tolerance for political participation because attitudinal properties 
unique to tolerance suppress political action potential. The costs-consistency theory I advanced 
in Chapter Three maintains that tolerance poses high costs to individuals, which are similar to 
the costs associated with contentious and collective “public” forms of activism; citizens who 
confront risk to enable political expression by reviled minorities should be more likely to face 
down social barriers to their own engagement through public means. To adjudicate between 
these accounts, I apply coarsened exact matching procedures to U.S. and European survey data 
to isolate the effects of tolerant and intolerant attitudes from effects attributable instead to 
differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. Findings lend preliminary support to the 
costs-consistency theory: attitudinal tolerance stimulates certain types of participation 
independently of individual-level factors that drive tolerance and activism.  
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter compares conventional accounts of the tolerance-participation relationship against 
the cost-consistency theory proposed in Chapter Three to begin to reveal how tolerance matters 
for political engagement. In doing so, it begins to confront the central methodological challenge 
at the core of this dissertation. As I have argued in previous chapters, different perspectives 
remain entangled because it is difficult to separate the effects of tolerance judgments on 
participation from effects that owe instead to individual-level factors that generate tolerance 
attitudes and also shape participation. Teasing out the independent effects of a tolerance 
judgment from the individual who passes that judgment requires rather sophisticated techniques. 
In Chapters Five and Six, I introduce, evaluate, and employ a new approach using randomized 
experiments to identify the direct effect of tolerance judgments on overt behavior and the 
attitudes that facilitate it. However, most political tolerance research is based on survey 
evidence; this first empirical chapter seeks to strengthen the causal inferences that can be made 
using observational data. To do so, I apply nonparametric matching techniques to U.S. and 
European survey data to better isolate the effects of tolerance attitudes on political activism from 
the resources, interest, and mobilization networks that shape civic voluntarism.   
Given certain disparities in the cross-national data, which are discussed below, this 
chapter offers only a preliminary assessment of the possible relationships outlined in the 
previous three chapters. In particular, this chapter only tests the syndrome and tradeoff accounts 
against Propositions 1, 3 and 4 offered in the previous chapter. I examine more nuanced causal 
mechanisms relating to risk, conflict, and perceived political freedom (Proposition 2, Chapter 3) 
using cross-national experiments in Chapter Six. Moreover, although this chapter employs a 
sophisticated means of isolating the effects of tolerance on participation, it nevertheless relies on 
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cross-sectional data; appropriate three wave longitudinal studies for analyzing tolerance and 
modes of participation are not currently available. Therefore, this chapter cannot examine the 
possibility of a positive feedback loop between political tolerance and political participation.    
Still, this chapter contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it begins to 
unveil whether and in what ways extending basic rights and liberties to offensive groups affects 
individuals who tolerate. Although tolerance is often considered the most important democratic 
value, its consequences for individuals remain poorly understood. This is so primarily because 
tolerance research has focused largely on its sources or determinants. Only a few observational 
studies have examined its micro-level effects, either on other attitudes (Gibson 1992b, 2002) or 
on political participation (Gibson 1987; Gibson and Bingham 1985). This chapter explicitly 
models political tolerance as an explanatory variable and speaks directly to the question of 
whether forbearance shapes political action potential. Second, whereas existing analyses of 
observational data have not effectively addressed the criticism that the relationship between 
tolerance and participation is spurious, this chapter applies nonparametric matching techniques to 
cross-national data, which increases both the power and the generalizability of causal inferences 
that can be made about whether and how political tolerance matters.  
The next section develops operational hypotheses and explains the coarsened exact 
matching procedures used to test them. Following a discussion of the data, measurement, and 
model specification, I then examine the effects of tolerance on both levels of participation and 
modes of participation across 17 countries. 
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4.2 OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES 
Two empirical accounts challenge the theoretical ideal of tolerant activists as custodians of 
liberal democracy. They assume different microfoundations, predict opposite directional 
associations, and respond to political context in unique ways.  According to the first, if a positive 
association between tolerance and political action exists, it is only because individuals possess a 
number of characteristics that simultaneously increase tolerance and their potential for political 
action. Hence, greater tolerance and regular participation constitute a syndrome of pro-
democratic orientations, shaped by similar underlying individual-level factors:  
Syndrome Hypothesis: Tolerant individuals are no more or less likely to participate in politics 
than intolerant individuals.  
   
By contrast, the second account suggests that tolerance and participation are conflicting, 
not complementary, orientations. From this perspective, tolerance and participation constitute a 
tradeoff between pro-democratic orientations. Moreover, this perspective conjectures a causal 
relationship between tolerance and participation with few contextual caveats. The attitudinal 
properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” in polities as diverse as the 
United States and Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa 
(Gibson and Gouws 2003). A direct, negative effect of tolerance on civic engagement owing to 
attitudinal, rather than individual-level, asymmetry should therefore hold across countries and 
should be robust to the inclusion of various control variables: 
  
Tradeoff hypothesis: Tolerant individuals are less likely to participate in politics than 
intolerant individuals 
 
It is not clear from either of these standard accounts which forms of political action, if 
any, political tolerance should influence. As I argued in Chapter Three, whether and how 
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tolerance influences participation depends on the difficulty of performing the political act. The 
hurdles posed by different modes of political expression may be understood as contextual 
determinants of whether tolerance stimulates or suppresses political action potential.  
Private political actions (e.g. voting, donating, contacting) pose low hurdles – usually 
loss of time, energy, or money – which civic skills and material resources serve to overcome. 
Public political actions (e.g. protest, boycotts, rallies, petitioning) pose high hurdles because they 
involve cooperation with other citizens and potential conflict with counter-participants and 
government authorities. Beyond resources, interest, and mobilization networks, these high social 
costs require certain positive dispositions toward disagreement, risk, and conflict.  
To the extent that tolerance is a more unpopular, disagreeable, and risky position than 
intolerance, it poses non-trivial social costs to the tolerant individual which are not unlike those 
costs associated with expressing one’s own political views through public means. This 
correspondence is important because social psychologists have demonstrated that individuals 
tend to behave consistently across similar types of situations, e.g. situations that make similar 
demands on actors who encounter them (Furr and Funder 2003; Shoda et al. 1993). Individuals 
who endure weighty costs to protect political expression by nonconformist groups may be more 
willing to confront similar costs to their own political expression. Hence, a direct relationship 
between tolerance and political activism is conditional on parallels in their relative costs to the 
individual actor:  
  
Behavioral Consistency Hypothesis: Tolerant individuals will be more likely to participate in 
high-cost, public forms of political action than intolerant individuals.  
  
Importantly, the connection between individuals’ applied support for civil liberties and 
their willingness to participation through contentious and collective public action may be far 
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more tenuous in certain political contexts. Whether individuals will draw any connections 
between democratic orientations like tolerance and civic engagement depends in the first place 
on the availabilities of these values in the public. Theories of political socialization expect broad 
disparities in the distribution and support for democratic norms across countries at different 
levels of democratization. Past studies find persistent differences across post-communist and 
Western democracies in levels of both tolerance (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007) and civic 
engagement (Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfner 2012). Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) also fail 
to identify connection between tolerance and participation in relatively new democracies. 
Political socialization therefore may account for:  
 
Political Socialization Hypothesis: Tolerant citizens are no more or less likely than intolerant 
citizens to participate in politics in post-communist democracies while they are more likely to 
participate in established democracies. 
 
Still, citizens in post-socialist democracies do not entirely lack democratic values (e.g. 
Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1993; Whitefield and Evans 2001); however, their understanding of 
democracy may differ significantly from Western publics’ (Dalton 1994; Neundorf 2010). 
Democratic transition in some formerly repressive regimes generated considerable political 
uncertainty, facilitated corruption and crime, and aggravated ethnic and linguistic divisions in 
society. Tolerant citizens in these contexts may be less likely to view dissent and disagreement as 
intrinsically useful to democratic stability and, in some cases, may continue to view the 
government and political actions taken in full public view with suspicion. For similar reasons, 
the costs of private participation may be perceived as higher in these contexts. Therefore, to the 
extent that connections can be drawn between tolerance and participation in post-authoritarian 
systems,    
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New Democracy Hypothesis: Tolerant citizens are more likely to engage in private modes of 
participation than intolerant citizens in post-communist democracies.  
4.3 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
One reason explanations of the tolerance-participation linkage remain entangled is that scholars 
have not been able to separate the direct effects of tolerance attitudes on participation from 
effects that owe instead to individual-level factors that generate tolerance attitudes. Fortunately, 
researchers using observational data can now minimize differences between tolerant and 
intolerant individuals on a host of observable traits that drive (in)tolerance and may also shape 
differences in participation (e.g. education, dogmatism, support for democratic norms and 
institutions, discussion network heterogeneity). Through coarsened exact matching (CEM) 
procedures (Iacus, King and Porro 2012; Ho et al 2007), it is possible to balance and pair 
individuals on such dimensions as completely as possible and constrain analysis only to 
respondents who mirror one another on all observable dimensions except tolerance.  
Statistical matching designs have their basis in the Neyman-Rubin causal framework 
(Neyman 1990; Rubin 2006), which increases the power of causal inferences in non-
experimental settings where selection confounders pose problems for analysis. In brief, let Yi1 be 
the potential outcome for the ith individual if she receives a treatment (e.g., a non-smoking 
program), and Yi0 if she does not. The causal effect of treatment then is πi = Yi1 – Yi0. However, 
the “fundamental problem of casual inference” (Holland 1986) is that we cannot both treat and 
not treat individual i; Yi1 and Yi0 cannot both be observed.  
Instead, we treat some but not others and observe differences across the groups. 
Experiments use random assignment to ensure that observed differences between the groups 
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result from treatment exposure rather than other factors. Nonrandom designs must rely on the 
assumption that selection into treatment depends only on X observable covariates and on no other 
observable or unobservable characteristics.
14
 That is, conditional on X, the potential outcomes of 
receiving treatment or control are orthogonal to the particular treatment assignment, or {T  Y1, 
Y0}|X. In the present analysis, conditioning on the set of observable factors that drive the choice 
to tolerate one’s most disliked political out-group – factors that have been theoretically grounded 
and shown to be empirically robust over a half-century of empirical research – permits me to 
assess the independent effects of tolerance on levels of participation. 
There are several matching methods for improving covariate balance between tolerant 
and intolerant individuals. Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) and Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) “choose a fixed number of observations ex ante (typically a multiple of the 
number of treated units) and hope for imbalance reduction [between treatment and control 
groups] as a result of the procedure. In contrast, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and caliper-
based approaches choose a fixed level of imbalance ex ante and hope that the number of 
observations left as a result is sufficiently large” (King et al. 2011: 2).  
However, two advantages of CEM over PSM are that the former makes no functional 
form or distributional assumptions about the relationship between treatment and outcome, and 
that its statistical properties enable CEM to further reduce imbalance, model dependence, 
                                                 
14
 This is typically called the Selection on Observables Assumption (SOA), which is 
assumed by most causal approaches in observational social science (Rubin 1974). The SOA 
requires that there are no unobserved or excluded characteristics that drive selection into 
treatment after conditioning on X. Therefore, SOA must be assumed to hold after conditioning. 
In practice, there is no direct way to assess whether SOA is reasonable in a particular study. 
However, balance and sensitivity tests can provide information about how strong the selection 
assumption will be in a particular research design. For instance, see Table 5 in this chapter. 
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estimation errors, bias, and variance between treatment and control respondents on most 
important covariates. By contrast, the balancing properties of PSM hold “only on average across 
samples and even then only by assuming a set of normally unverifiable assumptions about the 
data generation process. In any application, a single use of [PSM] techniques can increase 
imbalance and model dependence by any amount” (Iacus, King and Porro 2011: 2). Moreover, 
CEM can be applied to any modeling strategy – such as OLS regression or maximum likelihood 
estimation – as a simple weighting of respondents to render their values on selection confounders 
statistically balanced. This makes interpreting estimates derived from models in which CEM has 
been applied relatively straightforward; akin to conventional standards.  
The principal difference between non-parametric (i.e. pre-estimation) matching methods 
and statistical controls using multiple regression is that the former restricts analysis to a 
reasonable comparison group. That is, a group in which the “treated” and “control” subjects are 
approximately equivalent on factors that could predict their selection into the treatment or 
control categories. For instance, suppose that individuals “select into” treatment – tolerance, in 
this case – based only on their level of dogmatism and support for democratic procedures. 
Through CEM, the researcher stratifies tolerant and intolerant respondents by “coarsened” levels 
of each underlying variable to facilitate pairing a tolerant individual of moderate dogmatism and 
strong support for democratic procedures with an intolerant individual of moderate dogmatism 
and strong support for democratic procedures. Where differences between dogmatism and 
democratic procedures support have been balanced across tolerant and intolerant respondents, 
any disparity in these respondents’ levels of participation can be attributed to the fact that one 
respondent in the matched pair is tolerant while the other is not.  
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As a consequence of this type of procedure, matching sacrifices large sample sizes in 
order to furnish unbiased effects of tolerance on participation; this approximates the assumption 
of no omitted variable bias in linear regression (Zanutto 2006) – an assumption that is often 
violated according to the syndrome account of tolerance and participation. Matching techniques 
are generally unnecessary when covariate distributions are similar across “treatment” and 
“control” groups (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Rubin 1997). This will not be the case where 
tolerance is employed as an independent variable, because tolerant and intolerant individuals 
tend to differ substantially in terms of their basic psychological orientations (e.g. dogmatism, 
insecurity), broad democratic orientations (e.g. support for procedural norms), and concern for 
the normative community (e.g. sociotropic threat).  
I therefore employ CEM procedures to conduct a basic operational test of the 
perspectives developed here. If tolerance and participation constitute a syndrome of pro-
democratic traits, positive and significant bivariate correlations between them should vanish 
when tolerance is conditioned on individual-level selection confounders that cause tolerance and 
may also influence participation (the syndrome hypothesis). If instead the tradeoff hypothesis is 
accurate, tolerance should exert a significant but negative influence on participation after 
controlling for observable antecedents that cause it. Alternatively, the behavioral consistency 
hypothesis expects tolerance to stimulate participation – but only through collective and 
contentious, public means, and only in established democracies. 
4.3.1 Data, measurement, and model specification 
Analysis relies on the 2006 “U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy” (USCID) survey 
and the 2004 “International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) “Citizenship” survey of 16 
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European countries.
15
 Coarsened exact matching requires a dichotomous explanatory variable to 
allow each tolerant individual to be matched with her best “intolerant counterfactual.” I first 
generate tolerance indices for each dataset and then split at the index mean to create a grouping 
variable in which tolerant individuals are “more tolerant” than the sample mean and intolerant 
individuals are “less tolerant” than the sample mean. Dividing in this manner sacrifices no 
observations and allows for a more conservative test of between-subject differences by not 
limiting comparison to extremely (in)tolerant individuals. In the USCID, tolerance is measured 
as respondents’ mean willingness to allow “public demonstrations” by radical Muslims, atheists, 
communists, and religious fundamentalists. Tolerance in the ISSP is one’s average willingness to 
permit “public meetings” by religious extremists, racists, and militarists. These items are not 
“content-controlled” – that is, respondents formulate tolerance judgments about preselected 
groups rather than a particular group that they strongly dislike. Content-controlled tolerance 
items are available only in USCID data and I include results based on these measures for 
comparison throughout the analysis.
16
 Question wording for these and all other variables is 
presented in the appendix to Chapter Four. 
The theoretical rationale for CEM is to minimize differences across respondents on 
those individual-level factors that predict (in)tolerance but may also shape participation. As I 
discussed in Chapter Two, individuals are generally more tolerant when they perceive their 
political enemies as less threatening, when they more strongly support democratic norms and 
                                                 
15
 These are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.   
16
 Alternative cross-national datasets, such as the World Values Survey (1995) and 
Eurobarometer (1997) offer content controlled tolerance items but lack extensive or even similar 
participation items. The European Social Survey does not include tolerance items in any wave.  
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procedures, and when they are less dogmatic and psychologically insecure. These same factors 
may account for variation in levels of participation across tolerant and intolerant citizens  
Dogmatism represents the propensity for closed-minded thinking and is measured with 
five items: that there is only one correct philosophy in the world, that it is better to pick friends 
who share one’s beliefs, that people in the world are either for “truth” or against it, and that 
compromise with political opponents is dangerous. Sociotropic threat is measured as the extent 
to which respondents perceive their target group is dangerous, unwilling to follow the rules of 
democracy, un-American, or likely to “change everything” if they came to power. Support for 
democratic norms and procedures is a composite index of individuals’ support for individual 
freedom over public order and security and a firm belief in multiparty competition. Social 
network heterogeneity indicates the average opinion diversity among respondents’ political 
discussion partners who are friends, neighbors, or coworkers.  
Among these, discussion network heterogeneity and sociotropic threat measures are 
unavailable in ISSP data. To proxy for network heterogeneity, I match European respondents by 
population density. This cannot ensure that they do in fact discuss politics with people who hold 
different views, but research consistently reports higher network heterogeneity in terms of race, 
religion, income, occupation, and education among individuals who reside in urban areas (e.g. 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). To the extent that such factors influence political 
views, greater opportunity for ideologically diverse discussion partners will exist in urban areas 
than in the countryside. Threat measures are not offered in the ISSP, but these are not 
conventionally included in models that do not employ content-controlled measures of tolerance 
(Gibson 1992a).  
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Statistical models will compare the effects of tolerance on participation when tolerance 
has been “conditioned” on these factors through CEM and when it has not. But tolerance must 
also significantly influence political action independently of conventional predictors of “civic 
voluntarism” (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). According to standard accounts, people 
participate because they have assets at their disposal that enable political action, because they are 
sufficiently interested in political matters, and because they are in a better position to be called 
into action. Indicators of these three dimensions – resources (education, income, and free time), 
psychological engagement with politics (political interest and efficacy), and mobilization 
networks (involvement in civic associations) – are included in the vector of control variables in 
all models. Additionally, since education and associational involvement have been found to also 
increase tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Iglič 2010), I also include these variables in the CEM 
function.  Respondents’ education level ranges from 0 – 6, and at the poles represents no formal 
schooling and completed post-graduate degree, respectively. Free time is the weekly hours 
respondents do not spend working, and their income is categorized by decile. Efficacy is 
measured as respondents’ belief that they grasp political matters and that politicians are 
concerned with their political opinions. Political interest is respondents’ average frequency of 
political discussion and general interest in political matters, while associational involvement is a 
count of 0 – 17 memberships in voluntary organizations. 
Finally, I control for a variety of demographic and other predictors of political 
participation through simple regression adjustment. Previous research shows that using 
conventional controls to adjust for remaining covariate imbalances is robust against violations of 
the linear model in matched samples (Rubin 1979; Rubin and Thomas 2000). Gender has an 
important and variable influence on voting behavior while race carries mixed but nontrivial 
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effects, especially for non-voting participation (Leighley 1995). Dichotomous measures of both 
traits are incorporated into the models, as is respondents’ age. Beyond demographics, I control 
for strength of party identification, interpersonal trust (the belief that people are fair, helpful, 
and trustworthy), and institutional trust (average confidence in the legislature, political parties, 
constitutional court, and legal system). Whitely (1995) finds that strong party identifiers are 
more likely to be activists, while social trust increases participation especially in public actions 
like protest (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Benson and Rochon 2004). Political/Institutional trust is 
expected to decrease the probability of civic engagement Kaase (1999).  
I examine the effect of political tolerance on participation in several activities, including: 
voting, contacting elected officials, donating to political candidates or causes, volunteering for 
campaigns or other political work (USCID only), petitioning, boycotting products, attending 
political rallies (ISSP only), protest, and joining political causes via the internet. To assess 
whether political tolerance influences participation, initial models will examine the effects of 
tolerance on overall levels of participation using a full count of political activities, ranging from 
0 – 8 in both datasets. This serves as a preliminary test of the syndrome and tradeoff accounts of 
tolerance and participation, which do not predict heterogeneity across modes of action. I then 
examine how political tolerance matters for participation using a series of ordinal logistic 
regressions to compare cross-national patterns of participation through public and private forms 
of action. This serves to test the revisionist costs-consistency hypothesis and new democracy 
hypothesis proposed here. 
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4.4 POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION 
According to the syndrome hypothesis, political tolerance and political participation are 
positively associated because tolerant and intolerant citizens differ on a number of individual-
level characteristics that influence both tolerance and political activism. Operationally, this 
relationship should manifest as positive and significant bivariate correlations that wash out once 
tolerance is conditioned on individual-level differences through CEM. By contrast, the tradeoff 
hypothesis posits that tolerance will suppress political action potential because attributes unique 
to tolerance render preferences weak, pliable, and ambivalent. This relationship should emerge 
where tolerance has been conditioned on individual-level selection confounders through CEM. 
The results in Table 3 do not support either claim. Positive and significant bivariate relationships 
between tolerance and participation do not become insignificant and do not change direction 
when coarsened exact matching is applied. Instead, tolerance exerts a consistently positive effect 
on participation levels, whose magnitude surges as additional control variables are introduced. 
Political tolerance appears to increase political activity over and above the conventional 
predictors of political participation.  
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Table 3 Political Tolerance and Levels of Participation in the United States and Europe 
 
United States Europe† 
 
r CEM CEM with Controls r CEM CEM with Controls 
Tolerant 0.137 0.600 (0.218) 0.889 (0.216) 0.049 0.149 (0.056) 0.182 (0.042) 
Education 
   
0.193 (0.079) 
   
0.293 (0.020) 
Income 
   
0.022 (0.043) 
   
0.011 (0.021) 
Free time 
   
-0.012 (0.011) 
   
-0.001 (0.001) 
Political Interest 
   
0.864 (0.161) 
   
0.599 (0.049) 
Efficacy 
   
0.256 (0.152) 
   
0.371 (0.039) 
Associational involvement  
  
0.357 (0.066) 
   
0.403 (0.024) 
Institutional trust 
   
-0.143 (0.066) 
   
-0.073 (0.023) 
Social trust 
   
0.009 (0.067) 
   
0.116 (0.035) 
Strong Party ID 
   
0.238 (0.205) 
   
0.431 (0.138) 
Black 
   
-0.973 (0.305) 
   
-- -- 
Female 
   
-0.170 (0.211) 
   
0.054 (0.060) 
Age 
   
-0.006 (0.007) 
   
-0.001 (0.002) 
Cut 1 
 
0.001 (0.177) 1.834 (1.635) 
 
-1.697 (0.053) 2.719 (0.247) 
Cut 2 
 
0.714 (0.181) 3.049 (1.650) 
 
-0.717 (0.034) 3.878 (0.249) 
Cut 3 
 
1.424 (0.193) 4.004 (1.644) 
 
0.070 (0.035) 4.833 (0.246) 
Cut 4 
 
1.947 (0.200) 4.781 (1.649) 
 
0.814 (0.039) 5.746 (0.249) 
Cut 5 
 
2.603 (0.198) 5.572 (1.651) 
 
1.558 (0.041) 6.645 (0.243) 
Cut 6 
 
4.008 (0.343) 6.601 (1.644) 
 
2.363 (0.042) 7.577 (0.239) 
Cut 7 
 
5.093 (0.583) 8.258 (1.689) 
 
3.302 (0.078) 8.603 (0.233) 
Log pseudolikelihood  -557.788 -303.489 
 
-29921.922 -26493.567 
Observations 928 714 454 18528 16995 16430 
Pseudo-R² 
 
0.008 0.178 
 
0.069 0.146 
Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Standard Errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .05 
†Standard errors clustered by country. TABLE A.1 in Appendix A includes country fixed effects in the ISSP model 
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This is an important finding. Tolerance is, according to previous work, an ambivalent 
and weak position compared to intolerance. Yet it appears to stimulate participation in both the 
American and European contexts even after controlling for the most widely accepted and potent 
determinants of civic voluntarism. And the effect is not trivial. Exponentiation of the coefficients 
reveals that, in the United States, tolerant individuals are likely to take part in nearly 2.5 
additional actions than intolerant individuals, while Europeans will engage in at least 1.2 more 
actions – a 31 and 15 percent increase in participation, respectively. In the United States, this is 
roughly half of the cumulative effect on participation of resources, psychological engagement, 
and mobilization potential.  
Such influence merits additional robustness and specification checks. First, note the 
significant loss of U.S. observations in column three of Table 3. This loss is partially attributable 
to the CEM procedure itself (214 observations are lost from column 1 to column 2) and further 
attributable to the inclusion of additional control variables for which there are low response rates 
(namely, network heterogeneity and strong party identification). Since it is not theoretically 
defensible to exclude these latter controls, I address this problem by employing an alternate 
matching procedure – Propensity Score kernel Matching. PSM tends to preserve more 
observations. But it retains them at the expense of greater and sometimes random imbalance in 
other covariates and increased model dependence (Iacus, King and Porro 2011). However, a 
similar pattern of results across CEM and PSM models would increase confidence that the results 
are not model-dependent.  
PSM using the kernel algorithm uses all observations from the control, i.e. intolerant, 
group and weights them. The closer each intolerant individual’s propensity to in fact be tolerant 
– that is, the more similar each intolerant individual is to a tolerant individual in terms of their 
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threat perceptions, dogmatism, support for democratic values, etc. – the higher their weight. By 
contrast very low weights are given to intolerant observations that differ significantly from 
tolerant observations. Therefore, PSM using kernel matching retains more observations because 
each tolerant individual is matched with several intolerant individuals, and during estimation, 
weights are applied which are inversely proportional to the distance between tolerant and 
intolerant observations on selection confounders.  
The outcome of estimation represents the “Average Treatment effect on the Treated” or 
ATT, which in this case is the difference between the levels of participation between tolerant 
individuals and the levels of participation of tolerant individuals if they were instead intolerant:  
 
Equation 1 
 
 
where {D = 1} represents “treated” or in this case “tolerant” individuals, and {x} 
represents confounding variables sociotropic threat perceptions, dogmatism, support for 
democratic procedures, network heterogeneity, and education. The last term of Equation 4.1, 
E(y0|x, D = 1), is a counterfactual condition that cannot be observed, as we wish to know what 
the outcome would be for the tolerant if they had not in fact been tolerant {y0}. Propensity score 
matching provides a good approximation of this term by strongly weighting observations of 
intolerant individuals with very similar underlying characteristics as tolerant individuals in the 
data set, such that these matched pairs share similar propensity scores {p(x)} for being tolerant, 
but in reality differ in their observed levels of tolerance:  
 
Equation 2 
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Table 4 presents the results for the United States using Propensity Score kernel 
matching. As can be seen in the first column, this method retains fully 871 observations. In the 
second column, we see that the average effect of tolerance on participation is 0.477, which can 
be interpreted as the percent change in number of participatory actions in which an intolerant 
individual would engage if she had instead been tolerant. Given our underlying scale of 8 
participatory actions, tolerance contributes to an increase of approximately 3.8 participatory 
actions over intolerance where threat, dogmatism, democratic procedures support, education and 
network heterogeneity are equivalent across these groups. This suggests that the results are not 
method-dependent. 
 
Table 4 Tolerance and Levels of Participation in the United States using Propensity Score Kernel Matching 
     
 
N ATT 
Bootstrapped 
Standard Error 
 
            t-score 
     
Tolerant 480 0.477 0.123 3.881 
Intolerant 391    
     
Notes: Propensity score weighting on dogmatism, threat, democratic procedures support, education, and discussion 
network heterogeneity. Additional controls: institutional and social trust, income, free time, political interest, race, 
gender, age.  
 
A second possible objection to the findings in Table 3 is that CEM did not fully 
eliminate statistical differences across tolerant and intolerant groups and failed to minimize the 
influence of selection confounders on the relationship between political tolerance and political 
activism. In Table 5, I report the degree of imbalance between tolerant and intolerant groups on 
the main covariates before and after matching. The table shows that substantial differences 
between the groups on mean values of main covariates were largely eradicated after CEM 
procedures were implemented. This helps confirm that the observed difference between tolerant 
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and intolerant groups is not an artifact of preexisting disparities in the major predictors of 
tolerance and participation. 
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Table 5 Imbalance between Tolerant and Intolerant Groups on Main Covariates, USCID and ISSP 
    
  Pooled ISSP  USCID USCID content-controlled items 
 Pre-Matching Post-Matching Pre-Matching Post-Matching Pre-Matching Post-Matching 
 Tol. Intol. Tol. Intol. Tol. Intol. Tol. Intol. Tol. Intol. Tol. Intol. 
             
Sociotropic threat -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5.754 6.093 5.768 5.844 
             
Dogmatism 5.504 5.570 5.719 5.736 2.691 2.974 2.725 2.720 2.606 2.985 2.684 2.704 
             
Support for democratic 
values and procedures 5.592 5.501 5.631 5.642 3.758 3.545 3.706 3.654 3.883 3.486 3.767 3.728 
             
Network heterogeneity 2.697 2.656 2.577 2.556 3.864 3.673 3.744 3.636 3.917 3.668 3.862 3.979 
             
Education 2.858 2.738 2.871 2.869 3.421 3.035 3.521 3.529 3.681 2.904 3.665 3.549 
             
Income 3.352 2.862 2.911 2.910 5.371 5.301 5.455 5.766 5.662 5.083 5.565 5.629 
             
Free time 140.22 140.75 142.83 142.27 126.63 125.86 126.50 125.79 125.94 126.55 126.45 126.13 
             
Political interest 2.427 2.455 2.405 2.412 2.818 2.682 2.780 2.795 2.936 2.615 2.823 2.709 
             
Efficacy 2.874 2.816 2.825 2.827 2.794 2.681 2.823 2.817 2.895 2.622 2.899 2.737 
             
Associational involvement 1.363 1.215 1.153 1.161 1.382 1.131 1.419 1.427 1.504 1.083 1.402 1.082 
Boldfaced comparisons indicate significant differences at .10 level between tolerant and intolerant groups 
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A third source of bias may relate to how tolerance is measured. The tradeoff hypothesis is 
based on evidence that tolerance and intolerance are qualitatively different attitudes when 
measured in relation to groups that respondents select as their most disliked (i.e. content 
controlled measurement). The evidence herein that challenges the tradeoff hypothesis is based 
instead on measures of tolerance toward groups that researchers selected, which respondents 
may not necessarily oppose (i.e. GSS measures).
17
 However, the same patterns emerge in Table 
6, which repeats the analysis in the United States using tolerance for each respondent’s most 
disliked group as the independent variable.
18
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for a review of these measures of political tolerance.  
18
 Results are presented for U.S. respondents only; alternative tolerance items are not available in 
the ISSP. 
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Table 6 Tolerance for Most-Disliked Group and Levels of Participation in the United States 
    
 
r CEM CEM with Controls 
      Tolerant 0.129 0.466 (0.187) 0.468 (0.254) 
Education 
   
0.236 (0.090) 
Income 
   
-0.026 (0.077) 
Free time 
   
-0.004 (0.014) 
Political Interest 
   
0.713 (0.191) 
Efficacy 
   
0.149 (0.196) 
Associational involvement  
  
0.500 (0.081) 
Institutional trust 
   
-0.049 (0.084) 
Social trust 
   
-0.034 (0.086) 
Strong Party ID 
   
0.278 (0.271) 
Black 
   
-0.887 (0.366) 
Female 
   
0.031 (0.274) 
Age 
   
-0.010 (0.007) 
      Cut 1 
 
0.050 (0.154) 2.207 (1.960) 
Cut 2 
 
0.838 (0.162) 3.303 (1.968) 
Cut 3 
 
1.477 (0.183) 4.227 (1.991) 
Cut 4 
 
2.145 (0.184) 5.147 (2.014) 
Cut 5 
 
2.881 (0.179) 6.006 (1.990) 
Cut 6 
 
4.269 (0.314) 7.529 (1.982) 
Cut 7 
 
4.913 (0.427) 8.382 (2.033) 
      Log pseudolikelihood  -937.540 -504.396 
Observations 928 611 376 
Pseudo-R² 
 
0.005 0.137 
Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Standard Errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant 
at p ≤ .05 
 
 
Tolerance remains positively consequential for political participation where it is 
conditioned on sociotropic threat, dogmatism, support for democratic values, discussion network 
heterogeneity, education, and associational involvement. Respondents who extend basic rights to 
their most disliked groups participate in 1.6 more actions than respondents who do not (b=0.468; 
p≤.05). Again regression-adjusted CEM sacrifices a large number of observations; however, 
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Table 7 presents the same pattern of outcomes using propensity score kernel matching where 
tolerance is measured using content-controlled methodology. 
 
Table 7 Tolerance and Levels of participation in the United States using Content-Controlled Measures and 
Propensity Score Kernel Matching 
     
 
N ATT 
Bootstrapped 
Standard Error 
 
            t-score 
     
Tolerant 371 0.499 0.129 3.863 
Intolerant 458    
     
Notes: Propensity score weighting on dogmatism, threat, democratic procedures support, education, and discussion 
network heterogeneity. Additional controls: institutional and social trust, income, free time, political interest, race, 
gender, age.  
 
 
Finally, pooled European analysis in the ISSP may bias findings toward statistical 
significance given the large number of observations. Moreover, applying matching procedures to 
a pan-European sample ignores real variation across countries in both tolerance and its 
predictors. For instance, completing the highest level of education in the Netherlands and in 
Latvia may not produce identical knowledge effects across Dutch and Latvian citizens. As a final 
robustness check, I disaggregate the ISSP data, match tolerant and intolerant respondents within 
each country, and run unique models for each country sample. The third column of Table 8 
presents the marginal effects of tolerance on participation based on CEM-balanced ordered 
logistic regression estimates.  
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Table 8 Marginal Effect of Political Tolerance on Participation Levels, by Country 
      
 
Coefficient Standard Error Marginal Effect N 
New democracies 
   Bulgaria -0.200 0.196 0.819 667 
Czech Republic 0.533 0.163 1.704 726 
Hungary -0.395 0.198 0.674 835 
Latvia 0.100 0.163 1.105 671 
Poland 0.238 0.145 1.269 1129 
Slovenia 0.299 0.178 1.349 542 
Slovakia 0.048 0.135 1.049 842 
     Old democracies 
   Austria 0.476 0.179 1.610 623 
Denmark 0.304 0.175 1.355 560 
Finland 0.318 0.189 1.374 515 
France 0.018 0.136 1.018 930 
Ireland 0.373 0.172 1.452 589 
Netherlands 0.314 0.139 1.369 895 
Norway 0.477 0.162 1.611 746 
Sweden 0.286 0.142 1.331 851 
UK 0.439 0.200 1.551 450 
USA†  0.889 0.216 2.433 454 
USA (content-controlled [c-c])† 0.468 0.254 1.597 376 
      
Results from ordered logistic regression with CEM balancing. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .05 
†Estimates for U.S. based on USCID (2006) survey; all other estimates derived from ISSP (2004) 
  
The evidence again casts doubt on conventional syndrome and tradeoff accounts of 
tolerance and participation. Tolerance stimulates political action in 11 of 17 countries studied by 
an average of approximately 1.5 additional actions among tolerant over intolerant respondents. 
The effect is not entirely limited to longstanding democracies, as tolerance stimulates 
participation in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. But the effect is far weaker in the post-
communist context and, in the case of Hungary, suppresses political participation as the tradeoff 
hypothesis suggests.  
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The findings thus far challenge conventional notions of how tolerance and participation 
are linked. The increase in political activity that accompanies tolerance cannot be understood 
merely as a symptom of a broader constellation of democratic traits, as the syndrome hypothesis 
maintains. Matching procedures successfully isolate tolerance and intolerance from these factors 
(cf. Table 5), meaning that the observed differences between individuals are likely to have 
resulted from differences in tolerance attitudes. This in turn poses new questions for the 
“tradeoff” between greater tolerance and more vibrant civic engagement, either because being 
tolerant facilitates exposure to the kinds of cross-cutting political talk that sinks confidence in 
one’s own views and makes citizens socially accountable to diversely opinionated constituencies 
(Mutz 2005), or because tolerance is too weak and too dissonant a position to stimulate political 
action. The unexpected regularity emerging here is that attitudinal tolerance – divorced from 
those individual-level characteristics that lead one to tolerate in the first place – increases 
political engagement.  
Of course, the skeptic may still be skeptical: limitations in the USCID and ISSP survey 
data prevent me from examining the influence of additional variables that I argue in Chapter 
Three are crucial to public participation – namely attitudes toward conflict and dissent. Having 
matched on all important observed factors, these remaining unobserved factors could still 
account for the positive relationship. Matching reduces the degree to which the tolerance-
participation is spurious due to other observed variables in the statistical model. And while it 
cannot perfectly render unobserved factors inconsequential, the effects of such factors can be 
simulated empirically and ruled out theoretically (see section 4.6, below). I more fully address 
these factors using original survey-experiments in Chapter Six. Moreover, without longitudinal 
data, it is not possible to address whether a positive causal feedback between tolerance and 
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participation accounts for the relationship demonstrated above. However, the next section will 
test certain implications of both these perspectives by evaluating the influence of tolerance 
across different modes of participation, and across different countries. These analyses cannot 
conclude beyond a shadow of a doubt that only tolerance causes participation rather than the 
reverse, but they will provide a bevy of support for the heretofore understudied behavioral 
consequences of political tolerance. 
4.5 POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND MODES OF PARTICIPATION 
In what sense does being willing to extend expressive rights to disliked groups drive the tolerant 
individual to embrace those same rights for herself? I have proposed the behavioral consistency 
hypothesis to explain this outcome. Tolerance is an unpopular, disagreeable, and risky position 
that dissents from majority intolerance and may be misconstrued as overt support for a widely 
reviled group and its nonconformist ideals. In this sense, tolerance is not unlike public activism, 
which seeks to challenge the status quo through non-anonymous actions taken in full public 
view. On one hand, people tend to behave consistently across situations that make similar 
demands of the actors engaged (Shoda et al. 1993). On the other hand, previous research 
suggests that tolerance has the capacity to reduce perceptions of threat (Gibson 2002) and risk in 
a manner that may directly facilitate their engagement in high-cost forms of political activity. 
Individuals who endure weighty costs to protect political expression by nonconformist groups 
may be more willing to face-down similar barriers to their own political expression. Hence, the 
relationship between tolerance and political activism is conditional on parallels in their relative 
costs to the individual actor. The important contextual caveat, however, is that this relationship 
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may be reversed in new democracies where deep seated suspicion of government and collective 
political activities persists (Wallace et al. 1995) and where citizens may perceive very real risks 
of government reprisal should they publicly challenge the status quo. In the post-authoritarian 
context, I therefore speculate that tolerant citizens may be more likely to engage in private, rather 
than public, forms of action (the new democracy hypothesis).  
As evidence for these propositions, Table 9 illustrates the marginal change in 
participation in each particular action from intolerant to tolerant individuals within each country 
in the data. The entries reflect the increase or decrease in likelihood of taking each form of action 
that corresponds with a shift from intolerance to tolerance. The marginal change coefficients are 
grouped into quadrants so it is easier to visualize clusters of private and public activities among 
respondents in post-communist and longstanding democracies. Boldfaced entries are significant 
at p ≤ .05.  
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Table 9 Marginal Change in Participation, Intolerant to Tolerant 
  Private Actions 
 
Public Actions 
  
Vote Donate Contact Internet 
 
Petition Boycott Rally  Protest 
         
New democracies         
Bulgaria -0.083 -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 -0.024 0.001 0.015 0.019 
Czech Republic 0.013 0.049 0.014 0.003  0.106 0.035 0.032 0.015 
Hungary 0.008 -0.034 -0.034 0.000  0.000 -0.004 -0.010 -0.006 
Latvia -0.074 0.032 0.026 0.012  -0.026 -0.010 -0.012 -0.039 
Poland 0.024 0.068 0.009 0.011 
 0.027 -0.002 -0.001 0.046 
Slovenia 0.002 -0.004 0.029 0.000  0.052 0.023 0.024 0.044 
Slovakia -0.017 -0.015 -0.023 0.001  0.043 0.028 0.045 -0.014 
          
Old democracies        
Austria 0.027 0.020 0.028 0.006  0.079 0.142 0.122 0.114 
Denmark -0.018 0.111 -0.018 0.014  -0.001 0.059 -0.011 0.096 
Finland -0.007 0.110 0.081 -0.003  0.112 -0.016 0.093 -0.024 
France -0.023 0.039 0.016 -0.009  0.056 0.070 0.006 0.022 
Ireland 0.025 0.056 -0.021 0.010  0.056 0.152 -0.034 0.075 
Netherlands 0.004 -0.013 0.112 0.010  0.036 0.079 0.052 0.063 
Norway 0.006 0.059 0.087 0.021 
 0.016 0.113 0.061 0.065 
Sweden 0.001 0.063 0.094 0.008  0.054 0.013 0.060 0.004 
UK -0.021 0.079 0.030 0.000  0.005 0.143 0.039 0.074 
USA† 0.006 0.055 0.080 0.145  0.231 0.116 0.003 0.000 
USA (c-c) 0.007 0.029 0.058 0.107  0.214 0.112 0.096 0.015 
          
Results from CEM-balanced logistic regression. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .05  
†Estimates for U.S. based on USCID (2006) survey; all other estimates derived from ISSP (2004).  
 
The clearest results, in the lower-right quadrant, support the hypothesis that tolerance 
stimulates participation in contentious-collective, public actions in longstanding democracies. A 
shift from intolerance to tolerance raises the likelihood of at least one activity in every country in 
the sample. In Austria, tolerant citizens are more likely than their intolerant countrymen to 
engage in every public activity. The pattern is weakest in Denmark, where tolerant Danes are 
nearly 10 percent more likely to protest than intolerant Danes, but not significantly more or less 
likely to petition, boycott, or attend rallies.  
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In general, the magnitudes of marginal change in each public mode of participation from 
intolerance to tolerance are moderate to small in size. But the range of tolerance’s influence on 
public participation is far broader than it is on private modes of action. In the lower-left quadrant, 
it is clear that tolerant citizens in some – especially Scandinavian – countries will also tend to 
take more private actions than intolerant citizens. The effects are mostly confined to contacting, 
however, which has the most potential for conflict and may in some cases involve face-to-face 
encounters. Taken together, the lower half of Table 9 supports the liberal commitment 
hypothesis: tolerance stimulates more participation through public rather than through private 
political actions.  
The new democracy hypothesis is not supported, however. Tolerance in post-communist 
democracies does not tend to increase the likelihood that citizens will engage in private political 
activities. In Bulgaria and Hungary respectively, tolerance instead decreases the likelihood of 
voting and contacting officials, and is otherwise inconsequential. Tolerant Poles are 6.8 percent 
more likely and tolerant Czechs 4.9 percent more likely than their intolerant compatriots to 
donate to political parties or causes. But in these countries, and in Slovenia, tolerance also 
increases the probability of involvement in certain public acts as well, though the effects are 
generally small. These states experienced rather smooth transition to democracy and are 
characterized by low corruption and little ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. The positive influence 
of democratic orientations on activism may be taken as a sign of democratic consolidation in 
these countries.  
The core idea behind the behavioral consistency hypothesis is that tolerance, as a high-
cost decision, has the capacity to increase the degree to which individuals are willing to confront 
costs associated with public political action. In that sense, tolerance facilitates public political 
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action in the same way that resources, psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization 
potential lowers barriers to civic engagement in general. Does tolerance truly help lift citizens 
over the high barriers to public political action? A strong test of this proposition would show that 
tolerant individuals at the lowest level of resources, psychological engagement with politics and 
mobilization potential are nonetheless more likely to engage in public political activities than 
intolerant individuals at the highest levels of these factors. Using the most conservative, content-
controlled measures of tolerance for respondents most disliked group in USCID data, Figure 1 
depicts the marginal increase in probability of public action among tolerant and intolerant 
individuals at the minimum and maximum levels of associational involvement, political interest, 
and education. 
 
Figure 1 Public Participation among Tolerant and Intolerant Citizens at Polarized Levels of Civic 
Voluntarism Predictors 
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The effects of associational involvement make the point most clearly. Public actions, 
which require much cooperation and may involve conflict, require connections to organizations 
that create both the opportunity for actions like protest, volunteering, and boycotting (e.g. Diani 
and McAdam 2003), and also the encouragement to get involved in such activities. Yet tolerant 
individuals with the lowest levels of associational involvement remain more likely petition, 
boycott, volunteer, or demonstrate than the most involved intolerant individuals. Similarly, less 
educated tolerant citizens (i.e. those who have completed no more than a high-school education), 
remain more likely to engage in contentious and collective political actions than the most 
educated intolerant individuals (i.e. those who have completed at least some college). Although 
intolerant individuals who are more interested in politics appear slightly more likely to engage in 
public political activities than tolerant individuals, the difference does not achieve conventional 
levels of statistical significance. 
4.6 ROSENBAUM SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF TOLERANCE’S EFFECT ON 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Attitudinal tolerance increases public political action after conditioning on differences across 
tolerant and intolerant individuals on observed factors that drive tolerance and may also 
influence participation. Yet it remains possible that the effects demonstrated thus far owe instead 
to unobservable factor(s), and that these “hidden biases” account for the positive relationship 
between attitudinal tolerance and civic engagement. In Chapter Three, for instance, I reviewed 
evidence from political participation research that finds orientations toward risk and conflict in 
particular may render the costs of public activism less daunting. I argued that tolerance has the 
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capacity to shape these factors; however, it is possible that tolerant and intolerant individuals 
differ in terms of these dispositions as preexisting factors. If that is the case, then emergent 
regularity in this chapter may nevertheless remain spurious and the theoretical perspective I have 
developed in this dissertation may be indefensible. Fortunately, Rosenbaum (2002) proposes a 
sensitivity analysis that can be used to estimate the size of the effect on the individuals’ selection 
into tolerance that any bias due to unobserved factors would need to reach in order to overturn 
inferences about the influence of tolerance on public participation.  
The procedure relies first on propensity-score matching (as opposed to coarsened exact 
matching), and second on the estimation of a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the effects 
for public participation under increasingly restrictive assumptions about the probability of each 
individual in a matched pair being tolerant. A baseline is first established under the assumption 
that each individual in a matched pair shares equal likelihood of being tolerant. This is associated 
with an odds ratio (or, in the parlance of Rosenbaum Bounds analysis, a gamma “Γ”) of 1. The 
procedure then simulates gammas of larger values owing to the influence of unobserved factors 
such that the odds that one individuals in a matched pair being tolerant would be 10 percent 
higher (gamma = 1.1), 20 percent higher (gamma = 1.2) and so on. The Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test is calculated until the null hypothesis of “no effect of tolerance” can be rejected at the .05 
level. The gamma value at this point represents the magnitude that hidden bias would have to 
have on the selection process in order to alter the inferences about the effects of tolerance on 
public participation Such a procedure has been used  effectively elsewhere in political science, 
perhaps most clearly by Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2011). 
As a means of substantively grounding the size of this effect, the gamma estimate can be 
compared against the influence of the observed effect of the major theoretical predictors of 
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tolerance on individuals’ propensity to extend procedural rights and civil liberties to groups that 
they dislike the most. Table 10 estimates these observed effects. 
 
Table 10 Estimating the Propensity of Tolerance 
 
Coefficient Odds Ratio 
   Low perceived Sociotropic threat 0.641 1.899 
 
(0.125) 
 High support for democratic values and procedures 1.004 2.729 
 
(0.209) 
 Low dogmatism 0.522 1.685 
 
(0.194) 
 High discussion network heterogeneity 0.137 1.146 
 
(0.083) 
 Constant -9.858 
 
 
(1.073) 
 Results from logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant at p≤ .10 
(two-tailed) 
 
As expected: Tolerance is far more likely where respondents do not believe that their 
most disliked group poses a threat to society, where they more strongly support democratic 
values and procedures in principle, and where individuals are open-minded, rather than 
dogmatic, thinkers. Additionally, having a diverse political discussion network significantly 
increases the likelihood that an individual will countenance ideas and interests they strongly 
oppose.   
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Table 11 Sensitivity Analysis for Effects of Tolerance on Public Participation 
   
  Ratio of Gamma Associated with Unobserved Confounder(s) to Gammas 
(Selection Effect Odds-Ratios) Associated with: 
      
  
 
Gamma (Γ) 
 
Low  
threat 
 
Low 
Dogmatism 
High support for 
democratic values 
and procedures 
 
High network 
heterogeneity 
 
Public 
Participation 
 
 
1.97 
 
 
1.899 
 
 
1.685 
 
 
2.729 
 
 
1.146 
      
 
Table 11 compares these magnitudes against the simulated effects of unobserved factors 
on process of selection into tolerance, which are estimated through the Rosenbaum Bounds 
method. The Gamma value of 1.97 indicates the level at which the effect of tolerance becomes 
sensitive to hidden bias (upper bound p-value > 0.05): an unobserved factor would need to 
increase the odds that an individual would be tolerant by 97 percent in order to overturn the 
inferences I have reported. Substantively speaking, the unobserved factor would need to increase 
individuals’ propensity to tolerate over and above the effects of sociotropic threat and dogmatism 
by approximately 27 and 43 percent, respectively. This seems implausible, as these are among 
the strongest and most consistent predictors of tolerance across countries, and since they almost 
certainly capture, to some extent, unobserved factors related to personality, evaluations of 
current political and economic circumstances, etc. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude 
that the results I have reported are robust to reasonable levels of potential bias caused by 
unobserved factors. 
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4.7 DISCUSSION, OBJECTIONS, AND PREVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS 
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that political tolerance matters for political action 
potential, but not in a way that conforms to extant empirical research. Tolerance is a democratic 
orientation not only towards which ideas may be expressed legitimately in a society, but also 
toward how those ideas may be expressed. Independently of both the traits that lead one to put up 
with her political opponents and also the resources, interest, and opportunities that drive her 
participation, political tolerance stimulates greater civic engagement – especially through 
collective and confrontational modes of action that aim to alter the status quo through dramatic 
means. Tolerance facilitates participation the same way that standard predictors of civic 
voluntarism lower certain barriers to action. As an exercise in disagreement and dissent, 
tolerance renders the collective and contentious exercise of political rights and civil liberties less 
challenging or more endurable. Even at low levels of associational involvement – a factor that 
mobilizes individuals into public action – tolerant individuals are more likely to petition, 
volunteer, boycott and protest than intolerant citizens.    
Among the more important findings to emerge from the analysis is, hence, a null finding: 
political tolerance and the choice to vote are generally unrelated. This makes sense from the 
perspective developed in this dissertation. Beyond support for political rights and civil liberties, 
tolerance influences modes of participation because it is an orientation toward the actual exercise 
of those liberties. Voting, as well as other more private forms of action, are perhaps taken for 
granted in consolidated democracies and do not register as liberties to be exercised. They are 
simply fundamental features of life in a democracy.   
It is therefore important to pay greater attention to the types of participation under 
consideration when examining the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations. As 
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Gibson and Bingham (1985) note, “Whether a given propensity (i.e. attitude) will result in 
behavior…is determined in party by the ‘difficulty’ of performing the act. Strong propensities 
will only be blocked by high hurdles, whereas weak propensities may be blocked by relatively 
low hurdles. The strength of the propensity interacts with the situational context in producing 
behavior” (162). This chapter suggests that political tolerance lowers hurdles to collective and 
contentious action over and above the enabling effects of resources, psychological engagement 
with politics, and mobilization potential. It does little to facilitate the propensity to vote, donate, 
or contact officials.  
Several objections to this conclusion can be raised, however. Most basically, the casual 
arrow could point in the other direction. In fact, this was precisely the democratic learning 
hypothesis examined by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) in their multilevel analysis of political 
tolerance in seventeen countries using the 1995-1997 World Values surveys. Finding that 
unconventional, public, forms of participation were more strongly tied to political tolerance than 
more conventional, private, forms of participation, Peffley and Rohrschneider hypothesized and 
found that “because such modes of participation are frequently used by those in the minority to 
win concessions from those in the majority, they serve to instruct participants on the value of 
procedural rights. Thus, by using civil liberties, individuals are also likely to develop a stronger 
appreciation for political tolerance” (2003: 245, emphasis added). Peffley and Rohrschneider 
also found that one of the strongest level-2 predictors of political tolerance was democratic 
longevity. Moreover, the causal dynamic between political tolerance and civic engagement 
remains unclear. Although I present a bevy of evidence indicating that tolerance drives 
participation in collective and contentious action, survey data alone cannot begin to uncover 
what moves the politically tolerant to participate in more social modes of political participation. 
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Finally, substantiating the causal effect of tolerance on participation is made more 
difficult where the dependent variable relies on respondents’ self-reported level of political 
activism. Random measurement error in the dependent variable is not terribly pernicious because 
it does not bias coefficient slopes and inflates standard errors. It is possible to conclude that the 
this chapter’s analysis underestimates the effects of tolerance on participation. However, there is 
also risk of systematic measurement error in self-reported participation, especially among highly 
educated respondents and respondents residing in longstanding democracies in which political 
participation is cultivated as a civic responsibility. Although nonparametric matching techniques 
help rebut the individual-level concern (e.g. the effects of tolerance are estimated for tolerant and 
intolerant individuals at approximately equal levels of education), the tolerance-participation 
linkage’s inequality across longstanding and new democracies may be explained by something 
other than tolerance. Superior measurement of political participation is the best way to refute 
measurement-error concerns. 
Randomized experiments in political tolerance and direct measures of overt political 
behavior would help respond to these objections. Ideally, researchers would isolate the effects of 
tolerance on participation with experiments that assign subjects to manifest tolerance or 
intolerance and, through random assignment, eliminate differences in antecedent factors across 
individuals. Random assignment would allow researchers to observe how tolerance and 
intolerance independently affect participation.  
However, manipulating tolerance and intolerance in a manner conducive to examining 
their downstream effects on political behavior is challenging. As I argue in the next chapter, 
tolerance is more pliable in response to direct persuasion through counterarguments (Gibson 
1998), while framing civil liberties disputes variously in terms of public order or free speech 
 130 
(Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997) exerts only minimal influence over individuals’ natural 
proclivity toward tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995). I therefore set out in Chapter Five to introduce, 
test, and evaluate a novel framework for manipulating tolerance judgments in a manner that 
permits strong causal inferences regarding its effects on participation. This methodological 
interlude lays the foundation for my cross-national experiments, presented in Chapter Six, where 
I randomly assign subjects in the United States and Hungary to manifest tolerance or intolerance, 
and trace the effects of this judgment on subjects’ overt political behavior. 
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5.0  CAUSAL INFERENCE IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE: THE 
SELF-PERSUASION EXPERIMENT 
This chapter develops and tests a novel framework for randomly assigning subjects to practice 
tolerance or intolerance toward their least-liked group during a hypothetical civil liberties 
dispute. I first discuss the goals of causal inference and then highlight certain limitations 
inherent in extant experimental approaches, which hamper successful causal inference about the 
consequences of tolerance and intolerance for political outcomes. I next present the “self- 
persuasion experiment.” I theoretically ground it in social psychological research, and test its 
effects on attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. The findings indicate potent effects of the 
manipulation on both political tolerance and intolerance. The magnitude of attitude change is 
particularly strong and significant among initially tolerant respondents assigned to practice 
intolerance and initially intolerant respondents assigned to practice tolerance. Given that 
previous work has largely struggled to convert intolerance to tolerance, the self-persuasion 
experiment offers an important advancement in our ability to randomly assign subjects to 
manifest (in)tolerance and to study their downstream effects.  
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Causal inference requires that scholars unequivocally attribute variation in outcomes to the 
presence or absence of a unique stimulus. The “fundamental problem of causal inference” 
(Holland 1986) facing social scientists who employ observational data is the lack of the 
counterfactual condition: researchers can never simultaneously observe within a single unit the 
presence and absence of the same stimulus. Hence, one cannot attribute unambiguous 
explanatory power to that stimulus alone without invoking additional assumptions. 
Consequently, political scientists increasingly adopt and combine novel approaches to 
minimizing this problem. One such approach generates counterfactual outcomes from 
observational data through procedures like nonparametric matching, which I employed in 
Chapter four. Such techniques appreciably diminish the fundamental problem of causal 
inference; however, they remain open to objections at their assumptions. In particular, the choice 
of variables on which to “balance” treatment and control groups and the exact procedure for 
partly depends on researcher decisions. This discretion can unintentionally jeopardize estimators’ 
unbiasedness. Although matching methods are superior to regression because they restrict 
analysis to an appropriate comparison group and therefore come closer to fulfilling the 
assumption of no omitted variable bias, unobserved factors may still affect the relationship. The 
Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis in section 4.6 suggested minimal influence of unobservables on 
the positive relationship between tolerance and participation; however, while these effects can be 
estimated they cannot be ruled out entirely using observational data alone.   
A second, and more powerful approach, employs experiments to randomly assign 
subjects to different treatment conditions. The boon to causal inference, according to Gerber and 
Green (2012), is that “The procedure of assigning treatments at random ensures that there is no 
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systematic tendency for either the treatment or control group to have an advantage…In other 
words, random assignment implies that the observed and unobserved factors that affect outcomes 
are equally likely to be present in the treatment and control groups” (p. 7-8).  
The standard empirical model in current political science research utilizing randomized 
experiments is the “downstream model” of treatment effects. Its logic is simple. Subjects are 
assigned at random to either receive or not receive a treatment. Assignment to treatment is then 
used as an instrument to estimate effects of the actual receipt of treatment on a particular 
outcome. Differences between “treatment” and “control” subjects on an outcome of interest are 
calculated following exposure or non-exposure to the treatment. The discrepancy in mean 
outcome values between treated and untreated subjects provides an accurate estimate the effect 
of receiving treatment, because probability dictates that subjects have equal chance of being 
assigned to treatment or control, and hence are not likely to differ on selection confounders. 
Covariates can be included in the “downstream” model, but these serve to improve the precision 
of standard errors and do not fundamentally alter the relationship between treatment and 
outcome.  
Ideally, students of political tolerance and its consequences would employ experiments 
which assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and, through random assignment, 
eliminate differences in antecedents across these groups. Random assignment would allow 
researchers to observe whether and in what ways tolerance and intolerance independently affect 
political outcomes. Certain properties of political (in)tolerance render this ideal solution difficult 
to operationalize, however. On one hand, tolerance and intolerance are attitudinal responses to 
stimuli that individuals experience and process differently; in the strictest sense, attitudinal 
(in)tolerance per se cannot be randomly assigned. One solution to this problem employs 
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“emphasis frames” to manipulate tolerance attitudes indirectly by randomizing variation in 
stimuli that predict tolerance, like how threatening to society a group appears or how relevant 
democratic values like free speech are to a particular dispute. Still, these procedures hamper 
valid causal inferences about the direct effects of tolerance because they directly manipulate 
beliefs antecedent to tolerance, which themselves may influence outcomes of interest. As I argue 
below, framing violates the exclusion condition of the “downstream model.”  
On the other hand, tolerance judgments are not immutable or intrinsic properties of 
individuals and are not entirely inflexible in response to direct attempts at persuasion (Gibson 
1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Sniderman 1996). Tolerance and, to a much lesser extent, 
intolerance are labile in response to counterarguments that introduce considerations individuals 
may not have contemplated prior to rendering their initial judgment. Like framing experiments, 
these procedures facilitate explanations of the etiology of (in)tolerance but pose problems for 
causal inferences about the consequences of (in)tolerance. For instance, extant “persuasion 
experiments” tend not to employ control groups (i.e. individuals who are not exposed to any 
counterarguments) and thus lack a key counterfactual. It is impossible to gauge whether those 
individuals who have been “converted” (Gibson 1998) to tolerance and intolerance would exhibit 
different outcome patterns had they not been exposed to counterarguments. The solution, as I 
argue below, is more complicated than simply adding a control group, because direct persuasion 
has the potential to introduce other influences on outcomes as well – especially behavioral 
outcomes.  
The central methodological obstacle to understanding the consequences of tolerance and 
intolerance is that no adequate methodology for randomly and directly manipulating 
(in)tolerance currently exists. The purpose of this chapter is to develop, test, and evaluate novel 
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experimental techniques for randomized experiments in political tolerance. Even if individuals 
cannot be directly and randomly assigned to experience (in)tolerance as an attitude, I argue in 
this chapter that individuals can be randomly assigned to direct manipulations that compel them 
to apply tolerance or intolerance in practice. This distinction between attitudinal and applied 
(in)tolerance is more than a semantic end-around the challenge of manipulating core values and 
beliefs. Political (in)tolerance is unique among democratic values insofar as civil liberties 
disputes and contests over how to allocate rights and liberties in a society furnish very concrete 
circumstances that oblige the application of this value. Philosophers and political theorists have 
thus long distinguished between tolerance as a general disposition toward admitting the validity 
of different viewpoints, and toleration as behavioral resistance against the impulse to repress 
unsavory groups and ideas (e.g. Murphy 1997).  
The empirical portion of this chapter develops an experiment that randomly assigns 
individuals to apply tolerance or intolerance in response to a civil liberties dispute; demonstrates 
its potent influence on post-test tolerance attitudes; and justifies employing the experiment in the 
next chapter, which aims to substantiate the direct causal effect of tolerance on political 
participation. Before discussing my own methodological choices, I review current approaches to 
manipulating tolerance attitudes and explicate their limitations for causal inference with respect 
to the consequences of tolerance and intolerance. I then introduce an alternative framework for 
manipulating tolerance judgments, ground it in the psychology of “self-persuasion, and present 
the results of several trials. The final section describes how this method will be employed to 
answer substantive questions in the next chapter. 
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5.2 EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL TOLERANCE 
One reason the consequences of political tolerance remain unclear is that scholars have not been 
able to separate the direct effects of toleration from those individual-level factors that drive 
tolerance. Manipulating tolerance judgments, and only these judgments, is challenging. Scholars 
general employ one of two conventional approaches to manipulate tolerance attitudes: framing 
through experimental vignettes or direct persuasion through counterarguments. These techniques 
yield varying results with respect to their influence on attitudinal tolerance, but they have made 
undeniable contributions to what we know about the etiology and nature of tolerance and 
intolerance. However, neither method is appropriate for understanding the independent effects of 
tolerance judgments on political outcomes. Here I discuss each approach and detail why a 
methodological alternative is desirable.  
5.2.1 Framing and experimental vignettes 
The framing tradition in tolerance research is based on the idea that civil liberties disputes pose 
difficult questions that cross-cut multiple values, beliefs, and political issues. Media and political 
elites can shape citizens’ tolerance judgments by framing a civil liberties dispute in terms of 
(usually) just one of these dimensions. Frames in communication promote specific definitions, 
constructions, and interpretations of political issues (Gamson 1992). Framing effects may be 
distinguished from persuasion in that frames alter the relative importance of particular concepts 
for judging attitudes and beliefs toward an issue or idea, rather than try to change the content of 
one’s beliefs (Nelson and Oxley 1999), which characterizes the counterargument line of 
tolerance experiments (Gibson 1998).  
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For instance, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley’s (1997) canonical framing experiment in 
tolerance compares subjects’ willingness to allow a public rally by the Ku Klux Klan when the 
choice to do so is framed as either a matter of protecting public order or a question of upholding 
free speech. In cognitive psychological terms, frames increase the accessibility and salience of 
attitudes that are already available in individuals’ minds. In the case of tolerance judgments, 
perceived threat posed to society by their least-liked group and civil liberties support – two of 
the strongest predictors of tolerance judgments – are preexisting, available attitudes among 
subjects. In turn, framing a civil liberties dispute as an exhortation to uphold free speech will 
increase the importance subjects attribute to democratic and civil libertarian norms when judging 
whether the KKK should be allowed to hold their rally, while emphasizing threats that the KKK 
pose to public order and security increases the salience of sociotropic threat in subjects’ minds. 
The former should stimulate tolerance; the latter should suppress it.  
Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) find, in support of these propositions, that subjects 
exposed to “free speech” frames express 13 percent greater tolerance than subjects exposed to 
“public order” frames – an increase of 0.65 points on the 1-5 scale. Consistent with emphasis 
framing theory (e.g. Gamson 1992), this effect appears to be mediated by the differential 
importance subjects in each frame attribute to free speech versus public order considerations. 
Using both real media coverage of a proposed KKK rally in Ohio, as well as highly controlled 
vignettes to simulate newspaper coverage of the same rally, the authors report in their 
mediational analysis that public order frames directly increase the importance subjects attribute 
to security concerns (b=0.35, p≤0.05), which in turn decreases tolerance (b= -0.24, p ≤0.05). 
However, although Nelson, Clawson and Oxley find that free speech importance increases 
tolerance (b=0.48, p≤0.01), they cannot tie increased importance to the framing effect (b= -0.18, 
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p>0.05). They explain that the insignificant finding emerges “perhaps because of the already 
stratospheric level of support enjoyed by free speech values” (1997: 574).  
This outcome reveals important limitations of framing procedures in manipulating 
tolerance judgments. On one hand, the authors admit that the potency of the procedure is 
questionable: without evidence of a direct framing effect on the importance of free speech, it is 
not clear that the procedure carries any exogenous influence over subjects’ political tolerance. A 
control group (in this case, a group of subjects exposed to an issue-irrelevant frame) is necessary 
to rule out that the between-group treatment effect is not merely attributable to the bolstering 
influence of public order frames on perceived threat and, in turn, intolerance. In other words, 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) evince that they can indirectly decrease tolerance, but not 
that they can increase tolerance. For any between-groups design analyzing consequences of 
tolerance judgments, this problem is similar to an implementation problem known as one-sided 
noncompliance, when subjects assigned to receive treatment go untreated (Gerber and Green 
2012: 133). When this occurs, inferences based on between-groups comparisons are not 
unbiased.  
Nor does this procedure provide an unbiased estimator of intolerance for use in a 
“downstream model” of treatment effects. Framing experiments introduce unique complications 
that obscure the independent influence of tolerance judgments on any number of outcomes. 
Specifically, framing only permits researchers to indirectly shape political tolerance or 
intolerance. The procedures in the Nelson et al. study, for example, target two of the most 
theoretically grounded and robust predictors of tolerance attitudes – democratic norms and 
perceived threat – by increasing their salience to individuals who are confronted with questions 
about civil liberties. These factors themselves have been tied to directly to a variety of outcomes, 
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including civic engagement: threat breeds anxiety, which in turn motivates people to more 
closely monitor and engage in political affairs (Pantoja and Segura 2003), while support for 
democratic values has been directly tied to protest and other contentious political actions in 
several contexts (e.g. Benson and Rahn 1997; Benson and Rochon 2004; Finkel and Smith 2010; 
Gibson 1997). Directly manipulating the salience of threat or democratic values in order to 
influence tolerance judgments therefore paradoxically makes it difficult to isolate the effects of 
tolerance per se on downstream outcomes such as political participation.  In methodological 
terms, randomization in framing experiments no longer satisfies the exclusion condition for use 
as an instrumental variable for any downstream effects to be measured.  
A third problem with framing procedures is the tradeoff between theoretically informed 
measurement and operational costs. Framing experiments in political tolerance generally 
sacrifice content controlled measurement because they require lengthy vignettes or visual stimuli 
that are costly to vary. Moreover, it is difficult to convey verisimilar circumstances of civil 
liberties disputes across multiple types of groups – for instance, a respondent who selects the 
KKK as her most disliked group may find the threat of conflict and disorder plausible given the 
group’s violent past, whereas the respondent who selects atheists or Christian fundamentalists as 
her most disliked group may find such claims unrealistic. At a minimum, standardizing the target 
group across all respondents requires a control group that can provide a baseline measure of 
tolerance which is not subjected to exogenous manipulation attempts. Finally, framing effects are 
highly contingent upon a variety of additional factors, such as source cue and credibility (e.g. 
Druckman 2001), which increases the cost of variation and distances the manipulation’s degree 
of separation from a direct effect on political tolerance. 
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5.2.2 Persuasion experiments 
Persuasion experiments – efforts to convert individuals’ tolerance attitudes through 
counterarguments – offer several advantages over framing procedures. This approach, advanced 
largely by Gibson (1996, 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003), invites subjects to express their 
authentic, uninfluenced position (i.e. tolerant or intolerant) toward their least-liked group and 
then seeks to alter these attitudes through several arguments favoring the opposite judgment. 
Persuasion experiments thus employ content controlled methodology and manipulate tolerance 
judgments directly while (like framing experiments) preserving real dimensions of decision 
making in civil liberties disputes. That is, authentic decisions to uphold or repress hated political 
opponents’ rights are contextual; they are social choices that are pushed and swayed by political 
discussion and exposure to a variety of opinions, including countervailing views. Persuasion 
experiments procedurally simulate this feature of civil liberties decisions. An interviewer first 
gauges respondents’ baseline tolerance and then advances three pro-tolerance arguments to 
subjects who initially express intolerant positions, three anti-tolerance arguments to respondents 
who initially take tolerant positions, and one pro-tolerance and one anti-tolerance argument to 
respondents who express uncertainty over how to respond to the hypothetical dispute. These 
procedures are considered successful when original tolerance is converted to intolerance, and 
vice versa. 
The lasting contribution of persuasion experiments is what they reveal about the nature of 
tolerance and intolerance, especially the fundamental asymmetry of tolerant and intolerant 
attitudes. In particular, it is far easier to convert tolerance to intolerance than the reverse. 
Moreover, this disproportionate pliability is largely a function of the fact that tolerance is 
embedded within – and, in certain circumstances, at odds with – a host of broader democratic 
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beliefs that can be made accessible and “trump tolerance” (Gibson 1998: 844). The importance 
of persuasion experiments to scholars’ understanding of the nature of tolerance and intolerance 
cannot be understated. However, there are important reasons why direct persuasion through 
counterarguments is an inappropriate tool for evaluating the downstream consequences of these 
attitudes.  
Gibson (1998:846) adumbrates one of these reasons when he advances the following 
research question, implied by his results: “To what extent do future replies of these respondents 
reflect their ‘original’ views or their ‘converted’ views?” The problem for inferring causal effects 
of tolerance that has been manipulated through direct persuasion is that we cannot know whether 
what we observe is attributable to respondents’ original views or their converted views. A group 
of “pure” control subjects – whose judgments regarding toleration remain free from researcher 
influence – would be necessary to surmise how converted and original tolerance judgments 
differ. Since Gibson and colleagues primarily have been interested in comparing the relative 
pliability of tolerance and intolerance and the determinants of this pliability, such control groups 
generally have not been included as theoretically relevant design components.  
While this limitation is easy to resolve, the direct persuasion approach poses other, less 
mechanical, threats to unbiased causal inferences about the effects of (in)tolerance. The social 
psychology literature on persuasion and resistance to persuasion suggests that the mere attempt 
to directly persuade a subject carries at least one important implication for a subject’s attitudes. 
Attitudes that change in response to persuasive counterarguments tend to be weaker than 
original, unmanipulated attitudes (Crano and Prislin 2006), while individuals who resist attempts 
at direct persuasion in turn develop stronger attitudes and tend to be more certain that their 
initial attitude is correct than individuals whose original attitudes are never challenged in the first 
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place (Tormala and Petty 2002). This is especially true when the persuasive argument is 
perceived as strong. A related problem, as Gibson (1998: 846) notes, is that no means of 
“independently calibrating the arguments” for equal potency exists; anti-tolerance arguments 
may simply be stronger by virtue of the fact that they plug into alternate, valid democratic values 
while pro-tolerance arguments do not strongly appeal to respondents (i.e. the attitudinally 
intolerant) who more weakly embrace democratic values in the first place. Unless this can be 
validated empirically, it would be difficult to rule out that the effects of “converted” (in)tolerance 
relative to resistant (in)tolerance are attributable to unintentional differences across argument 
strength.   
 This is potentially important because strong attitudes last longer over time, show greater 
resistance to attack, and have a greater impact on judgments and behavior (Petty and Krosnick 
1995). Attitude certainty functions in a similar way, and it has been shown that as individuals are 
increasingly certain of their attitudes, these attitudes increasingly predict behavior (Fazio and 
Zanna 1978). In other words, although an attitude’s content may not change in response to 
persuasion, the resistant attitude’s properties do not fundamentally remain the same, either. 
Hence, both persuasion and resistance yield consequences for attitude strength that may affect 
outcomes despite the change or lack of change in content of the attitude itself. The apparent 
solution to this problem – randomly assigning individuals to pro-tolerance or anti-tolerance 
“counterarguments” – makes little theoretical sense in the context of direct persuasion 
experiments, because we must first know what individuals’ tolerance attitudes are. In other 
words, there are theoretical and methodological justifications against full randomization in direct 
persuasion experiments (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2002).  
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A final consideration remains important for persuasion experiments that employ 
counterarguments. According to the preeminent social psychologist, Elliot Aronson (1999), the 
balance of evidence from decades of social psychology research suggests that “the attitude 
change induced by direct persuasion is usually small and short-lived, especially when 
communication departs radically from the recipient’s original attitude…And that is when they 
are listening at all!...[W]hen faced with communication that…runs counter to their own attitudes 
or beliefs, most people are adept at either tuning out, turning off, or simply refusing to expose 
themselves to that message (Hyman and Sheatsley 1947; Pratkanis and Aronson 1992” (Aronson 
1999: 876, emphasis added).  
The framing and direct persuasion approaches to manipulating tolerance judgments 
reveal much about the etiology and nature of tolerance and intolerance. However, neither is 
appropriate – or capable – as a means to randomly assign subjects to tolerance or intolerance so 
as to draw causal inferences about these judgments’ consequences for political outcomes. 
Framing experiments influence tolerance indirectly, with questionable strength, and can lead to 
biased inferences based on between-groups analyses. Direct persuasion experiments are not 
theoretically suited for randomization and may inadvertently alter attitudinal properties that 
distinguish converted and resistant (in)tolerance from the (in)tolerance of individuals who are not 
exposed to counterarguments.  
In the next section, I develop an alternative framework for randomly assigning 
individuals to express tolerance or intolerance in a manner that is both internally valid and 
applicable to the study of the consequences of tolerance judgments. I base this approach on 
social psychological research on “self-persuasion,” take care to discuss and anticipate threats to 
internal validity, and introduce the experimental procedure. 
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5.3 APPLIED (IN)TOLERANCE AND THE SELF-PERSUASION EXPERIMENT 
One unexplored possibility for advancing experiments on the consequences of (in)tolerance is to 
randomly assign subjects to conditions that compel them to actively apply tolerance or 
intolerance in practice – regardless of whether they hold tolerant or intolerant attitudes or would 
(not) tolerate in principle. At a minimum, practicing tolerance suggests doing nothing; one will 
repress neither the expression of an objectionable idea nor others’ expression of their desire to 
repress that idea. At a maximum, it means vigorously countering intolerance by taking a stance 
in favor of allowing objectionable ideas by abhorrent groups to be expressed. Practicing 
intolerance, by contrast, requires that one actively oppose the expression of objectionable ideas 
or interests. Researchers may randomly assign individuals to scenarios that compel them to 
actively take up and defend a tolerant position or an intolerant position, regardless of their 
natural predisposition to do so, and regardless of their variable responsiveness to stimuli 
surrounding the disputed group, ideas, rights, or actions. 
To simulate these situations, I propose the self-persuasion experiment. Unlike direct 
persuasion through counterarguments, in this experiment interviewers do not attempt to talk 
respondents out of attitudes or beliefs they have previously expressed. Instead, the subject 
persuades someone else to change their tolerance judgment. In other words, the onus of 
developing and defending a tolerant or intolerant position falls to the subject, not to the 
researcher. Through this design, subjects can be assigned at random to scenarios in which they 
must convince a confederate to abandon her intolerant position (i.e. the subject applies tolerance) 
or tolerant position (i.e. the subject applies intolerance).  
This procedure therefore permits researchers to assign individuals to a task where they 
more realistically practice tolerance or intolerance toward a group that they strongly dislike. In 
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direct persuasion experiments, individuals may or may not acquiesce to a tolerant or intolerant 
position after exposure to up to three counterarguments. In the self-persuasion experiment, 
subjects must reconcile with their negative attitudes toward a target group in a cognitively 
intensive manner and then put them aside in order to advocate a tolerant position. In the case of 
intolerance, they instead must put aside any commitments to civil liberties and prioritize negative 
characteristics of the target group or negative consequences of affording it rights. In this sense, 
the self-persuasion experiment more closely approximates the actual practice of tolerance or 
intolerance and, as such, individuals may be randomly assigned to defend these positions 
regardless of their underlying attitudinal disposition toward or against tolerance.  
Beyond randomizing applied tolerance and intolerance, the self-persuasion experiment 
furnishes a powerful alternative method of manipulating attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. 
Janis and King (1954) discovered that a side effect of subject-to-audience persuasion (e.g. 
through essay writing, debates, or advice-giving) is that subjects tend to persuade themselves that 
the position they have advocated approximates their true belief. Even participants who argue a 
counterattitudinal point of view (i.e. devil’s advocacy) are more likely to be persuaded by 
themselves than by others’ arguments that favor this same counterattitudinal position (e.g. Eagly 
and Chaiken 1993; Wilson 1990).  
Several explanations for this “self-persuasion” effect exist (e.g. Janis 1968), but 
dissonance reduction is the most prominent. Festinger (1957) argued that advocating a 
counterattitudinal opinion leads to cognitive dissonance, which is reduced through attitude 
change. When the inducement (e.g. financial reward) to defending such an opinion is low, people 
must seek additional justification for the position they advocated. They accomplish this by 
persuading themselves that the position they advocated is not really far from their true position. 
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The end result is a shift in attitude away from their original belief, toward the argued position 
(Aronson 1999). Self-persuasion can also occur following proattitudinal argumentation (Crano 
and Prislin 2006), as subjects adopt new justifications for their initial positions (Cooper 2007).   
Self-persuasion exerts powerful influence over both attitudes and behavior. It has been 
shown to reduce hostile attitudes, negative stereotypes, and prejudice toward minority groups 
(e.g. Aronson and Patnoe 1997; Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney and Snapp 1978); to increase 
condom use among college students (Aronson, Fried and Stone 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, 
Winslow and Fried 1994), and to increase water conservation and recycling (Dickerson, 
Thibodeau, Aronson and Miller 1992). In general, self-persuasion more readily influences the 
content of attitudes, rather than their intensity, and its effects are particularly noticeable among 
subjects who argue counterattitudinal positions. Nevertheless, both proattitudinal and 
counterattitudinal advocacy exert similar (and generally potent) influence over behavioral 
intentions (Gordijn, Postmes, and de Vries 2001). According to Aronson’s (1999) review of this 
research, “Self-persuasion is almost always a more powerful form of persuasion (deeper, longer 
lasting) than more traditional persuasion techniques – that is, than being directly persuaded by 
another person, no matter how clever, convincing, expert, and trustworthy that other person 
might be – precisely because in direct persuasion, the audience is constantly aware of the fact 
that they have been persuaded by another. Where self-persuasion occurs, people are convinced 
that the motivation for change has come from within” (882).  
I hypothesize that the self-persuasion experiment will produce similar patterns of change 
in tolerance attitudes. Subjects assigned to receive treatment complete an “intensive 
manipulation” in which they develop arguments to convince another person to abandon her 
intolerance (i.e. the tolerance treatment condition) or tolerance (i.e. the intolerance treatment 
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condition). A control group completes a similar persuasion task about an unrelated issue. 
Following several distractor questions, subjects express their post-test tolerance. I expect that 
attitudinal tolerance among subjects assigned to the tolerance condition will be greater than the 
control group, while subjects assigned to apply intolerance during the manipulation will exhibit 
less tolerance than the control group. Moreover, I expect to observe stronger evidence of attitude 
change among those subjects assigned to write arguments that ran counter to their original 
beliefs.
19
  
Self-persuasion experiments are not without threats to internal validity. I have designed 
the present experiment to account for several of these challenges. For instance, systematic 
differences in the intensity of arguments in favor or against toleration may emerge across 
treatment groups or types of individuals. I have sought to keep this more or less constant with 
constraints on essay length and writing time and hired coders (blind to the study’s purpose) to 
independently code the intensity of each elaboration. These procedures also serve to check 
against active noncompliance – a condition in which subjects may elect to write nonsense or 
simply fill the space required by the survey software to move forward, rather than dedicate their 
full attention to the task (McDermott 2011: 31).  
A more pernicious threat to internal validity is mortality – particularly when attrition 
occurs following random assignment. In this case, subjects might elect not to write arguments 
out of principle, to write nonsense, or to write arguments that squarely oppose what they have 
been asked to write. This can introduce bias especially when attrition occurs disproportionately 
in a single treatment group, or among respondents writing counterattitudinal positions. Forcing 
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 As I will describe below, the tolerance post-test is unrelated to the actual task subjects 
complete during the manipulation.  
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respondents to write through a validation mechanism or by threatening to refuse payment is not a 
valid solution, as this can lead to active noncompliance and generally blocks the dissonance 
reduction mechanism of producing attitude change (e.g. Cooper 2007). “Best practices” in the 
literature suggest allowing respondents to opt-out and receive full payment at that point of the 
study, while also appealing to their good will by describing what a great service they would be 
providing researchers if only they would comply (Aronson 1999; Cooper 2007). Fortunately, as I 
describe below, post-randomization attrition was not a systematic problem in this study.  
5.4 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
5.4.1 Sample 
A sample of 300 Americans, selected at random from respondents available to the online survey 
agency, Qualtrics,  was recruited, to participate in a study of “How people persuade one another 
in politics.” Participants completed the online survey-experiment in two sittings: three days after 
responding to the pre-test survey, they were assigned to receive treatment and completed the 
post-test questionnaire.
20
 The results, given the 27.3% attrition rate, are based on the final sample 
of 218 subjects.
21
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 Qualtrics’ survey partners began call backs as soon as 24 hours after the initial survey and 
concluded their efforts after 72 hours. Fully 73% of respondents completed the second wave of 
the study on the third day. Treatment was administered when re-contacting was successful, and 
differences in duration between pre- and post-test questionnaires do not alter the findings.   
21
 This represents the pre-treatment attrition rate, as respondents were assigned to treatment 
conditions in the second wave of the survey. 
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5.4.2 Pre-test questionnaire and measurement 
The pre-test served to gauge respondents’ baseline tolerance for their least-liked group ; the level 
of threat respondents believed that group poses to society;  respondents’ support for individual 
liberty over public order; their level of dogmatic thinking, and a host of demographic traits. 
Respondents were asked to select one of ten “political groups currently active in American 
society today”: The Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion 
supporters); pro-life groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; 
American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; or gay rights supporters.
22
  
Initial tolerance for their least-liked group is based on respondents’ average level of 
agreement (α = 0.85) that the group: 1) should be banned from your community; 2) should be 
allowed to make public speeches in your community; 3) should be allowed to stand in elections 
for public office; 4) should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community. To tap 
sociotropic threat perceptions, respondents then rated (from 1=not at all, to 100= extremely) the 
extent to which they believed the group they selected is dangerous to society, likely to take away 
Americans’ freedoms if they came to power, and unwilling to follow the rules of democracy. I 
rescaled the items to range from 1-10 and averaged them (α = 0.81).  
  Support for freedom over order was measured as respondents’ average level of 
agreement (α = 0.83) with five Likert-scaled items based on Gibson (2002): 1) Freedom of 
                                                 
22
 48.91 percent of respondents selected the Ku Klux Klan as most-disliked, followed by 18.48 
percent selecting Islamic fundamentalists. Atheists and Gay Rights Supporters tied as the third 
most commonly abhorred group, with only 5.43 percent of respondents selecting one or the 
other. While this bias against the far right appears suggestive of ideological skew in the data,  
67.24 percent of ideological conservatives (who comprise 31.52% of the final sample) selected 
the KKK or Islamic fundamentalists as their least-liked group, compared to 71.64 percent of 
liberals (36.41% if the sample) and 62.71 percent of self-described “pure moderates” (32.07% of 
the sample).    
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speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the things they say are 
dangerous or insulting to others in society; 2) It is better to live in an orderly society than to give 
people so much freedom that they can become disruptive; 3) Free speech is just not worth it if it 
means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views; 4) Society 
shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of 
the majority; 5) Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical 
and extremist groups should not be allowed to demonstrate.  
I also followed Gibson (2002) in measuring dogmatic thinking as the average support for 
four statements (α = 0.72): 1) There are two kinds of people in this world: Good and Bad; 2) A 
group cannot exist long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own members; 3) 
Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct; 4) Compromise with 
our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own position. 
Finally, respondents answered half of the total demographic and ideology questions in the pre-
test, including their level of political conservatism (1=Extremely liberal, 7=Extremely 
conservative), race, gender, and education level. Remaining demographic items were employed 
in the post-test questionnaire among the distractor questions between the manipulation and post-
test tolerance measure. 
5.4.3 Manipulation, post-test questionnaire, and measurement 
Prior to beginning the post-test, subjects were alerted to the possibility that they may be asked to 
advocate a counterattitudinal position and were informed that they could exit the study without 
penalty. This condition ensures low justification for writing a counterattitudinal position, as the 
reward for participation and non-participation is identical. Following much of the self-persuasion 
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and counterattitudinal advocacy literature (e.g. Cooper 2007), the instruction set also petitioned 
respondents for their assistance despite any discomfort they might experience: 
In this portion of the study, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument 
that you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: 
we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with 
what you have been asked to write. If you feel that you must refuse to write such 
an argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey without loss of 
payment. But your participation is very important to our research and would be of 
great help to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously.  
 
Following this statement, respondents were randomly assigned to receive treatment 
(tolerant condition N=73; intolerant condition N=73; control condition N=72). Subjects in the 
treatment (tolerant or intolerant) conditions confronted the following scenario, which portrays a 
civil liberties issue involving the political group each respondent selected as least-liked in the 
pre-test survey: 
Imagine that a large group of {GROUP members} wish to hold a public 
demonstration in your community. Some people openly hate this group while 
many others find what the {GROUP} believes to be very offensive. In the past, 
members of this group have not cooperated with the authorities and have 
sometimes violated the conditions of their parade permits. Other recent 
demonstrations by this group have led to property damage and open conflict with 
counter-protesters and the police.  
 
This scenario portrays equivalent levels of normative threat (e.g. refusal to cooperate and 
to follow all the laws) and evidence of violence (e.g. property damage, conflict) across tolerant 
and intolerant conditions and across groups. I intentionally worded the scenarios to suggest 
moderate-to-high threat, to reduce the possibility that any increase in tolerance could be 
attributable to variation in probable threat across the scenario conditions. Subjects were next 
prompted to,  
 
 
 152 
In the tolerant condition:  
 
Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should not be 
allowed to hold their demonstration.  Please write a short but strong argument 
that can help convince this person that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold its 
demonstration in your community,   
 
and in the intolerant condition:  
 
Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP) should be allowed to 
hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help 
convince this person that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold its 
demonstration in your community.   
 
Control group subjects were asked to:   
 
Imagine that you are in charge of a media campaign to promote the use of 
renewable energy sources – such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric power. Your 
goal is to convince the public that it is better for American industries to develop 
and invest in these new sources of energy and that Americans should stop using 
fossil fuels like oil, coal and natural gas. Some people believe that a shift to 
renewable energy could badly damage the economy, while many others believe 
that new energy sources are all that necessary. 
 
Think of someone you know who would think that Americans and American 
industry should not try to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. 
Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that 
developing renewable energy sources is the more sensible policy.  
 
In each condition, subjects had 20 minutes to “write at least 5 sentences, but not more 
than 10 sentences” in a text box that appeared at the bottom of the page. Alternatively, and in 
line with the instructions, they could voluntarily opt out of the exercise and exit the survey. Only 
5 individuals elected to exit the survey upon assignment to treatment, a rate of 2.3 percent, 
distributed rather evenly across conditions. Two subjects assigned to the tolerant condition 
(2.8%) and two assigned to the intolerant condition (2.7%), refused to write compared to only 
one subject assigned to the control condition (1.4%). Higher rates of active noncompliance are 
apparent; I discuss this issue at length in the analytic section below.   
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Subjects completed several distractor questions prior to expressing their post-test 
tolerance attitudes (using the same questions and scales as in the pre-test). These distractor 
questions included the ten-item personality inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow and Swan 2003), the 
general risk aversion scale (Mandrik and Bao 2005; Kam 2012), and the remaining demographic 
questions – age, income, and political interest. The exact question wording for these and other 
items are included in this chapter’s supplemental appendix.  
Finally, I included several covert and coder-based post-test measures to help rule out 
threats to internal validity. Although length and time of the arguments were limited in the same 
manner across conditions, I embedded into the online survey a hidden measure of “writing 
duration” in order to analyze whether differential time spent advocating a position influenced the 
results. Subjects spent as little as 144 seconds (approximately 3 minutes) and as much as 1169 
seconds (approximately 19 minutes) writing their essays, with an average of 629 seconds (10 
minutes). Moreover, following (Gordijn, Postmes and de Vries 2001), I hired four coders – blind 
to the study’s objectives – to independently code the intensity of each elaboration on two 
dimensions – the number of arguments generated and the persuasiveness of the arguments 
(1=absolutely not, 7=absolutely). Inter-coder reliability for the number of arguments (α = 0.71) 
and for the quality of arguments (α = 0.66) is acceptable according to Orwin (1994). Mortality 
threats to internal validity – particularly active noncompliance – have been addressed statistically 
and are discussed below. 
5.4.4 Active noncompliance 
In order to discuss noncompliance, it is important first to be clear about what constitutes 
“treatment” in the self-persuasion experiment. The manipulation centers on an intensive essay-
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writing task; individuals who have been assigned to treatment may be considered as having 
received treatment if and only if they have, in fact, written an essay. A more restrictive definition 
of receiving treatment is also possible: one could require for designation as “treated” that this 
essay be written on the required topic, and in the required direction (i.e. in favor or against 
allowing a group to demonstrate). However, this restrictive definition is ill-advised in 
experiments on political tolerance, as one must acknowledge the possibility that some of 
individuals will systematically refuse to take certain positions on civil liberties disputes 
involving their most disliked groups.  Therefore, I describe two types of noncompliant groups – 
those who eschewed the essay task and those who confronted it in order to reject the required 
position.  
A total of 29 respondents (13.3%) who chose to write essays refused to comply with the 
treatment. Of these, 22 subjects (10.1%) wrote “nonsense” arguments or entered a random series 
of alphanumeric characters to meet the 200-character minimum required by the survey software 
in order to move forward with the questionnaire. An additional 7 subjects (3.2%) squarely 
rejected the instruction set and wrote arguments defending the opposite point of view. Examples 
of all arguments can be found in Table B.1 of Appendix B. Overall, however, this post-
assignment attrition occurred rather evenly across treatment groups (Table 12):   
Table 12  Pre- and Post-Assignment Attrition by Treatment Condition 
   
 Pre-assignment attrition Post-assignment Attrition 
    
 Voluntary Exit Nonsense Essay Anti-Treatment Essay 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) 
       
Tolerant condition 2 2.7 8 10.9 3 4.1 
Intolerant condition 2 2.7 7 9.6 2 2.7 
Control condition 1 1.3 7 9.6 2 2.7 
       
Total 5 2.3 22 10.1 7 3.2 
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Although the total number of noncompliant participants is small, it is best to be 
forthcoming about what types of people tended to exit, ignore, or reject treatment. Table 13 
presents summary statistics using several variables included in the pre- and post-test 
questionnaires:  
 
Table 13  Attrition Rates across Demographic and Attitudinal Traits 
   
 Pre-assignment Attrition Post-assignment Attrition 
   
 
Voluntary Exit Nonsense Anti-Treatment 
 
N % N % N % 
       
Pre-test Tolerant  2 33.33 10 50.00 5 62.50 
Female 3 50.00 4 20.00 4 50.00 
Black 1 16.67 3 15.00 2 25.00 
Conservative 3 50.00 12 60.00 7 87.50 
Educated 1 16.67 10 50.00 3 37.50 
Highly threatened 4 66.67 10 50.00 3 37.50 
Highly dogmatic 4 66.67 19 95.00 4 50.00 
Highly risk averse 3 50.00 8 40.00 4 50.00 
       
Continuous variables have been dichotomized at the mean; entries represent the count and percent of 
noncompliant respondents with above-average scores on the grouping variable in column 1.  
 
Conservative and highly dogmatic respondents exhibited disproportionate rates of post-
assignment attrition. Active rejection of the treatment appears most commonly among 
ideological conservatives, whereas dogmatic individuals account for by far the most nonsensical 
entries in the noncompliant sample. However, dogmatists and conservatives failed to comply 
rather evenly across treatment conditions. All 6 of the nonsensical “intolerant condition” essays, 
all 7 of the nonsensical “tolerant condition” essays, and 6 of 7 nonsensical control condition 
essays can be attributed to respondents with above average dogmatism. Conservatives and non-
conservatives evenly rejected the intolerant condition by writing pro-tolerance essays, while 
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conservatives penned 4 of 7 essays to reject the tolerant condition. Five of seven noncompliant 
control essays can be connected to conservative authors.  
Given that treatment has been defined as “received” when subjects truly write an essay, 
that the number of subjects who eschewed the essay task by composing nonsense or random 
alphanumeric strings is relatively small, and that the distribution of nonsensical essays is fairly 
well-balanced across treatment conditions, I am inclined to exclude them from certain analyses 
below.
23
 By contrast, anti-treatment essays meet the conditions for “received” treatment and, 
although they are small in number, should be included for important theoretical reasons.  
 Still, one important question is whether active noncompliance via “nonsense” essays 
varies systematically by counterattitudinal or proattitudinal groups or by pre-test tolerance levels. 
If so, these essays ought perhaps to be interpreted the same way as anti-treatment essays – i.e. as 
principled and unmovable objection to the position required to be argued. Again, however, 
among subjects assigned to the “tolerant condition,” individuals who expressed intolerance 
during the pre-test authored only 4 of 7 nonsensical essays. In the “intolerant condition,” half of 
the nonsensical essays are attributable to individuals originally holding intolerant attitudes. 
Hence, noncompliance does not appear to vary by direction of the argument. ANOVA finds no 
statistical difference in noncompliance (coded 1 for a nonsensical essay and 0 otherwise) across 
pro- and counter-attitudinal essay writers in the tolerant condition (M=0.003, F=0.05, p=0.832), 
intolerant condition (M=0.051, F=0.50, p=0.483) or control condition (M=0.033, F=0.53, 
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 Note that I return these subjects to the sample to conduct a proper “downstream effects” 
model, in section 5.6. In any case, exclusion does not alter the substantive findings.   
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p=0.441).  A second analysis of variance attributes no significant difference in noncompliance to 
pre-test tolerance levels
24
  (M=0.061, F=0.45, p=0.500).  
Given these patterns, I shall exclude from the first empirical section below those 22 
subjects who failed to receive treatment by eschewing the essay-writing task. This helps to more 
accurately document the directional effects of the manipulation on post-test attitudinal tolerance 
and intolerance. However, I return these 22 subjects to the second empirical analysis in order to 
evaluate both the impact of the assignment procedure (i.e. the “Intent to Treat” Effect, or ITT), 
and also the magnitude of the treatment’s influence on attitudinal tolerance (i.e. the Complier 
Average Causal Effect (CACE)). In these cases, sampling and non-compliance are relevant 
considerations for unbiased casual inference (Gerber and Green 2012: chapter 5). 
5.4.5 Compliant essays 
The intensive manipulation – in which respondents write brief essays – gives the self-persuasion 
experiment certain advantages over extant alternatives.  First, unlike direct persuasion through 
counterarguments, the manipulation at the center of the self-persuasion procedure more fully 
simulates the application of tolerance or intolerance toward highly disliked groups. By placing 
subjects in a situation in which they must devise and defend their own original arguments in 
favor of or against toleration, subjects are compelled to manifest tolerance or intolerance 
irrespective of their attitudinal proclivity to (not) tolerate. Second, to the extent that subjects are 
persuaded by their own unique arguments, few assumptions need to be made about the relative 
strength of arguments across conditions. This has been a problem for the direct persuasion 
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 Pre-test tolerance was split at the mean, such that only respondents with above-average 
tolerance scores were classified as “tolerant.” 
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approach, where it has been conjectured that pro-tolerance and anti-tolerance counterarguments 
provided by researchers may differ in convincingness (Gibson 1998). 
Third, the essay-writing task helps to overcome the central problem framing experiments 
face as a tool for examining downstream effects of tolerance. Procedures that indirectly influence 
tolerance by manipulating perceptions of threat or support for democratic norms lose the ability 
to exclude these variables’ extraneous influence over any outcome which tolerance is believed to 
influence. One could argue that the self-persuasion technique is open to the same criticism, since 
whatever reason a particular individual may have to self-persuade into tolerance could act as an 
extraneous influence on participation. However, there is at least a pluralistic failure of the 
exclusion condition, which in turn will cancel out in the aggregate, and which does not cancel 
out in framing experiments of the Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) approach.  
Indeed, subjects who complied with the instructions (i.e. subjects who did not write 
nonsensical essays) defended tolerance and intolerance from a variety of perspectives. Some of 
these arguments reflect those advanced by researchers using the direct persuasion approach. For 
instance, standard pro-tolerance counterarguments invite respondents to consider that 1) the 
government shouldn’t be allowed to decide who has rights; 2) it is unfair to allow some groups to 
express their views but not others; and 3) groups (that respondents dislike) should express their 
views openly so people can see that they are wrong. Some subjects in the self-persuasion 
experiment included these same arguments in an overall pro-tolerance position:  
 
As much as I abhor the Tea party, it is important that they have the right to 
demonstrate on behalf of their beliefs. Denying them this right would be the 
beginning of a slippery slope in which other groups, like Occupy [The Occupy 
Movement], are denied theirs as well. Besides, they are their own worst enemy. 
The more they shout from the rooftops, the more their ignorance is on display for 
all to behold and ridicule. If we know exactly what they think, we are in a better 
position to counter their arguments, no matter how badly misspelled (sic) they are. 
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Or, more bluntly, as another respondent put it: “How would you feel if someone told you 
that you couldn’t say what you think? What if the Irish couldn’t hold our annual parade but the 
Italians could do all that Columbus Day stuff? You can’t let some people do things that you 
don’t let other people do.”  
Still, respondents assigned to write a tolerant essay found many unique justifications for 
their position. Some promoted a “generic tolerance,” such as “Everyone is entitled to an opinion. 
People have a choice about what they believe in even if it may be different from your own.” 
Others subjects support “conditional tolerance,” such that they are willing to uphold the rights of 
a group they strongly dislike so long as there are means to ensure that nothing goes wrong:  
“Everyone has the right to peacefully protest. There can be a strong police presence in place if 
need be. And we can bring machine guns and tear gas if need be. We can give them a set amount 
of time and no more.” Another wrote, “First off, I do not care. They are a bunch of idiots anyway 
you look at it. They can say what they want. But if they get violent we will shut them down 
ASAP.” 
Other respondents couched their tolerance in patriotic exhortations: “Our soldiers have 
fought and died for our freedoms. One of those freedoms is the freedom of speech. While we 
have the right to disagree with them, they still have the right to say what they want to say. If you 
take that away, then what happens when it comes your chance to be heard, and you can't because 
someone won't let you?” Still others appealed to “end times” theology, such that tolerance is 
what the bible commands: “True Americans should have a right to say what they want. For GOD 
so loved the world. We as a people have lost what really matters were here for one reason to save 
the lost and to prepare for Christ's return. GOD gave us the right for free speech and we must use 
it to prevent the Devil’s return.” 
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Some subjects make compelling procedural arguments for allowing their least-liked 
group to demonstrate. One respondent wrote: “The [KKK] should be allowed to talk because 
they might have something important to say…sure, some folks might end up supporting them, 
but there needs to be a positive back and forth exchange to where a person who opposes the 
KKK can also counteract their views.” Another argues that “by allowing the demonstration you 
get more people engaged and thinking about the stuff that matters. If you can’t prevent what you 
think is wrong, then get out and demonstrate for yourself! Raise your voice! Get involved! 
People will never lift a finger if they don’t have something to fight against.” 
Subjects assigned to argue against the public demonstration by their most disliked group 
(i.e. subjects in the intolerant condition) also found diverse reasons for delimiting who gets 
rights. Few offered procedural arguments or concern with threat to the democratic system (e.g. 
“the group won’t follow parade permit rules”; “if the group came to power it would take away 
my freedoms”), which are standards in direct persuasion experiments. Instead, many respondents 
appealed to far more basic norms of “common decency,” such as: “My community is three-
quarters Hispanic/Latino and one-quarter African American. We experienced a historic low in 
1992 after the Rodney King verdict and any white supremacists who came here would obviously 
just be instigating. No way the KKK should be allowed here”; or “pro-lifers just want to add 
more trauma to a bad experience. They can believe what they want but their actions are so 
indecent.” 
Others showed concern for public costs, “This would require too much mob control. 
There’s no way people can express counteropinions (sic) – and people would definitely want to – 
without a clash in the street. That causes damage and costs way too much money.” Some 
expressed intolerance in xenophobic terms – “Islamists want to make all of us pray to 
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Mohammed and have no idea that we are a Christian nation that will fight them in the streets” – 
while others equated tolerance with Liberals and Democratic Party supporters, “We have a 
constitution that places limits on what you can and cannot say. Like, you can’t say fire in a 
theater. But the liberals would say you can’t say “no” to a group that would just as soon get rid 
of you. I’d say let the [Islamic fundamentalists] have their rally just to show the Liberals what 
they’ve turned this country into, but I love America too much.” 
In my future research, I plan to examine these responses more carefully. In general, 
however, subjects appear to offer so many different and unique defenses of tolerance or 
intolerance, that it seems reasonable to argue that any failure to satisfy the exclusion restriction at 
the individual will wash out in the aggregate, because of the pluralistic nature of subjects’ essay 
content. 
5.5 INITIAL FINDINGS 
The self-persuasion experiment randomly assigns subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance. In 
the tolerant condition, subjects elaborate an argument to convince a hypothetical discussion 
partner to abandon her intolerance; in the intolerant condition, subjects encourage that person to 
abdicate her tolerance. The control group advocates that US industry rely on renewable energy 
sources instead of fossil fuels. My basic hypotheses are:   
H1: Subjects in the “intolerance condition” will exhibit lower post-test tolerance than 
subjects in the control group; 
 
H2: Subjects in the “tolerance condition” will exhibit higher post-test tolerance than 
subjects in the control group and subjects in the “intolerance condition” 
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A one-way, between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of 
treatment on attitudinal tolerance in the applied tolerance and applied intolerance conditions. A 
significant effect of manipulation on attitudinal tolerance at the p<0.05 level is apparent for the 
three conditions (applied tolerance, applied intolerance, control) [F(2, 186) = 14.47, p<0.001]. 
Table 14 presents mean differences across the conditions. The Sidak, Bonferroni, and Scheffe 
values represent increasingly conservative tests of significant mean differences.    
 
Table 14  Post-Hoc Significance Tests of Mean Differences in Tolerance across Experimental Conditions 
    
 
Tolerant vs. Control Intolerant vs. Control Tolerant vs. Intolerant 
    
Mean difference 0.493 -0.466 0.959 
    
Sidak 0.019 0.028 0.000 
Bonferroni 0.019 0.028 0.000 
Scheffe 0.024 0.034 0.000 
    
Sideak, Bonferroni, and Scheffe tests are increasingly conservative post-hoc estimates of significant differences in 
between-group means identified by ANOVA. 
 
 
Post-hoc comparisons – by even the most conservative, Scheffe test of significance –
indicate that the average level of tolerance for one’s most disliked-group was significantly lower 
among subjects in the applied intolerance condition (M=2.117, SD=0.879) than among subjects 
in the control condition (M=2.583, SD=1.174). Moreover, all post-hoc significance tests indicate 
that the average level of tolerance for one’s most-disliked group was significantly greater among 
subjects exposed to applied tolerance (M=3.077, SD=0.925) than among subjects exposed to 
applied intolerance or the control argument. Figure 2 depicts these mean differences:  
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Figure 2 Average Tolerance for Least-Liked Group by Experimental Condition 
 
No differences were found for the time participants spent writing down arguments 
(M=629.41, F=1.10, p=0.336). Also, no differences were found for the number of arguments 
generated (M=4.83, F=0.55, p=0.571) or the average quality of those arguments as perceived by 
the coders (M=4.96, F=1.77, p=0.172). This suggests that assignment schedule did not influence 
the nature of the arguments, the intensity of the elaboration, or the degree to which subjects 
strived to develop compelling points of view.  Nor were any significant differences in pre-test 
tolerance levels apparent across the treatment groups.  
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Table 15 Balance in Pre- and Post-Test Tolerance by Treatment Condition 
   
 Experimental Condition  
 Tolerant  Intolerant  Control  ANOVA 
     
Pre-test Tolerance 2.625 2.613 2.439 M=0.579, F=0.56, p=0.576 
Post-test Tolerance 3.106 2.121 2.581 M=14.677, F=14.47, p=0.000 
     
Mean differences in boldfaced entries significant at p<0.05 
 
Entries in the top row of Table 15 represent subjects’ average tolerance toward their 
least-liked group prior to random assignment. They are grouped by treatment condition, and a 
one-way between-subjects ANOVA shows that pre-test tolerance levels were indeed “balanced” 
before exposure to the intensive manipulation. In other words, subjects holding originally 
tolerant attitudes were not disproportionately assigned to practice tolerance and attitudinally 
intolerant subjects were not disproportionately assigned to practice intolerance.  
Finally, I examine in Table 16 whether the intensive manipulation increases tolerance in 
the tolerant condition and intolerance in the intolerant condition relative to the untreated group 
after controlling for the most robust and theoretically grounded predictors of political tolerance. 
Substantively speaking, treatment via elaborating a pro-tolerance argument increases tolerance 
for respondents’ least-liked group by nearly one half point on the five-point scale – an increase 
of almost 10 percent. Intolerance treatment exerts a similar decrease in attitudinal tolerance. 
These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2, above. Randomly assigning individuals to apply 
tolerance or intolerance in practice significantly influences their average level of attitudinal 
tolerance relative to control subjects that are not compelled to actively tolerate or not tolerate 
their least-liked group during a civil liberties dispute. Table 17 confirms that these substantive 
results hold when controlling for pre-test tolerance levels as well.  
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Table 16 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effect on Tolerance toward Least-Liked Group 
     
 
Tolerant Condition Intolerant Condition 
 
Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Treatment 0.464 0.152 -0.458 0.154 
Sociotropic threat -0.097 0.025 -0.091 0.025 
Support for individual liberty 0.703 0.116 0.571 0.120 
Dogmatism -0.105 0.129 -0.047 0.121 
Education 0.107 0.060 0.151 0.050 
Female -0.066 0.148 -0.216 0.154 
Black 0.211 0.219 0.051 0.215 
Age 0.080 0.047 0.050 0.056 
constant 0.532 0.470 0.807 0.577 
     N 125 127 
R-squared 0.458 0.390 
     
Notes: Boldfaced coefficients significant at p≤ .10 
 
Table 17 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effect on Tolerance toward Least-Liked Group, with Pre-Test Tolerance 
     
 
Tolerant Condition Intolerant Condition 
 
Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Treatment 0.343 0.122 -0.495 0.115 
Pre-Test Tolerance 0.653 0.091 0.652 0.864 
     
Sociotropic threat -0.049 0.018 -0.020 0.018 
Support for individual liberty 0.306 0.104 0.067 0.122 
Dogmatism -0.167 0.071 -0.007 0.077 
Education 0.171 0.039 0.073 0.040 
Female 0.012 0.108 -0.138 0.119 
Black 0.151 0.195 -0.207 0.166 
Age 0.042 0.034 0.039 0.045 
constant 0.363 0.332 0.852 0.432 
     N 125 127 
R-squared 0.728 0.645 
     
Notes: Boldfaced coefficients significant at p≤ .10 
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The particular advantage of “self-persuasion” over direct persuasion through 
counterarguments is evident in its robust influence on attitude change among subjects that 
advocate counterattitudinal positions. That is, self-persuasion should not only convert tolerance 
to intolerance, but it should also convert intolerance to tolerance – a transformation that existing 
studies have found extremely difficult and less common than the reverse (e.g. Gibson 1998; 
Gibson and Gouws 2003).This is achieved through attitude change, whereby subjects advocating 
counterattitudinal positions come to believe that the argued opinion reflects their true belief (e.g. 
Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). Self-persuasion may also lead to similar changes among 
advocates of proattitudinal positions because the intense manipulation often compels these 
individuals to find new justifications for their beliefs. Still, the effects tend to be more potent 
among subjects that engage in counterattitudinal advocacy. I therefore expect the self-persuasion 
experiment to have exerted stronger effects on counterattitudinal essay writers than on subjects 
who wrote proattitudinal essays in the treatment conditions.  
 
Figure 3  Effects Pre-Test Attitudes on Self-Persuasion 
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This pattern is apparent in Figure 3. As expected, the self-persuasion procedure 
compelled change among those who advocated positions running against their true (i.e. original) 
beliefs. The rightmost bar over “prior tolerant” shows that tolerant subjects who practiced 
intolerance by arguing against allowing their most disliked group to hold a demonstration 
express far less tolerance than the tolerant control group (t62= -4.784, p<0.001). Similarly, the 
middle bar over “prior intolerant” indicates a perceptible increase in tolerance among initially 
intolerant subjects who practiced tolerance relative to the intolerant control group that did not 
(t63=4.049, p<0.001). By contrast, proattitudinal positions differ little from the “natural’ 
positions among control group subjects – practicing tolerance modestly, but does not 
significantly, increase post-test tolerance among those who entered the experiment with above-
average tolerance levels (t91=0.939, p=0.175), while only a slight but insignificant decrease is 
apparent across among the originally intolerant who also practiced intolerance relative to the 
control subjects who completed a distractor task (t56=-0.695, p=0.245).  
Inasmuch as the self-persuasion experiment is more successful than direct persuasion 
through counterarguments at converting intolerance to tolerance, it makes an important 
contribution to our ability to study the downstream effects of randomized tolerance on political 
outcomes. The ultimate objective is to make valid between-group comparisons on patterns of 
political participation among subjects assigned to apply (in)tolerance. This requires increased 
confidence that – as a whole – the self-persuasion experiment brings the initially tolerant and the 
initially intolerant closer together via the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance. 
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5.6 COMPLIERS AVERAGE CAUSAL EFFECT (CACE) OF THE TREATMENT 
ON (IN)TOLERANCE 
In the previous section, I demonstrated that the self-persuasion experiment moves attitudinal 
tolerance in the correct directions – individuals who apply tolerance to their least liked group 
express higher levels of post-test attitudinal tolerance than the control group, while individuals 
who apply intolerance express lower levels of attitudinal tolerance – and this movement, by and 
large, is significant. In this section, I demonstrate that the magnitude of the experimental 
treatment’s effect on tolerance and intolerance is nearly identical. More importantly, I establish 
that the effect is causally attributable to the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance. 
Such claims cannot be substantiated without careful attention to sampling and treatment 
fundamentals – especially the discrepancy between subjects the experiment intended to treat and 
subjects it indeed treated. If every subject who was assigned to treatment received treatment (and 
every subject assigned to not receive treatment did not receive it), causal effects are measured as 
the difference in outcome Y when subject i has been treated (di=1) and when subject i has not 
been treated (di=0), or Yi(1) – Yi(0). Given the fundamental problem of causal inference – that 
we cannot simultaneously observe Yi(1) and Yi(0) for the same subject – experimenters can 
observe the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the “sum of the subject-level treatment 
effects, Yi(1) – Yi(0), divided by the total number of subjects” (Gerber and Green 2012: 25). In 
practice, this means subtracting the average outcome in the control group from the average 
outcome in the treatment group.  
Recall that the definition of “treatment” in this experiment is satisfied when a subject 
who was assigned to write a substantive essay did in fact write such an essay. We thus excluded 
22 “nonsense” essay-writers in the above analysis as a first cut of the “directional” validity of the 
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self-persuasion effect. However, we cannot assess the power of the treatment effect – or its direct 
causal influence – over attitudinal tolerance and intolerance without statistically accounting for 
the noncompliant subjects. Although only a small percentage of subjects in this experiment 
ignored or actively rejected the instructions, excluding them impedes our ability to appraise the 
overall magnitude of the treatment effect, and to evaluate its parity across treatment conditions – 
i.e. whether practicing intolerance increases intolerance as much as practicing tolerance increases 
attitudinal tolerance.  
Non-compliant subjects become problematic in the “potential outcomes” frameworks for 
causal inference for at least two reasons. First, excluding subjects who were assigned to receive 
treatment but, in fact, did not is equivalent to attributing to them an outcome score of “zero.” 
That amounts to assuming that the 14 subjects in the tolerant condition who wrote “nonsense” 
essays would not have expressed different levels of tolerance had they actually written the essay. 
To the extent that this assertion is implausible, the true impact of the treatment on attitudinal 
tolerance will be underestimated. Second, one should not draw equivalence between subjects that 
have been assigned to treatment and have been treated, on one hand, and subjects that have been 
assigned to treatment and have not been treated, on the other. The latter is most likely not a 
random sub-set of the original treatment group and ignoring this “opens the door to biased 
inference” (Gerber and Green 2012: 134).  
In other words, noncompliance yields biased estimates of the Average Treatment Effect 
because researchers lack the complete schedule of potential outcomes for the subjects. Under 
noncompliance, researchers should estimate the local average treatment effect or, in Gerber and 
Green’s (2012: 142) terms, the “Complier Average Causal Effect,” or CACE. The CACE is 
calculated as average outcome Y among the group – including non-compliers – that was assigned 
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to receive treatment (this is denoted the “Intent-to-Treat” effect, or ITT), weighted by the 
percentage of that treatment group that was successfully treated (this ratio is denoted ITTD). The 
CACE is a more conservative estimate of causal influence than my prior estimates (but  not more 
conservative than the ITT); it converges toward the ATE as ITTD approaches 1 (i.e. as the 
percentage of the assigned treatment group that was actually treated approaches 100 percent). 
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Table 18 Complier Average Causal Effect of Self-Persuasion on Post-Test Tolerance and Intolerance toward Least-Liked Group 
   
 Post-Test Average Tolerance by Experimental Condition Causal Impact 
        
 
Tolerant Treatment N Control N ITT ITTD 
 
        
Outcome among the Treated 3.106 59 
     Outcome among the Untreated  2.286 14 2.581 72 
   Outcome among all subjects Assigned to Treatment 2.949 73 2.581 72    
     
0.368 0.808 0.455 
        
 
Intolerant Treatment N Control N ITT ITTD 
 
        
Outcome among the Treated 2.121 62 
     Outcome among the Untreated  2.614 11 2.581 72 
   Outcome among all subjects Assigned to Treatment 2.195 73 2.581 72    
     -0.386 0.849 -0.454 
        
        
“Treated” refers to subjects who were assigned to treatment and who received treatment, while “Untreated” refers to subjects who were assigned to treatment but did  not 
receive treatment. The overall outcome among the group “Assigned to Treatment” is simply the average outcome among the scheduled treatment group, whether that 
treatment was successfully received or not. The ITT, or “Intent to Treat” effect represents the difference in post-test tolerance between all subjects assigned to write a 
tolerant or intolerant essay (whether they complied or not) and all subjects assigned to write an essay about renewable energy sources.  
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Table 18 calculates the Complier Average Causal Effect of self-persuasion on subjects’ 
attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. The top panel of Table 18 estimates the CACE of applied 
tolerance on attitudinal tolerance, while the bottom panel estimates the causal effect of applied 
intolerance on attitudinal tolerance. The three quantities of interest in each panel appear in the 
first substantive column. They include the average post-test tolerance among the actually treated, 
the average post-test tolerance among subjects who were assigned to be treated but went 
untreated (i.e. who wrote nonsense essays), and the overall level of post-test tolerance among 
subjects assigned to treatment – regardless whether they successfully received it or not. We 
estimate ITT by subtracting from the overall post-test tolerance in the assigned-to-treatment 
group the post-test level of tolerance among the control group. This latter quantity is identical to 
the “outcome among the untreated” in the same column because the factorial design ensures that 
subjects in the control group were never inadvertently induced to apply tolerance or intolerance.  
The ITT, or “intent-to-treat” effect can be interpreted as a measure of the overall 
effectiveness of assignment to treatment rather than the causal effect of the treatment itself. This 
is useful to know because, in the next chapter, I will assign subjects to practice tolerance or 
intolerance and trace the effect of this manipulation on political participation. That is, assignment 
to treatment will function as an instrument for the practice of tolerance of intolerance; if the 
effect of this treatment on attitudinal (in)tolerance are too weak, the procedure would lack 
adequate power for predicting effects on political participation, and an alternate experimental 
approach would merit consideration. Fortunately, the effects are not: Those subjects assigned to 
practice tolerance were 0.368 more tolerant than the control group, while those assigned to 
practice intolerance were 0.386 less tolerant than the control group.  
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Noncompliance was a relatively minor problem in this study – ITTD for the tolerant 
condition yields 0.808, and the ITTD estimate for intolerant condition is 0.849 – meaning that I 
successfully treated 80.1 percent and 84.9 percent of subjects assigned to practice tolerance and 
intolerance, respectively. Nevertheless, the causal effect of these treatments must account for 
non-compliance. This estimated Compliers Average Causal Effect, or , is calculated as 
.  
As the far right entries in Table 18 indicate, the boost in post-test attitudinal tolerance 
among individuals who practiced tolerance is 0.455, while the nearly identical drop in attitudinal 
tolerance among subjects who practiced intolerance is 0.454. How potent are these effects given 
that subjects enter with different levels of dogmatic thinking and support for basic individual 
freedoms, have unequal education, and respond differently to stimuli like sociotropic threat? In 
order to obtain these parameter estimates, I employ two-stage least squares as a regression-
adjustment strategy (Gerber and Green 2012: 104, 157 – 60).  
In the first stage of the regression, we estimate the effects of actual treatment (i.e. among 
compliers) on post-test tolerance. This model does not include the assignment schedule because 
assignment to treatment is assumed to have no effect on outcomes over and above the effect of 
the actual treatment (Gerber and Green 2012: 159). The second stage model uses assignment to 
treatment (i.e. including non-compliers) as an instrument for successful treatment because it is 
assumed to be independent of the disturbance term. In addition, it includes as covariates the most 
common and strongest predictors of tolerance – sociotropic threat, dogmatism, and general 
support for democratic values – and other demographic factors that may influence post-test 
attitudinal tolerance. Including this vector of confounders Z on the right-hand side of the 
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equation produces a more accurate estimate of the compliers average causal effect. Put simply, 
we subtract from the disturbance term the amount of unexplained variation in attitudinal 
tolerance attributable to the most theoretically grounded and robust predictors of political 
tolerance and, in turn, reduce the standard error of the CACE. Moreover, the two-stage least 
squares instrumental regression enables us to calculate a 95% confidence interval for the  
with which we may understand the effect in more familiar terms.  
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Table 19 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate of CACE and Covariate-adjusted CACE of Applied Tolerance 
          
 
CACE  Covariate-adjusted CACE 
      
 
 
Instrumental Model  
 
Instrumental Model 
 
Coeff Robust SE Coeff Robust SE  Coeff Robust SE Coeff Robust SE 
     
 
    Treated 0.574 0.171 0.455 0.215  0.430 0.149 0.458 0.177 
Sociotropic threat 
 
 
  
 
-0.088 0.024 -0.089 0.024 
Dogmatism 
 
 
  
 -0.114 0.124 -0.116 0.127 
Support for individual liberty   
  
 0.653 0.115 0.651 0.115 
Education  
   
 0.075 0.057 0.076 0.057 
Female 
    
 -0.029 0.144 -0.029 0.144 
Black 
    
 0.251 0.231 0.254 0.235 
Age 
    
 0.056 0.046 0.056 0.045 
Intercept  2.532 0.120 2.581 0.134  0.909 0.439 0.907 0.439 
     
 
    N 144 144  144 144 
R-squared 0.070 0.067  0.390 0.389 
          
Boldfaced entries achieve significance at p ≤0.05 
Note that in the second column, “treatment” is instrumented by “assignment to treatment” 
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Table 20 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate of CACE and Covariate-adjusted CACE of Applied Intolerance 
    
 
CACE  Covariate-adjusted CACE 
      
 
 
Instrumented Model  
 
Instrumented Model 
 
Coeff Robust SE Coeff Robust SE  Coeff Robust SE Coeff Robust SE 
     
 
    Treated -0.464 0.173 -0.454 0.202  -0.513 0.151 -0.425 0.170 
Sociotropic threat  
   
 
-0.079 0.025 -0.080 0.025 
Dogmatism  
   
 -0.077 0.121 -0.074 0.121 
Support for individual liberty   
  
 0.574 0.117 0.569 0.117 
Education  
   
 0.134 0.049 0.133 0.049 
Female 
    
 -0.213 0.146 -0.217 0.146 
Black 
    
 -0.032 0.206 -0.021 0.209 
Age 
    
 0.035 0.050 0.035 0.049 
Intercept  2.585 0.113 2.581 0.134  0.998 0.504 0.980 0.501 
     
 
    N 144 144  144 144 
R-squared 0.042 0.048  0.357 0.355 
          
Boldfaced entries achieve significance at p ≤0.05 
Note that in the second column, “treatment” is instrumented by “assignment to treatment” 
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Tables 19 and 20 presents the two-stage least squares estimated CACE and covariate-
adjusted CACE of applied tolerance and intolerance, respectively. The stage two model, in each 
case, returns precisely the CACE estimate derived from simple calculations above. In the case of 
applied tolerance (Table 19), however, that effect appears to have been slightly underestimated. 
This is because the other independent variables are balanced as they should be; they affect the 
outcome, but not the relationship between the treatment or the instrumented treatment on the 
outcome. Controlling for the predictive power of perceived threat, dogmatism, support for 
democratic values, education, and demographics, the second-stage of model 2 – in the far right 
column – returns a CACE of 0.458. By contrast, the second-stage covariate-adjusted model of 
applied intolerance, in Table 8, indicates that prior models overestimated the effect of treatment 
on attitudinal intolerance. But not by much: CACE = 0.425.  
Overall, the effect of the self-persuasion experiment is comparable across groups 
assigned randomly to practice tolerance and groups assigned to practice intolerance. Moreover, 
this effect is robust following the inclusion of several major predictors of political intolerance. 
Given sampling uncertainty, the procedure can probably generate up to nearly a half-point 
increase in tolerance – averaged across all respondents assigned to practice tolerance – and just 
over an average of four-tenths decrease in tolerance among all subjects assigned to practice 
intolerance. It forces tolerant subjects and intolerant subjects together within each treatment 
group, by substantially decreasing tolerance among the initially tolerant by over eight-tenths of a 
point, and by increasing tolerance among the initially intolerant by approximately the same 
degree. 
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5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has introduced a means of randomly assigning subjects to the conditions in which 
they simulate the actual practice of tolerance and intolerance. The logic of this “self-persuasion 
experiment” is grounded in social psychology research, in which subjects who take up a position 
that is contrary to their original beliefs change these beliefs to conform to the counter-attitudinal 
argument. The effects are powerful among subjects advocating counterattitudinal positions, but 
changes are also evident among subjects who write proattitudinal positions.  
The self-persuasion experiment offers several advantages over alternative experimental 
techniques in the political tolerance literature, while also preserving most of their benefits. 
Unlike framing experiments, the self-persuasion experiment constitutes a direct manipulation of 
political (in)tolerance insofar as subjects are assigned at random to apply tolerance or intolerance 
in civil liberties dispute scenarios that are presented identically – with equal probabilities of 
threat, equal (i.e. zero) mention of free speech or democratic values, and equal situational 
elements (e.g. location is each respondent’s local community). Moreover, this manipulation 
successfully moves political tolerance in both directions. Whereas framing experiments have not 
been able to provide evidence that between groups comparisons are not attributable entirely to 
the suppressive effect of public order and security frames on tolerance (as opposed to in 
combination with the stimulating effect of free speech considerations on tolerance), the self-
persuasion experiment can stimulate and suppress political tolerance the applied tolerance and 
applied intolerance conditions, respectively.  
The self-persuasion experiment shares with traditional persuasion experiments the feature 
of a direct manipulation of political (in)tolerance. However, whereas direct persuasion 
experiments using counterarguments have struggled to convert originally intolerant respondents 
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to tolerant judgments, the strongest effect to emerge from the self-persuasion experiment is the 
increase in tolerance among subjects who entered the experiment holding intolerant attitudes and 
who were assigned to practice tolerance toward their least-liked group in response to the 
hypothetical civil liberties dispute. Furthermore, direct persuasion experiments leave open the 
possibility that resistance to persuasion might generate stronger attitudes among a subset of the 
sample. Since intolerant subjects are far and away more likely to resist persuasion than tolerant 
subjects, it is difficult to attribute any downstream effects of manipulated tolerance on political 
outcomes to differences in attitude content. This is particularly relevant when the dependent 
variable is participation, since strong attitudes are more predictive of behavior than weak 
attitudes; resistance to direct persuasion may strengthen attitudes while acquiescence may 
weaken attitudes. 
A final fundamental difference between the self-persuasion experiment and direct 
persuasion through counterarguments is that no assumptions need to be made about the 
differential strength of pro-tolerance and anti-tolerance arguments.  The intensive elaboration at 
the core of the self-persuasion experiment requires each respondent to devise an argument that 
they themselves deem convincing. In combination with the content-controlled measurement 
strategy, one might claim that the self-persuasion experiment not only ensures that each subject 
generates judgments about tolerance in relation to a group they abhor, but also that each subject 
has a relatively equal opportunity to unravel and overturn the reasoning or feelings that led to 
their initial tolerance judgment in the first place.  
Previous research on attitude change following self-persuasion suggests that its effects 
endure much longer than those associated with direct persuasion through counterarguments (e.g. 
Aronson 1999). Moreover, this is particularly true of attitudes that compel behavior – such as 
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attitudes toward water conservation and shower duration or environmental attitudes and 
recycling frequency (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson and Miller 1992) – and high-risk behavior, 
at that (on condom use among college students, see Aronson et al. 1991, 1994). But additional 
research is required to compare the relative duration and potency of tolerance attitude change 
following direct and self-persuasion, especially in the context of a longitudinal study. 
One important challenge to the self-persuasion experiment is that allowing respondents to 
control the arguments they make in favor or against allowing their most-disliked group to 
demonstrate publicly means researchers effectively lose control over the extraneous influence 
these arguments may have on outcomes like political participation. I have argued, however, that 
in the aggregate there is a pluralistic failure of the exclusion condition such that this failure 
cancels out in the aggregate. Section 5.4.5 provides anecdotal evidence to suggest that individual 
subjects do offer a bevy of different pro- and anti-tolerance justifications. In my future research, 
I will address this more rigorously, especially comparing cross-national justifications for 
(in)tolerance across countries where democratic values are presumed to be deeply ingrained and 
where they are not. Moreover, the essay task at the core of self-persuasion procedures provides 
an important source of qualitative data in tolerance research, not unlike the intensive interviews 
conducted by Chong (1993) for his study of “How Americans Think, Reason, and Feel about 
Rights and Liberties.” Americans may differ widely in their conceptualization of tolerance and 
their understanding of the rationale for toleration in general. This may have implications for 
political attitudes and behavior depending on the nature of civil liberties disputes as they emerge 
and develop in real time. 
The results in this chapter show that simulating applied tolerance and intolerance exerts 
powerful effects over attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. This finding is a central stepping 
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stone in this dissertation: attributing causal effects of political tolerance on political participation 
requires that, at a minimum, experimental researchers randomly assign tolerance and intolerance 
in a convincing manner.  The self-persuasion experiment by and large satisfies this requirement. 
The next step is to build this manipulation into a substantive study of the consequences of those 
attitudes. In the next chapter, I return to the question of how tolerance influences political 
behavior and examine what moves the politically tolerant to engage in more social forms of 
action than the politically intolerant. 
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6.0  THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY 
This chapter employs the self-persuasion experimental procedure to randomly assign American 
and Hungarian subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance. Following exposure to 
manipulation, subjects are presented with the opportunity to either sign a petition or make an 
anonymous donation. Technologies embedded within the online survey experiment framework 
permit me to directly observe whether subjects assigned to tolerance participate more or 
differently than subjects assigned to intolerant or control conditions. Results of the experiment 
provide the first direct assessment of whether, how and where political tolerance may influence 
actual political behavior.  
6.1 BRIEF REPRISE AND INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER SIX 
What are the behavioral consequences of political tolerance? In theory, tolerant activists serve as 
the custodians of liberal democracy. But it remains unclear whether tolerant citizens are 
necessarily more active citizens. One line of literature maintains that any positive association 
between tolerance and participation is spurious – explained by more fundamental demographic 
and personality traits (Sullivan et al. 1982). Another suggests that one endures nonconformity at 
the expense of vibrant civic engagement – tolerance is attitudinally too weak, pliable, and 
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dissonant to compel action on behalf of nonconformist others and leads individuals to abstain 
from expressing their own political views through even the most ordinary forms of participation, 
like voting (Mutz 2005).  
This dissertation offers the costs-consistency theory of tolerance and participation as a 
third alternative. Its core idea is that tolerance and participation may be linked in terms of the 
“social costs” they pose to individuals as political actors. Individuals who bear substantial social 
costs to enable political expression by widely disliked others will be less likely to perceive 
barriers to their own political activism. Two mechanisms may explain this effect. On one hand, 
behavioral consistency across similar situations (e.g. Furr and Funder 2003) may account for a 
direct effect of tolerance on contentious and collective, or “public” participation. Practicing 
tolerance exposes individuals to high social costs, which in turn conditions their willingness to 
engage in contentious and collective actions that entail similar costs – costs that material 
resources cannot overcome alone (cf. Figure 1). 
On the other hand, cognitive consistency may indirectly motivate tolerant individuals to 
engage in public political actions. Tolerance is a more dissonant position than intolerance 
(Gibson 2006) because it readily contradicts other cherished social and democratic norms (e.g. 
Sniderman et al. 1996). To the extent that such inconsistency is psychologically distressing 
(Festinger 1957), individuals will be motivated to strengthen or develop beliefs related to 
tolerance – such as perceived political freedom, support for dissent, and risk acceptance – that 
justify the decision to extend rights to unsavory groups and restore cognitive consistency. 
Therefore, tolerance may produce certain psychic benefits that facilitate engagement in high-cost 
public modes of participation.   
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Chapter Four tested the first of these two mechanisms and offered preliminary support for 
this revisionist account of tolerance and participation. The behavioral consistency hypothesis 
expected tolerant individuals to associate lower costs with – and, hence be more likely to engage 
in – “public,” contentious and collective forms of action than intolerant individuals. By contrast, 
I expected few differences between tolerant and intolerant citizen participation via “private,” 
individual avenues of engagement. Model estimates based on nonparametric matching of tolerant 
and intolerant respondents on a bevy of confounders that explain the propensity for both 
tolerance and participation generally support the behavioral consistency hypothesis in 
longstanding Western democracies.  
However, from analysis of survey data in Chapter Four, no clear pattern of a relationship 
between tolerance and participation emerges in the post-communist context. While this appears 
consistent with pooled country-level analyses that rely on political socialization perspectives 
(e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; Peffley and Rohrschneider2003), certain anomalies 
emerge that weaken this view. In Poland and Czech Republic, for instance, tolerance increases 
the propensity for private political actions in a manner consistent with the new democracy 
hypothesis. However, in these cases and in Slovenia, tolerance also increases the likelihood of 
engagement in public actions (petitioning, boycotting, and protesting) in a manner consistent 
with the behavioral consistency hypothesis. Finally, in the most fragile new democracies – 
Bulgaria and Hungary – political tolerance decreases political participation in a way that reflects 
the tradeoff account of tolerance and participation. 
What this may suggest is that a general effect of tolerance on participation exists across 
countries, but this effect may also be counterbalanced by certain contextual forces in the post-
authoritarian context. For instance, I speculated in Chapter Three that the relative fragility of 
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democracy in certain East Central European countries could lead citizens to perceive contentious 
acts of dissent as less intrinsically useful to the democratic process or democratic stability. 
Alternatively, the communist legacy has left citizens in many countries deeply suspicious of 
collective actions, and in some regimes (e.g. Hungary and Romania), real risks of government 
retaliation and repression for dissenting behavior persist.  
On balance, evidence from Chapter Four suggests two things. Most importantly tolerance 
stimulates participation in collective and contentious political activities in many cases, but does 
less to influence private, individual forms of activism over and above the classic predictors of 
civic engagement. This pattern – most strongly apparent in longstanding, Western democracies – 
challenges conventional empirical accounts of the tolerance-participation relationship. Moreover, 
cross-country variation in the tolerance-participation relationship is likely more nuanced than 
political socialization theory suggests. Still, these conclusions remain open to at least three 
important objections, to which I attempt to respond in this chapter. First, the causal arrow could 
run in the opposite direction: participation in contentious and collective action may itself 
increase political tolerance, rather than the reverse. Second, survey respondents’ self-reported 
participation is susceptible to measurement error and may bias the results. Third, survey analysis 
does little to substantiate the potential micro-level processes underlying this relationship. 
Randomized experiments offer an important means of ruling out endogeneity, improving 
measurement, and determining what moves the politically tolerant to engage in more public 
forms of action. Chapter Five introduced the “self-persuasion experiment” to exogenously and 
randomly manipulate tolerance and intolerance. Its value is twofold. First, it more closely 
simulates the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance because respondents elaborate their own 
argument for upholding or restricting the rights of their least liked group. Second, in the course 
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of developing this argument, subjects ultimately convince themselves that (in)tolerance is the 
appropriate response to a civil liberties dispute. Intent-to-treat analysis shows that random 
assignment to applied tolerance or intolerance meaningfully influences subjects’ underlying 
attitudinal tolerance. Importantly, assignment to treatment significantly bolsters intolerance 
among initially tolerant subjects and tolerance among initially intolerant subjects with equal 
frequency and similar power – a balanced influence that direct persuasion experiments have not 
yet been able to achieve – which can improve causal inferences about the downstream effects of 
political (in)tolerance.  
This chapter employs the self-persuasion experiment to refine and extend the analysis in 
Chapter Four. I first randomly assign subjects in the United States and Hungary to manifest 
tolerance or intolerance and then directly observe their post-judgment participation using overt 
measures of subjects’ political behavior. This unobtrusive measurement strategy is not open to 
self-reporting bias in survey research and improves upon previous experimental work that has 
evaluated only behavioral intentions (e.g. Marcus et al. 1995). These experiments permit a direct 
test of the tolerance-participation relationship. They also illuminate cognitive consistency as a 
potential causal mechanism. In particular, a mediational analysis explores how protecting or 
restricting the rights of hated political opponents influences subjects’ perceptions of political 
freedom, support for dissent, and risk aversion – attitudes that shape how individuals weigh the 
costs of different political actions.  
I review the operational hypotheses and case selection in the next section. In the third 
section, I discuss the experimental protocol and measurement strategies. The final sections 
present and discuss the results. 
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6.2 OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES 
This chapter will re-test the behavioral consistency hypothesis advanced in Chapter Four because 
endogeneity and measurement error may remain problematic in survey analysis even when 
matching techniques are employed. Original survey experiments conducted in the United States 
and Hungary also permit me to test additional hypotheses derived from Proposition 2, which 
posit that practicing tolerance carries positive psychic benefits for individuals in the form of 
decreased risk aversion, increased support for dissent, and increased political freedom. In 
general, I will call these the cognitive consistency hypotheses. 
Individuals’ innate need to maintain cognitive consistency may account for these latter 
effects. Tolerance cross-cuts other important democratic norms like equality (Sniderman et al. 
1996), desires for public order and security (Gibson 1998), and legitimate social goals like anti-
racism (e.g. Bleich 2011) and women’s and LGBT minorities’ rights (e.g. Mudde 2010). 
Tolerance is therefore recognized as a more internally inconsistent, or dissonant, position than 
intolerance (Gibson 1998, 2006). Social psychology research consistently reports that individuals 
who experience inconsistency between two beliefs or between their beliefs and their actions 
encounter, as a consequence, a palpable psychological discomfort which they are motivated to 
reduce (Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). This is achieved by restoring cognitive consistency; 
individuals bolster existing attitudes or develop new beliefs to reduce any ambivalence they 
experience.  
Through this consistency restoration mechanism, tolerance may influence three attitudes 
that should lower the perceived costs of contentious and collective activism. First, based on 
Gibson’s (1992b) bivariate associations between tolerance and perceptions of freedom (i.e. the 
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belief that the government will not repress or otherwise infringe upon individuals’ right to 
express views that challenge the government), I expect that: 
 
Political Freedom Hypothesis: Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater 
perceptions of political freedom than individuals who practice intolerance.  
 
Gibson cautions against drawing inferences about the causal direction of this relationship; 
however, the methodology developed in Chapter Five permits a direct assessment of the 
association. By randomly assigning subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance in response to a 
hypothetical civil liberties dispute, I am able to discern whether tolerance judgments carry 
independent effects on perceptions of political freedom. Citizens who incur substantial costs to 
protect the basic rights of offensive groups may justify this decision through increased 
confidence that they lay unfettered claim to these same rights. Hence, tolerance should increase 
perceptions of political freedom.  
In a similar vein, upholding the expressive rights of heinous groups poses certain risks to 
the tolerant individual – such as violating broadly accepted social norms of having one’s 
tolerance mistaken for acceptance of an unpopular group and support for its views. Restricting 
rights to these groups shields the intolerant individual from such risks. To the extent that 
individuals incur risks in order to defend the legitimacy of unsavory political expression by 
widely disliked groups, tolerant individuals may rationalize that the risk was justified. In turn, 
tolerance may decrease individuals’ aversion to potential risks associated with their own political 
expression:  
 
Risk Aversion Hypothesis: Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater risk-
acceptance attitudes than individuals who practice intolerance.  
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Finally, tolerance may be conceptualized as an act of dissent from the majority. A 
generation of political tolerance research demonstrates that, despite widespread support for civil 
libertarian norms, most citizens in most democracies are unwilling to extend basic procedural 
rights and civil liberties to groups they strongly dislike (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1985; 
Duch and Gibson 1992; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; but see Petersen et al. 2011). Hence, 
tolerant individuals are a minority subset in the broader, intolerant population. Individuals may 
reduce the dissonance associated with minoritarian tolerance by bolstering their belief that 
dissent from the majority is a necessary condition for good democracy.   
 
Support for Dissent Hypothesis: Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater 
support for dissent than individuals who practice intolerance.  
 
Via these products of cognitive consistency restoration, tolerance should contribute to 
citizens’ propensity for public political activism, which is contingent upon attitudinal 
dispositions toward risk, conflict, and dissent. But such psychic benefits should do little to 
facilitate engagement in private, individual actions whose low costs to action do not require 
positive attitudinal dispositions toward freedom, risk, and dissent to overcome.  
However, certain theoretical allowances need to be made for contextual differences 
across entrenched liberal democracies and post-authoritarian (and potentially illiberal) 
democracies. In particular, contextual forces in the post-authoritarian context may block or 
counterbalance these proposed effects of tolerance. It is possible that cognitive consistency 
restoration will not increase perceptions of political freedom where real constraints on political 
freedom exist. In the case of Hungary, where Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have eroded 
civil liberties and de-legitimized the political opposition vigorously over the past several years, 
post-communist citizens who already view the government and collective action with suspicion 
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(e.g. Wallace et al. 2012) may not develop new assurances that their rights are secure by 
extending them to others in the political opposition. Moreover, one could speculate that few 
citizens will perceive dissent as intrinsically useful to democratic stability where democratic 
backsliding is underway, as it is in Hungary.  
Indeed, Hungary is the clearest case of a post-communist democracy whose authoritarian 
roots were never fully clipped and aerate once more.
25
 In Hungary, democratic transition 
generated considerable political and economic uncertainty, aggravated linguistic and ethnic 
tensions, and opened the door to Orbán’s authoritarian revival. It is possible that such 
considerations block the basic availability of pro-democratic orientations toward freedom and 
dissent as “justifications” for tolerance. I therefore speculate that if a connection between 
tolerance and participation exists in Hungary, it should be driven by behavioral consistency, such 
that enduring the costs of tolerance equips individuals to endure costs associated with their own 
political engagement. But I reiterate the new democracy hypothesis here as well: given the 
heightened (perhaps prohibitive) risks of public activism in Orbán’s Hungary, tolerance should 
be more likely to generate private, individual activism than contentious and collective activism. 
                                                 
25
 It is at least the clearest case in the European Union, and clearest among the countries included 
in cross-national survey analysis from Chapter Four.  
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6.3 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
6.3.1 Summary 
The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether tolerance judgments shape political 
participation and the attitudes toward freedom, risk, and dissent that may condition how 
individuals perceive costs of different avenues of action. The pre-test procedures and questions 
largely match those described in Chapter Five; however, certain basic differences are discussed 
below. This study’s major novelties are then discussed in the “treatment and post-test” sub-
sections 6.3.3and 6.3.4.  
First, to test the micro-theoretical framework, subjects responded to post-test items 
designed to tap risk perceived freedom, risk aversion, and support for dissent. Second, subjects 
were provided with the opportunity to take action on behalf of a political goal they listed as 
“most important” to them in the pre-test. These measures of behavior are overt and unobtrusive: 
respondents could either donate money to, or sign their name to a petition circulated by, a group 
working to advance the subjects’ particular cause. Technologies embedded within the online 
survey framework permit me to directly observe not only whether and how respondents 
participate following the practice of tolerance or intolerance, but also whether they were willing 
to do so in a manner that sacrifices their anonymity.
26
 The fundamental details of these 
procedures are discussed below; the full text of the survey-experiment along with the exact forms 
respondents could access are included in the appendix to Chapter Six.  
                                                 
26
 This approach builds on current research design advances through which overt measures of 
behavior are increasingly incorporated into experimental settings (e.g. Shineman 2012). 
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6.3.2 Sample and cover story 
A random sample of 880 subjects in the United States and Hungary was purchased through the 
online survey agency, Qualtrics. A total of 440 Americans and 440 Hungarians participated in 
the study of “How people persuade one another in politics.” The Hungarian survey was 
administered in Hungarian by “Research Now,” Qualtrics’ partner in Budapest. The survey 
translated into Hungarian independently by four contractors at TransPerfect – a professional 
translation agency based in New York, NY – and proofread for errors and consistency.  
The basic structure of the survey experiment closely matches that described in Chapter 5. 
Importantly, however, given the high cost of “call-backs” in the Hungarian context, I was unable 
to separate the pre-test questionnaire from the treatment and post-test measures by dividing the 
survey-experiment into two separate sittings. Instead, participants completed the online study in 
a single sitting. I therefore took additional steps toward minimizing the influence of testing 
effects that could alert respondents to the purpose of the study and potentially bias its findings. In 
particular, I furnished a deceptive description of the survey format to help obscure similarities 
between pre-test and post-test questionnaires and to reduce subjects’ ability to infer the intention 
of the experiment from its basic structure. Subjects were informed that they had agreed to 
participate in two separate research studies regarding their political beliefs: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in these research studies. In what follows, 
you will respond to two separate surveys about politics and current events in 
[country]. You will be paid for both. [Survey Agency name] has adopted this two-
survey format to improve the survey experience for you, the respondent. In 
particular, you will be asked only once to answer basic questions about yourself – 
such as your age, education, gender, and so on – as this information is relevant to 
both research studies. Separate instruction sets have been provided for each 
study, so you will know when you have completed one and have begun the other.   
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This device allowed me to provide unique introductions and instruction sets for the pre-
test and post-test. This strategy helped divorce pre-test and post-test content in a credible manner 
and reduce the degree to which subjects might assume a relationship between questions 
preceding and following the manipulation. This procedure is consistent with deceptive practices 
employed in social psychological studies of attitude change, such as through cognitive 
dissonance (e.g. Cooper 2007), in which pre-test and post-test questions are often identical. 
6.3.3 Pre-test questionnaire and measurement 
The pre-test served to gauge respondents’ baseline tolerance for their least-liked group, the level 
of threat respondents believed that group poses to society; respondents’ support for individual 
liberty over public order and security; their level of dogmatic thinking, and basic demographic 
traits. The questionnaire employed in this study is identical to that described in Chapter Five with 
a few important exceptions. For brevity, I summarize in Table 21 the variables I have previously 
discussed.   
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Table 21 Pre-Test Questionnaire Items and Reliability 
    
Pre-test variable #Items Range/meaning of high values Scale Reliability 
     
   U.S. Hungary 
     
Tolerance† 4 1-4   (4=most tolerant) 0.84 0.78 
Threat 3 1-10 (10=most threat) 0.83 0.83 
Support for individual freedom over order 5 1-5   (5=most freedom) 0.88 0.67 
Dogmatism 4 1-4   (4=most dogmatic) 0.74 0.62 
Conservatism 1 1-7   (7=most conservative)   
Gender 1 0,1   (1=female)   
Race/Ethnicity 1 0,1   (1=black; ethnic minority)    
Education 1 1-7   (7=advanced degree)   
Political Interest 1 1-5   (5=most interest)   
     
† American respondents could select one of ten “political groups currently active in American society today”: The 
Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life groups (abortion 
opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; or 
gay rights supporters. Hungarian respondents were able to select from among eight groups: Gypsies; Jobbik party 
supporters; Jews; Homosexual rights supporters; Communists; “Milla” supporters (anti-government protesters); 
Fidesz party supporters; Catholic nationalists. These groups represent the broad range of targets of Hungarian 
intolerance, from political leftists and social liberals (Romani rights groups, Homosexual rights supporters; 
Communists) to political rightists and social conservatives (Jobbik party supporters; Fidesz party supporters; 
Catholic nationalists). I have also included “Gypsies” and “Jews” were included as the most common targets of 
xenophobia and intolerance in modern Hungary 
 
The basic claim of this dissertation is that tolerance influences political action 
independently of conventional predictors of civic voluntarism (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995). Moreover, case studies of tolerance and participation around a specific political issue 
report that, for both tolerant and intolerant individuals, political behavior is at least partly a 
function of a general propensity toward activism and issue-salience (Gibson 1987). I included 
three pre-test questions to account for these factors.   
First, I measured subjects’ associational involvement – a strong predictor of activism – by 
asking “How often do you participate in activities that are organized by groups you belong to, 
such as churches, sports clubs, political organizations, volunteer or charity groups, unions, 
professional associations, etc.?”  
 Second and following Gibson (1992b), I evaluated respondents’ broad propensity for 
engagement in different sorts of political actions with the following question: “Suppose the 
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government did something you believed was wrong and you wanted to do something about it. 
Would you be willing or unwilling to take the following actions…1) Put a sign in front of your 
home or apartment; 2) Join  a peaceful protest; 3) Contact an elected official to express your 
opinions; 4) Donate money to an organization that supports your views; 5) Vote more frequently; 
6) Create a local organization to oppose the government’s actions; 7) Create and gather 
signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions; 8) Sign your full name to a public 
petition to oppose the government’s actions. Four-category responses ranged from “definitely 
unwilling” to “definitely willing” and were averaged to generate a participation potential index 
(α = 0.84, United States; α = 0.84, Hungary). 
Third, I introduced a question concerning subjects’ political goals to address issue-
salience. After reporting their political ideology, respondents encountered a list of political issues 
generally covered by the news media at the time of each survey. They were asked “Which policy 
goal would you say is the MOST important to you right now?” In most cases, a clear liberal 
(leftist) and conservative (rightist) issue position had been advocated in the news. American 
subjects could choose from six policy questions, designed to represent liberal or conservative 
issue positions:  
 
 End tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans 
 Cut wasteful government spending 
 Repeal Obamacare 
 Fast-track immigrant children to U.S. citizenship 
 Legalize same-sex marriage across the country 
 Ban same-sex marriage across the country 
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Likewise, Hungarians could select from among six questions that dominated political 
news coverage throughout March 2013.  
 Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition 
 Protect government-funded subsidies for college tuition 
 Rename “Horthy Park” to its original name - Gyromo Park 
 Require voters to pre-register before 2014 general election 
 Protect protesters’ rights at the March 15th rallies 
 Increase police presence at the March 15th rallies 
 
Technologies embedded within the online survey allowed me to tailor options for real 
participation (described below) for each subject based on their response to this question. For 
instance, Americans selecting “cut government spending” as their most important political goal 
were offered an opportunity to advance this goal; Hungarians who opposed the re-naming of 
Gyromo park after notorious Nazi sympathizer, Miklos Horthy, could take action to revert the 
name change; and so on. I adopted this approach to partially limit the role that unequal issue-
salience may play in generating participation in the post-test. Survey costs prohibit extensive 
measurement of issue-salience and attitude strength. However, this basic measure provides at 
least minimal assurance that all respondents encountered an opportunity to act on an issue they 
perceived as important. 
6.3.4 Manipulation and post-test attitudinal measures 
Subjects next encountered instructions for a distinct research study of “How people persuade one 
another in politics.” As the central manipulation, described in Chapter Five, subjects wrote an 
essay to convince a hypothetical discussion partner to either permit (tolerant condition) or 
prevent (intolerant condition) a public demonstration by the subject’s own least-liked group. 
Subjects in the control condition argued in favor or against selling genetically modified, 
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laboratory-grown tomatoes in place of natural, farm-grown tomatoes in their local stores. Again 
following conventions in self-persuasion research, subjects were informed prior to the writing 
task that they may be asked to advocate a counterattitudinal position, were given the option to 
exit the study without penalty, and encountered a gentle plea for their assistance despite any 
discomfort they might experience.
27
  
Subjects elected whether to withdraw from the study before assignment to treatment.
28
 
This protects against one-sided attrition by condition, but increases the possibility of 
noncompliance. I consider subjects as having received treatment if and only if they have 
completed the intensive essay-writing task. I therefore excluded from the analysis noncompliant 
treatment-group subjects who wrote “nonsense” essays rather than developing and defending a 
tolerant or intolerant position on the hypothetical civil liberties dispute. However, subjects who 
wrote essays opposing the position they were asked to advocate (i.e. subjects assigned to 
tolerance who wrote defenses of intolerance and vice versa) were not excluded (see Chapter 
Five, Section 5.4.4).  
Subjects who chose to proceed were then randomly assigned to treatment conditions, in 
which they had up to 10 minutes to “write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences” 
in a text box that appeared beneath the question. After completing the tolerant, intolerant, or 
control essay task, subjects answered three questions – presented in random order – designed to 
measure their perceptions of political freedom, aversion to risk, and support for dissent.  
                                                 
27
 Subjects read: You will be asked to write a short but strong argument that you think could 
persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: we politely ask that you try to write 
a strong argument, even if you disagree with what you have been asked to write. If you feel that 
you must refuse to write such an argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey 
without loss of payment. But your participation is very important to our research and would be 
of great help to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously. 
28
 20 American subjects and 18 Hungarian subjects withdrew from the study.   
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Following Gibson (1992b), I measured perceived political freedom with the question: 
“Suppose you felt very strongly that something the government was doing was very wrong and 
you wanted to do something about it. Do you think the government would definitely allow, 
probably allow, probably not allow, or definitely not allow you to… 1) Organize a nationwide 
strike; 2) Organize public meetings to oppose the government’s actions; 3) Organize protest 
marches or demonstrations; 4) Make a speech criticizing government’s actions; 5) Create and 
gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions. The four response categories 
included “definitely not allow, probably not allow, probably allow, definitely allow”; responses 
were averaged and higher values represent higher perceptions of political freedom (α=0.88, 
United States; α=0.84, Hungary).  
To measure support for dissent, respondents were invited to “Please indicate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 1) It is very good that 
people have freedom to protest against issues they dislike; 2) Most disagreements undermine 
society; 3) You have to be ready to accept new ideas; new ideas are needed for the advancement 
of society; 4) Challenging ideas held by the majority of people is essential to democracy. The 
averaged Likert-scaled items generate a reliable index in both countries (α=0.70, United States; 
α=0.69, Hungary) in which higher values represent greater support for dissent.  
Lastly, I measured risk aversion with 10 statements employed in recent political science 
research (e.g. Kam 2000; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). Specifically, respondents were 
invited to “Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements: 1) I do not feel comfortable about taking chances; 2) I like new and exciting 
experiences, even if I have to break the rules; 3) Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely 
sure about how things will turn out; 4) I would like to explore strange places; 5) I prefer 
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situations that have foreseeable outcomes; 6) I feel comfortable improvising in new situations; 7) 
I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain circumstances; 8) I prefer friends who 
are exciting and unpredictable; 9) I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes; 10) I like to do 
frightening things. These scales, on which higher values have been coded to represent higher risk 
acceptance, are also reliable across contexts (α = 0.79, United States; α = 0.65, Hungary). 
6.3.5 Direct measures of political behavior 
I built two separate measures of political participation into this experiment. The first directly 
measures subjects’ overt political behavior. The second aims to explicitly capture the “public” 
or “private” dimensions of political participation.  
To properly distance these measures from the manipulation, respondents were first led to 
believe they had completed the online survey. Following the post-test attitudinal questions, they 
were thanked and informed that they would be paid $5.00 (1,700 Hungarian Forints).
29
  
At the same time, subjects were also informed that the study was partly funded by the 
“Citizens Initiative Lobby Group” – a fictitious organization described as “a non-partisan, non-
profit group that advances citizen interests in {Washington/Budapest}. Since 2002, the CILG has 
worked daily in courts, {legislatures/parliament}, and communities to promote the public’s 
views on important government decisions. We operate only in response to public demand.” Prior 
                                                 
29
 Subjects were remunerated in these exact amounts via Qualtrics and Research Now survey 
houses.  Note that Hungarian respondents were paid more than American respondents – these 
values do not represent exchange rates. 
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to exiting the study, subjects were invited to “view an important message from the Citizens’ 
Initiative Lobby Group” on the next page.30  
Overt Behavior Measure. Upon advancing the page, each subject viewed a message 
tailored to reflect concern over the issue they selected as “most important” to them during the 
pre-test. Half of subjects selecting each issue were asked whether they would like to sign a 
petition distributed by the Citizens Initiative Lobby Group to advance their cause; half were 
asked whether they would like to donate a portion of their earnings from their survey to the 
Citizens Initiative Lobby Group to advance their cause.  
For instance, American respondents who reported “legalize same-sex marriage” as the 
most urgent priority for US politics read:  
 
As you probably have heard, several states now officially recognize same-sex marriage. 
But many others do not. Several activist groups maintain that this imbalance is not 
sustainable. The Citizens’ Initiative Lobby group is now [circulating a petition around 
the country / raising money for its campaign] to legalize same-sex marriage across the 
country.  
 
Those selecting “Ban same-sex marriage” as the most important issue read:  
 
As you probably have heard, a few states now officially recognize same-sex marriage. 
But many others do not. Several activist groups maintain that this imbalance is not 
sustainable. The Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group is now [circulating a petition around 
the country / raising money for its campaign] to ban gay marriage across the United 
States, at the federal level.  
 
I furnished similar vignettes for each issue; these are presented in the appendix to Chapter 6. As 
a measure of overt political behavior, subjects were next invited to download the petition or 
donation form, complete it, and re-upload it to the survey website:   
 
 
                                                 
30
 In practice they had no choice but to view the message.  
 201 
 
Feel free to download and fill out the [petition/donation form] by clicking this link: 
{link}.  
 
Save it to your computer and, when you are finished, you may upload your [signed 
petition/completed donation form] by clicking {“Choose File”} below. If you do not 
wish to participate, please click “next” to exit the survey interface. 
  
[Petition]: Upon exiting this survey on the next page, your signed petition along with 
your name and email address will be automatically forwarded to the specified recipients, 
and the Citizens Initiative Group will receive a copy for their permanent records.  
 
[Donation]: Upon existing this survey on the next page, the amount you elect to donate 
will be automatically withheld from your payment for participating in this study. This is 
to ensure your anonymity.  
 
 
I furnished unique petition and donation forms for each issue, which can be viewed in the 
Appendix to Chapter 6. By way of example, Figure 4 presents the Citizens’ Initiative Lobby 
Group petition to ban same-sex marriage. Note that subjects are asked to provide their last name 
and first initial, and to indicate whether their name may be forwarded to the government actors 
listed in blue at the top of the page. Standards of research conduct limit the amount of 
information I could ethically request from individual respondents. Nevertheless, the petition 
contains at least two credible suggestions that participation would reveal the participant’s 
identity to the petition’s recipients – in particular, the government and media actors’ names are 
highlighted in blue and the respondent is explicitly asked whether their name (even if not fully 
revealed) can be kept on record.  
 202 
 
Figure 4 Petition Viewed by Subjects selecting "Ban same-sex marriage" as Most Important Political Goal 
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By contrast, the donation form in Figure 5 assures anonymity. Subjects do not provide 
their name, and in any case must explicitly request that it be included in a list of “contributors.”   
 
Figure 5 Donation Form Viewed by Subjects selecting "Ban same-sex marriage" as Most Important Political Goal 
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The re-upload function allowed me to directly measure which respondents returned a 
completed petition or donation form. Respondents are coded as having “signed the petition” or 
“made a donation” if they returned a completed form to the online survey. On the other hand, 
“non-participants” are those individuals who did not re-upload a completed form before 
proceeding to the end of the survey. 
Public vs. Private Action Measure. The division between petitioning and donating is 
partially theoretical and partially functional. In theory, these behaviors can be differentiated by 
the degree to which they expose participants to potential conflict with the government. Hence, 
petitioning represents “public” political activism, whereas “donating” is an example of private, 
individual activism. As the examples above suggest, I took additional steps toward emphasizing 
this in each condition. Moreover, this distinction has been validated by other empirical research. 
In her study of risk attitudes and political participation, Kam (2011) finds that donations stand 
apart from other behaviors in that they are only weakly conditioned by risk-acceptance relative to 
more public actions, like petitioning. And in the case of donations to religious organizations, risk 
acceptance predicts abstention. Functionally, these are the easiest behaviors to map using online 
survey technologies.31  
Still, there may be other reasons why a subject would be more likely to petition than 
donate that do not relate to the collective-contentious or individual dimensions of costs proposed 
here and in the participation literature. For instance, these studies were conducted during 
economic recessions in both the U.S. and Hungary; respondents may be reluctant to part ways 
with money they just earned over the past 30 minutes. Even though I can control for income in 
                                                 
31
 Ideally, I would contrast protest or rally attendance against voting or donating behavior; but 
this requires a natural experimental setting, such as emerged around the Ground Zero “Mosque” 
dispute. This is a subject for future research. 
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the analysis, subjects invited to donate may be primed to think about the amount of time they 
dedicated to the study relative to their remuneration and be reluctant to give more, whereas this 
is not a consideration for subjects offered the opportunity to sign a petition.  
Therefore, I embedded a cleaner measure of the public vs. private dimension of 
participation directly into the petition and donation forms. Petitioning respondents were informed 
that: Your signature to this petition will be published with other signatures, unless you elect to 
remain totally anonymous by selecting the appropriate box on the petition itself. Donating 
respondents were told: Your donation will be deducted automatically and is completely 
anonymous. If you would like your name to be included among the published list of 
“contributors” to this cause, please select the appropriate box on the donation form itself. 
Respondents therefore explicitly revealed their willingness to preserve or forego their anonymity 
in the case of both donating and petitioning. This strengthens the validity of my conclusions in 
the event that some unknown characteristic associated with these behaviors renders categorizing 
them as “public” vs. “private” untenable. 
6.4 DIRECT EFFECTS OF TOLERANCE ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In the self-persuasion experiment, treatment is considered to have been “received” when a 
subject who was assigned to write a substantive (i.e. non-control condition) essay did in fact 
write such an essay. A total of 23 American respondents (15.8 percent) in the tolerant condition 
and 19 Americans assigned to the intolerant condition (13 percent) returned alpha-numeric 
strings or nonsensical commentaries unrelated to the hypothetical civil liberties dispute at the 
core of the treatment. By definition, these subjects have been coded as “non-compliers” who did 
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not receive treatment in line with the experimental design. The Hungarian sample returned a 
similar rate of noncompliance: 16 (12.5 percent) of subjects assigned to tolerance and 20 (13.1 
percent) subjects assigned to intolerance wrote nonsensical essays.  
When not every participant receives the assigned treatment, experiments commonly 
provide two estimates of treatment effect. The “intent-to-treat” (ITT) analysis compares rates of 
participation across conditions, independent of essay content. That is, the ITT estimates the 
causal effect of treatment assignment, rather than treatment-receipt – ignoring, for the moment, 
whether subjects actually defended a tolerant or intolerant position in a manner consistent with 
the manipulation’s intent. Then, the Compliers Average Causal Effect (CACE) is estimated as 
the average rate of participation weighted by the percent of the treatment group that actually 
received treatment. 
6.4.1 Tolerance and participation in the United States 
Before turning to the main results, a manipulation check confirms that the self-persuasion 
experiment influenced levels of tolerance for respondents’ most disliked groups. A one-way 
between subjects ANOVA finds significant and substantively meaningful difference in tolerance 
cross subjects assigned to write tolerant, intolerant, and control essays [F (2, 373) = 8.97, 
p<0.01]. Cross condition mean differences, depicted in Figure 6, are significant at the .05 leve 
using the Scheffe post-hoc test.  
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              Figure 6 Effect of Self-Persuasion on Political Tolerance, United States 
 
Looking next at overt behavior among American respondents, Table 22 presents the rates 
of petitioning and donating among subjects across experimental conditions. The top panel 
reveals a large effect of assignment to tolerance on petitioning, with approximately 81 percent of 
the treatment group downloading, signing, and re-uploading to the online survey their completed 
petition to push the government forward on the issue they identified as “important” in the pre-
test. Nearly two-thirds of subjects assigned to intolerance and control conditions also signed 
petitions. While the difference in petitioning across intolerant and control group subjects is 
small, fully 21 percent more subjects petitioned following assignment to tolerance relative to the 
control.  By contrast, the lower panel shows that subjects in the tolerant condition were 
somewhat less likely to make an anonymous donation than subjects assigned to the intolerant or 
control conditions, with small differences apparent across the three treatment conditions.  
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Table 22 Effect of Manipulation on Participation Rates, United States 
  
 
Compliance (%) Petitioning (%) ITT 
 
CACE   N 
        Tolerant 84.93 80.82 21.67 
 
25.52* 
 
73 
Intolerant 86.30 61.64 2.49 
 
2.89 
 
73 
Control 100.00 59.15 -- 
 
-- 
 
69 
        
 
Compliance (%) Donating (%) ITT 
 
CACE   N 
  
  
    Tolerant 83.56 60.27 -0.38 
 
-0.45 
 
71 
Intolerant 87.67 63.01 2.36 
 
2.69 
 
75 
Control 100.00 60.65 -- 
 
-- 
 
75 
        * Scheffe post-hoc means comparison significant at p≤.05 
 
The Compliers Average Causal Effect (CACE) is the Intent-to-Treat effect weighted by 
the percent of the treatment group that actually received treatment or, referring to Table 22, the 
observed difference between treatment and control in column 3 divided by the rate of compliance 
in column 1. This estimate returns the effect of toleration on the rate of participation among 
individuals who wrote essays consistent with the instruction-set. Practicing tolerance exerts a 
25.52% increase in the likelihood of petitioning over the control group. Intolerance by contrast 
increases the rate of petitioning by 2.89 percent. By contrast, tolerant subjects are approximately 
0.5 percent less likely to donate, and intolerant subjects approximately 2.7 percent less likely to 
donate than the control group.  
In other words, individuals who developed and defended an argument to allow their least-
liked minority groups to demonstrate more readily downloaded, signed and returned their 
petitions than individuals who refused demonstration rights to their least-liked group and control 
subjects who wrote an essay having nothing to do with civil liberties [F(2,188) = 4.09, p = 
0.018)]. Post-hoc comparisons using the Scheffe test of significance find that the average rate of 
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petitioning was significantly higher among tolerant subjects than control and intolerant subjects 
at the p<0.05 level. By contrast, no significant differences in intent to donate emerge across 
conditions [F(2,188) = 0.11, p = 0.900)].  
These results provide the first clear evidence of a direct effect of tolerance judgments on 
overt political action. They lend further credence to the behavioral consistency hypothesis, and 
the broader notion that it is important to take stock of variation in the participatory act when 
evaluating the behavioral consequences of tolerance and democratic values in general. Still, 
while differentiated between petitioning as a “public” contentious-collective action and donating 
as a “private” action may be theoretically defensible (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978) and has been 
validated by other recent empirical work (e.g. Kam 2011), these acts may differ in other ways 
that do not reflect the public-private dimension of participation. 
 In defense against these unobserved sources of bias, I embedded directly into each 
petition and donation form a direct indicator of the “public” vs. “private” dimension of action. 
Those individuals who encountered the petition were asked for permission to “send their name to 
the recipients” of the petition. They could either agree to expose their identity, or elect to be 
represented as a “confidential supporter” (cf. Figure 4). Individuals who completed the donation 
form were able to provide their name, though this was explicitly optional, and were asked 
whether “we may publish your name among our list of supporters” (cf. Figure 5) Hence, 
petitioners were able to “opt out” of the public dimension of petitioning, while donors were able 
to “opt out” of the private dimension of donating.  
Tolerance requires that citizens “uncouple” perceptions of threat from questions of 
whether to extend rights to unsavory groups. The sources of this threat not only lay with the 
target group, but also stem from the broader intolerant majority. To the extent that tolerant 
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citizens confront disagreement, conflict and other social costs to uphold the rights of groups that 
society prefers to repress, they should be more willing to expose themselves to these same costs 
to voice their own political views. Individuals confront these costs when they participate in “full 
public view” (Milbrath 1965: 10). Therefore, one plausible measure of this exposure is the 
willingness to reveal one’s identity as a participant.  
 
Figure 7 Non-Anonymous Activism across Experimental Conditions, United States 
 
Figure 7 illustrates mean differences across conditions in subjects’ willingness to forego 
anonymity. Subjects in the tolerant condition were 16 percent more likely to willfully attach their 
name to their petition than the control group, and 22 percent more likely to do so than subjects 
assigned to refuse rights to their least liked group. More importantly, the same pattern is 
apparent among subjects who made a donation. Approximately 36 percent of tolerant subjects 
agreed to have their name “published” among the list of donors to the hypothetical Citizens’ 
Initiative Lobby Group: a significantly higher ratio than both intolerant (21.7 percent) and 
control-group subjects (22.6 percent). Mean differences [F (2, 128) = 3.99, p = 0.021)] are 
significant across tolerant and intolerant group subjects (pScheffe = 0.054) and across tolerant and 
control group subjects (pScheffe = 0.068).  
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In line with the behavioral consistency hypothesis, this pattern suggests that the influence 
of tolerance on participation might be understood in terms of preparing individuals to incur costs 
associated with their own political participation. Table 22 and Figure 7 confirm the pattern of 
results reported in Chapter Four. In longstanding democracies like the United States, tolerance 
appears to directly stimulate participation through public means relative to intolerance, but it 
does little to facilitate activism through more conventional, private modes of engagement. 
6.4.2 Tolerance and participation in Hungary 
I hypothesized that this pattern may very well be reversed in new democracies with a recent 
history of authoritarian rule. Hungary exemplifies this case, not only because of its communist 
past, but also because the modern opposition – in politics, media, and the public – suffers real 
constraints on its freedom under Prime Minister Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Moreover, Hungary 
is a deeply intolerant society which publicly scapegoats and disparages its Jewish, Romani, and 
homosexual minorities. In this illiberal context, it is possible that the costs one incurs on behalf 
of one’s opponents will not translate into a greater willingness to risk exposure to the regime. 
Hence, to the extent that tolerance and participation are meaningfully related in Hungary, 
tolerant citizens may be more likely to engage in private modes of participation.  
Before turning to the main results, a manipulation check confirms that the self-persuasion 
experiment did in fact influence tolerance levels in a meaningful fashion in Hungary. A one-way 
between subjects ANOVA finds that assignment to treatment yields a significant and 
substantively meaningful influence on attitudinal tolerance in Hungary [F (2, 397) = 12.47, p< 
0.01). Mean differences across conditions, depicted in Figure 8, achieve significance at the .05 
level using the post-hoc Scheffe test.  
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                  Figure 8 Effect of Self-Persuasion on Political Tolerance, Hungary 
 
Unlike results from the American sample, however, the manipulation did not exert a 
strong effect on overt political behavior among Hungarians. The bottom panel of Table 23 shows 
that only 2.15 percent more subjects assigned to the tolerant condition than the control condition 
freely donated a portion of their remuneration to the fictitious Citizens Initiative Group to 
advance a cause of importance to them. Neither these differences, nor those across treatment and 
control conditions with respect to petitioning, are significant by conventional F-tests.   
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Table 23 Effect of Manipulation on Participation Rates, Hungary 
  
 
Compliance (%) Petitioning (%) ITT 
 
CACE N 
       Tolerant 91.55 40.00 -0.13 
 
-0.001 65 
Intolerant 87.34 42.47 1.14 
 
 0.001 73 
Control 100.00 41.33 -- 
 
-- 75 
       
 
Compliance (%) Donating (%) ITT 
 
CACE N 
       
Tolerant 84.51 26.15 2.15 
 
2.55 64 
Intolerant 84.81 23.29 -0.71 
 
0.84 75 
Control 100.00 24.00 
  
-- 75 
       
 
At first blush, the experimental results appear to contradict the behavioral consistency 
hypothesis and comport instead with the findings from Chapter Four, where tolerance appears to 
exert no meaningful influence on patterns of participation in post-communist countries. A 
common supposition of public opinion research in new democracies is that citizens in countries 
like Hungary have not had long enough to fully understand, embrace, and draw connections 
between liberal democratic norms such as tolerance and civic engagement. In this sense, the lack 
of a relationship between tolerance and engagement in Hungary and the post-communist area in 
general may simply be a function of its short and uncertain experience with democracy.  
However, the rates at which Hungarian participants elected to publish their names with 
their petitions and donations point to a wrinkle in these “political socialization” explanations 
offered thus far. Regardless of the type of political engagement, Figure 9 shows that Hungarian 
subjects assigned to practice tolerance are also significantly more willing to sacrifice their 
anonymity. This is true for tolerant petitioners (M=0.310) relative to subjects assigned to 
intolerance (M=0.180) and control (M=0.221), and for tolerant donors who are also significantly 
less willing to attach their names to contributions to the Citizens’ Initiative Group than intolerant 
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or control subjects [F(2,43) = 2.58, p = 0.087)]. What this means is that there is no difference in 
actual petitioning or donating across the manipulations, but there are differences in the rate of 
public behavior provided that a behavior was chosen.  
 
Figure 9 Non-Anonymous Activism across Experimental Conditions, Hungary 
 
This result is highly unexpected. Survey evidence in Chapter Four suggests tolerant 
Hungarians are less likely to participate through even conventional, private modes of activism 
than their intolerant counterparts. Experimental results point to small increases in donations 
among tolerant relative to control and intolerant-treatment subjects, but tolerance also stimulates 
willingness to expose oneself to the potential costs of participation through either public or 
private means for which a participation opportunity was presented. To what form of participation 
does tolerance contribute in Hungary? 
This can be evaluated more clearly by restating the behavioral consistency hypothesis 
precisely in terms of its implications for public expression, irrespective of how different modes 
of action are categorized theoretically. In other words, tolerance increases individuals’ 
willingness to reveal their identity as participants regardless of how they choose to engage in 
 215 
politics. This represents the core of the behavioral consistency hypothesis’ notion that the costs 
of tolerance render individuals more likely to face down the costs of public participation, costs to 
which an individual is exposed only if he or she participates in “full public view” (Milbrath 
1965). This hypothesis can be tested using a dependent variable with three unordered outcomes: 
public (petition or donation with respondent’s name published voluntarily), private (petition or 
donation with respondent’s name kept confidential), and inaction. To model this variable, I rely 
on multinomial logistic regression. In Tables 24 and 25, I estimate a model for each treatment 
condition (against the control group), controlling for pre-test measures of individuals’ overall 
willingness to participate in politics, extent of associational involvement, level of education, 
gender, and age. To control for policy-specific effects, I generate a dummy variable for “anti-
government policy” if the respondent selected as his or her most important political goal an issue 
preference that contradicts the Orbán regime’s status quo policy.  
 
Table 24 Treatment Effects of Tolerance on Willingness to Participate vs. Not to Participate (Base Outcome) 
       
  
Public participation  
 
Private participation 
       Treatment 0.925 (0.400) 
 
0.014 (0.506) 
Willingness to participate 1.302 (0.350) 
 
2.445 (0.659) 
Associational involvement 0.062 (0.139) 
 
0.257 (0.179) 
Education -0.091 (0.182) 
 
0.248 (0.135) 
Anti-Government Policy  -0.125 (0.189) 
 
-0.864 (0.233) 
Female 
 
-0.296 (0.408) 
 
0.248 (0.135) 
Age 
 
0.211 (0.150) 
 
-0.296 (0.190) 
Constant 
 
9.442 (8.987) 
 
9.425 (8.725) 
Log pseudolikelihood -152.63   
   Obs 
 
288 
    Pseudo R-squared 0.173 
      
Entries represent multinomial log-odds ratios of a change from non-participation to public or private 
participation. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .10; standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 25 Treatment Effects of Intolerance on Willingness to Participate vs. Not to Participate (Base Outcome) 
       
  
Public participation  
 
Private participation 
       Treatment 0.029 (0.474) 
 
0.111 (0.413) 
Willingness to participate 0.953 (0.292) 
 
0.778 (0.285) 
Associational involvement 0.359 (0.153) 
 
0.199 (0.145) 
Education 0.100 (0.238) 
 
0.018 (0.152) 
Anti-Government Policy  -0.201 (0.263) 
 
-0.478 (0.188) 
Female 
 
0.080 (0.497) 
 
-0.154 (0.409) 
Age 
 
0.033 (0.173) 
 
-0.117 (0.181) 
Constant 
 
2.927 (11.818) 
 
7.302 (3.583) 
Log pseudolikelihood -164.68   
   Obs 
 
304 
    Pseudo R-squared 0.079 
      
Entries represent multinomial log-odds ratios of a change from non-participation to public or private 
participation. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .10; standard errors in parentheses 
 
Coefficients represent the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the corresponding 
independent variable on the log-odds outcome (e.g. public participation) relative to the base 
outcome (e.g. no participation). Table 24 suggests rather strongly that tolerance principally 
influences individuals’ willingness to confront costs associated with public political 
participation. The multinomial logit estimate for a unit increase in treatment (i.e. tolerance 
relative to control) changes the log-odds for public participation relative to complete inaction by 
0.925 while holding all other variables in the model constant. By contrast, in column 2 it is 
apparent that practicing tolerance has no statistically significant influence on the log-odds ratio 
for private participation relative to non-participation. Table 25 suggests that, in Hungary, 
practicing intolerance does little to influence participation of any sort – where no treatment 
effects significantly alter the log-odds ratio of being overtly or privately participatory relative to 
the control group.   
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Although political socialization theory has been advanced elsewhere to account for the 
lack of a relationship in new democracies (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), my experimental 
evidence suggests that upholding the rights of disliked groups in Hungary renders citizens more 
willing to expose themselves to the costs of activism. Although tolerance and participation are 
unrelated to the direct behavioral measures of petitioning and donating, practicing tolerance does 
produce statistically significant influence over the “public vs. private” behavior measure 
embedded into the petitions and donations. Substantively, this means that tolerant Hungarians are 
significantly more willing than others to reveal to government, media, and advocacy group actors 
that they are engaging in public affairs. In this sense, evidence from Hungary does not fit  with 
political socialization argument. But nor does it directly support the behavioral consistency 
hypothesis I advanced in Chapter Three and tested in Chapter Four. The next section explores 
cognitive consistency restoration as a potential mechanism behind this pattern of results. 
6.5 UNCOVERING THE CAUSAL MECHANISM 
I have presented two plausible mechanisms for the effects of tolerance on public modes of 
participation. The first posits that the costs of tolerance mirror the costs associated with 
collective and contentious action; to the extent that individuals tend to behave consistently across 
similar situations, I argued that practicing tolerance may directly contribute to individuals’ 
willingness to engage in more costly, public political actions. Experimental evidence from the 
United States supports this behavioral consistency hypothesis; evidence from Hungary does not. 
However, in Hungary we nevertheless see effects of tolerance on subjects’ willingness to expose 
themselves to the potential costs associated with taking action in full public view.  
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The second possibility is that toleration indirectly facilitates public political actions by 
producing attitudes that reduce the degree to which citizens will perceive contentious or 
collective actions as costly or socially undesirable. Tolerance is a high-cost, risky, and 
minoritarian position that potentially conflicts with other legitimate and more intensely held 
beliefs about the goals of democracy and about norms of common decency. (Such conflict is 
apparent in the essay examples I provided in section 5.4.5, above.) This sort of value conflict can 
produce psychological discomfort that tolerant individuals will be motivated to reduce by 
strengthening or developing new beliefs that justify the decision to tolerate a heinous group. The 
cognitive consistency mechanism thus suggests that practicing tolerance confers psychic benefits 
in the form of higher perceptions of political freedom, reduced risk aversion, increased support 
for dissent relative to intolerant individuals.  
Subtle evidence for post-tolerance attitude changes exists elsewhere in the literature. 
Sullivan et al. (1993) argue that tolerance requires individuals to “uncouple” perceptions of 
threat from decisions about how to allocate rights and liberty to others. The authors argue for this 
effect among national policymakers who often perceive higher levels of threat from their 
political enemies than rank-and-file citizens, but who are nevertheless more willing to extend 
rights to these groups (but see Shamir 1991). Gibson (2002) shows that this “uncoupling” may 
have downstream effects to the extent that ordinary citizens who extend rights to their least-liked 
groups are subsequently less likely to perceive threats from these groups. And Gibson (1992b, 
2008) finds consistent bivariate associations between tolerance and the belief that one is free to 
express one’s own political beliefs without fear of government retribution or restraint.  
The experimental procedures developed in this dissertation permit a test of the 
implications of the cognitive consistency argument by comparing post-judgment attitudes toward 
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freedom, risk, and dissent across subjects assigned to control and subjects assigned to practice 
tolerance or intolerance.  
First, I posited that citizens who incur substantial costs to protect the basic rights of 
offensive groups may justify this decision through increased confidence that they themselves lay 
unfettered claim to these same rights. Hence, the political freedom hypothesis: individuals who 
practice tolerance will express greater perceptions of their own political freedom than individuals 
who practice intolerance. However, I speculated in section 6.2 that the same pattern may not be 
apparent in the Hungarian context. Under Viktor Orbán, a real threat of repression exists in: the 
Fidesz Party’s white-knuckled clutch on the courts and media, their successful attempts to 
marginalize and delegitimize the political opposition, and a recent history of subtle repression of 
free association by the anti-government “Milla” group suggest a rather real risk of government 
retribution for nonconformist political activism. To the extent that a real threat of government 
repression is present in Hungary, I proposed that tolerance may do little to increase perceptions 
of freedom or risk acceptance.  
 
Figure 10 Effect of Manipulation on Perception of Freedom in the U.S. and Hungary 
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Reading across Figure 10 from left to right, each column represents the mean value of 
perceived freedom among individuals assigned to tolerant, intolerant and control conditions in 
the United States and Hungary. Scores have been recoded to range from 0-1. Looking first at 
evidence from the U.S., subjects who wrote arguments defending the rights of their least-liked 
group reported significantly higher perceptions of freedom [F (2, 379) = 4.74, p = 0.009)] than 
subjects in either the intolerant or control conditions. Moreover, in Hungary, practicing tolerance 
increases perceptions of political freedom (M=0.642) relative to the control group (M=0.603), 
with mean differences significant at the 0.05 level. Among subjects who actually received 
treatment (i.e. those who wrote an essay consistent with the instruction set), the average causal 
effect of developing and defending a tolerant argument is nearly a five percent increase in the 
belief that the government will not punish political expression that opposes its policies. This is 
remarkable in Hungary, where the government has intensively and overtly restricted opposition 
rights over the past three years.   
These results are important. While Gibson (1992b, 2008) has previously demonstrated 
micro-level associations between attitudinal tolerance and perceptions of political freedom, 
findings from this experiment show that individuals assigned to practice tolerance perceive 
greater overall freedom to challenge the government’s action than individuals who do not – and 
that this effect is robust to rather wide variation in country context. Given that tolerance is 
manipulated exogenously via the self-persuasion procedure, we are able to be more confident 
that this effect is attributable to the practice of tolerance itself.   
A second mechanism through which individuals might reduce the internal conflict that 
tolerance produces is via increasing support for dissent as a “democratic good.” Tolerance is 
commonly the minority position among ordinary citizens in response to disputes over civil 
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liberties – even in established liberal democracies (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1985; Duch 
and Gibson 1992; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007). By contrast, intolerance is more internally 
consistent with other beliefs and tends to be the majority reaction to disputes over the rights of 
widely disliked groups. To the extent that individuals must justify standing at odds with majority 
opinion, the support for dissent hypothesis proposes that individuals who practice tolerance will 
express greater support for dissent from majority opinion relative to individuals who practice 
intolerance. The left panel of Figure 11 supports this hypothesis with respect to the U.S., where 
subjects assigned to develop tolerant arguments exhibit significantly higher support for dissent 
[F (2, 379) = 5.55, p = 0.004)] than subjects in either the intolerant or control conditions.  
 
 
Figure 11 Effect of Manipulation on Support for Dissent in the U.S. and Hungary 
 
I conjectured that certain contextual features of illiberal politics may work against this 
effect in Hungary. On one hand, citizens may be less likely to view dissent as intrinsically useful 
to democratic stability in new democracies, especially those where economic conditions are 
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fragile and democratic backsliding is well-underway. In Hungary, tolerance and intolerance both 
exert a suppressive effect on support for dissenting behavior relative to the control group [F (2, 
413) = 5.29, p = 0.005)], though the causal effect is somewhat stronger among subjects who 
actually received the tolerant treatment (4.1 percent decrease relative to the control) than subjects 
who complied with the intolerant manipulation (2.7 percent decrease relative to the control). If 
dissent is generally considered threatening to stability in brittle democratic systems, then 
exposure to a civil liberties dispute involving a nonconformist group may prime individuals in 
both treatment conditions (i.e. tolerant and intolerant) to consider these threats more fully when 
responding to post-manipulation questions about dissent. In other words, the manipulation may 
have an unintended, secondary effect on subjects in Hungary that it does not exert on subjects in 
the United States, where democracy too stable for nonconformist political expression to disrupt. 
This effect in Hungary would explain why the control group – which was not exposed to a civil 
liberties dispute or a nonconformist group (they wrote essays about genetically modified 
tomatoes) – expresses comparatively strong support for dissent.  
 
Figure 12 Effect of Manipulation on Risk Acceptance in the U.S. and Hungary 
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The risk aversion hypothesis – which proposes that practicing tolerance renders 
individuals less averse to risk in their own decision making than practicing intolerance – is not 
supported in either context. I argued that upholding the expressive rights of heinous groups poses 
risks to the tolerant individual – such as violating broadly accepted social norms or having one’s 
tolerance mistaken for acceptance of an unpopular group and support for its views – while 
restricting rights to these groups shields the intolerant individual from such risks. Tolerant 
individuals may therefore justify enduring these risks on behalf of widely disliked groups by 
perceiving less risk in general. This argument is not substantiated by the data. Tolerance exerts 
no meaningful effect on attitudes toward risk in the United States or Hungary (Figure 12). 
Although tolerant subjects reported higher levels of risk acceptance than their intolerant or 
control counterparts in the U.S. [F (2,379) = 2.20, p = 0.110)], by the most conservative post-
hoc tests these differences do not achieve significance across paired conditions. In Hungary, risk 
acceptance is somewhat lower among treatment condition subjects relative to control group 
subjects, but these differences are insignificant. 
Somewhat stronger support for the cognitive consistency mechanism becomes apparent 
when we chart the effects of tolerance on perceptions of freedom and support for dissent by 
levels of pre-test tolerance. We should expect to observe strong effects of tolerance on these 
perceptions among the initially intolerant subjects in the sample, who presumably experience 
high levels of psychological discomfort upon practicing tolerance. 
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Figure 13 Treatment Effects by Prior Tolerance, United States 
 
Figure 13 shows that initially intolerant Americans who were assigned to write an essay 
defending their least-liked group’s right to hold a demonstration (i.e. tolerant-treated intolerant) 
express marginally greater political freedom than even control group subjects whose pre-test 
tolerance exceeds the sample mean (i.e. control-tolerant). Also consistent with Gibson’s (1992b, 
2008) findings, practicing intolerance reduces perceptions of political freedom: initially tolerant 
subjects who wrote an essay opposing the rights of their least liked group to demonstrate (i.e. 
intolerant-treated tolerant) recognize less political freedom than the tolerant control group (but 
not less than control subjects who expressed intolerance in the pre-test). In general, the same 
pattern of results characterizes support for dissent: practicing tolerance generates greater support 
for dissent both among subjects who expressed tolerant attitudes (i.e. tolerant-treated tolerant) 
and intolerant attitudes (tolerant-treated intolerant) in the pre-test questionnaire.  
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Figure 14 Treatment Effects by Prior Tolerance, Hungary 
  
Figure 14 reveals that in Hungary, as in the United States, tolerant individuals assigned to 
the control condition (i.e. whose tolerance was not manipulated) express “naturally” higher 
levels of perceived freedom than intolerant individuals in the control group. However, 
Hungarians who entered the experiment with intolerant attitudes and were assigned to practice 
tolerance (i.e. tolerance-treated intolerant) profess significantly higher levels of perceived 
freedom than the control-intolerant – levels that approximate those in the control-tolerant group. 
Similarly, perceptions of freedom among initially tolerant Hungarians who composed intolerant 
essays (i.e. intolerant-treated tolerant) do not significantly differ from the perceptions of 
intolerant Hungarians who wrote control essays (i.e. control-intolerant). These patterns suggest 
that the application of tolerance and intolerance significantly and independently shapes 
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perceptions of liberty among citizens in new and illiberal democratic Hungary, just as it does in 
the established liberal democratic United States.  
Figure 14 also suggests that rendering any applied judgment – tolerant or intolerant –  on 
a civil liberties dispute in Hungary decreases citizen support for dissent relative to the control 
group. Support for dissent does not significantly differ across tolerant and intolerant Hungarians 
in the control group; nor does it in the United States (cf. Figure 13). However, whereas applied 
tolerance increases support for dissent among both initially tolerant and intolerant American 
subjects, it universally decreases that support among Hungarians. The same pattern characterizes 
subjects assigned to practice intolerance.  
These patterns may shed some explanatory light onto the curious effects of tolerance on 
participation demonstrated in section 6.4.2. Recall that while tolerance does not tend to increase 
political activism directly in Hungary, it does influence Hungarian subjects’ willingness to 
expose themselves to the potential costs of “public” political activism by increasing the rates at 
which they reveal their names along with their petition and donation forms. It is possible that the 
former relationship is mediated by support for dissent, whereas the latter effects are mediated by 
perceptions of political freedom: citizens who do not fear government reprisal for their actions 
should perceive few costs associated with revealing that they are active participants in Hungarian 
political life. An individual may oppose dissent and nevertheless believe that the government 
will not punish it.  
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Figure 15 Mediational Analysis, Hungary 
Treatment is coded so that 1 = assigned to tolerant condition; 0 = assigned to control. *p<0.10. 
 
This notion can be tested via a path analysis to examine the mediational effects of support 
for dissent and perceived political freedom on overt participation and the more specific measure 
of the public dimension of this participation. The upper panel of Figure 15 finds no direct effect 
of assignment to tolerance on the likelihood of petition. While tolerance significantly increases 
perceptions of freedom and decreases support for dissent, these factors do not influence “public 
participation.” The bottom panel of Figure 15 suggests that perceptions of political freedom 
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mediate citizens’ willingness to reveal their identities to the state. In Hungary, then, extending 
rights to one’s least liked group increases one’s perception of political freedom. This in turn 
stimulates citizens’ willingness to expose themselves to “full public view” (Milbrath 1965: 10). 
However, to the extent that tolerance decreases support for dissent, Hungarians may be less 
likely to engage in the sort of actions that require a disposition toward non-anonymity.  
  
 
Figure 16 Mediational Analysis, United States 
Treatment is coded so that 1 = assigned to tolerant condition; 0 = assigned to control. *p<0.10. 
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These effects work against one another in the Hungarian case; they work in concert in the 
American case. Figure 16 conducts the same mediational analysis on the US sample and finds a 
very similar pattern of results. The effect of tolerance on petitioning is partially mediated via its 
bolstering effect on support for dissent; its effect on “publishing” is mediated by its stimulating 
influence on perceptions of political freedom. Importantly, however, in the American case, 
tolerance continues to exert a positive, independent impact on both outcomes. 
6.6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents direct evidence that putting up with one’s political opponents carries 
consequences for political behavior. Tolerance stimulates participation in public, contentious and 
collective actions (in this case, signing one’s name to a petition to alter the status quo) but does 
little to facilitate private, individual actions (e.g. making an anonymous donation). Moreover, 
extending basic procedural rights and civil liberties to offensive groups cultivates individuals’ 
belief that they also enjoy unfettered access to these same rights. While previous research  
(Gibson 1992b, 2008) has identified strong micro-level associations between tolerance and 
perceptions of political freedom, evidence from a randomized experiment in political tolerance 
shows that toleration is not merely a correlate but also a direct contributor to these perceptions in 
both the American and Hungarian context.  
The experimental procedures employed in this chapter offer several advantages over 
previous work. First, causal inferences regarding the downstream effects of tolerance on political 
activism are strengthened because tolerance and intolerance have been exogenously manipulated 
at random. Differences across individuals’ other characteristics therefore do not vary 
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systematically across treatment assignments, and complex statistical procedures are not required 
to simulate a control group. Intent-to-Treat and complier average causal effects represent the 
direct effect of assignment to (in)tolerance and the actual application of that (in)tolerance on 
political behavior. The randomized experiment in tolerance therefore helps to rule out 
endogeneity concerns, which are ever-present in observational research. Second, the present 
study mitigates concerns over self-reporting bias in survey-based studies of political participation 
by generating unobtrusive measures of political participation. Technologies embedded within the 
online survey experiment allow me to directly observe whether a subject actually petitioned or 
donated on behalf of a cause they deemed important to them.  
Of course, this approach considerably strengthens the internal validity of the experiment 
at the expense of its external validity. Compared to survey-based reports of political activism 
across countries (e.g. Wallace et al. 2012), rates of participation are generally high in both the 
American and the Hungarian contexts. This may be attributed to the fact that the survey-
experiment eliminated variation in one of the most important determinants of activism: 
opportunity. This is a crucial limitation to the experiment’s external validity, but one that is 
necessary to enhance internal validity with regards to direct measurement of political 
participation. It is therefore important to place a realistic ceiling on the meaning of the rates of 
activism across tolerant, intolerant, and control group subjects. These results do not necessarily 
imply that an individual who exercises tolerance will go out and seek to engage in politics; 
rather, when the opportunity to participate presents itself, these results suggest that an individual 
who has recently upheld the rights to free expression of others will be significantly more likely to 
exercise these same rights for himself.  
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However, the general validity of these results is strengthened by the fact that patterns 
based on experimental procedures largely reflect estimates based on cross-national survey 
evidence in Chapter Four. This is especially true of longstanding democracies, of which the 
United States is exemplary. Here, and across countries of Western Europe, tolerance tends to 
stimulate engagement in public, contentious and collective actions relative to intolerance, but 
seems not to influence private, individual modes of political activism. Experimental evidence 
supports this pattern, defends its directionality, and provides important insights into a possible 
causal mechanism for why tolerance may stimulate activism rather than the reverse. The 
evidence provides support for both the behavioral and cognitive consistency mechanisms 
through which tolerance may exert an effect on public modes of participation. On one hand, 
tolerance carries a direct effect on petitioning; on the other hand, it directly increases perceptions 
of freedom and support for dissent in a manner that increases subjects’ willingness to expose 
sacrifice anonymity when pursuing political objectives of importance to them.    
But additional analysis is required to more carefully address the particular psychological 
propositions underlying the cognitive consistency mechanism. In order to facilitate a first-cut 
examination of the notion that toleration can shape participation, I have devoted considerably 
greater effort in this dissertation to demonstrating the relationship empirically than I have to 
pinning down with precision the assumptions underlying the costs-consistency theory. The effect 
of tolerance on participation is apparent; future research is required to explicate and evince its 
microfoundations.  
The evidence I have provided thus far suggests a call for additional theorizing and further 
cross-national comparative analysis. For instance, survey analysis from Chapter Four provides 
no clear evidence of a generalizable relationship between tolerance and participation in the post-
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communist context. At first blush this appears to fit well with political socialization perspectives, 
which expect the reservoir of democratic orientations to be too shallow in new democracies for 
citizens to be able to draw meaningful connections across them. Experimental evidence from 
Hungary, however, suggests a more nuanced perspective. Hungarian subjects who develop and 
defend tolerant arguments perceive greater political freedom following the manipulation than 
subjects assigned to write intolerant or distractor arguments. These beliefs, in turn, increase 
subjects’ willingness to expose their identities to a repressive state when they participate in 
politics. This “covert” measure of public participation contrasts sharply with the overt measure 
of behavior: Hungarian subjects are generally unwilling to sign and send actual petitions to 
advance their particular political agendas. This suggest that tolerance may indeed have 
something of a general effect on perceptions of freedom across societies, but also that political 
context plays a role in constraining the degree to which this effect translates into actual political 
engagement.  
This may help account for variation across post-communist states in terms of the 
tolerance-participation relationship and in terms of the mixed survey-based results in Chapter 
Four. Czech Republic, Slovenia and, to some extent, Poland are widely regarded as among the 
most stable political and economic systems in post-communist Europe. There, survey evidence 
suggests that toleration contributes to the likelihood of engagement in public political actions as 
it does in established western democracies. By contrast, no effect is apparent in the least stable 
systems – Bulgaria, Hungary, and Latvia. Should citizens be more concerned over the future of 
democracies in these countries, tolerance may not influence support for dissent in a manner that 
facilitates contentious political activism. But these effects can be viewed only in terms of 
behavioral consistency, given that corollary attitudinal measures are unavailable in these data 
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and, even if they were, the temporal priority of tolerance could not be established without 
longitudinal data. Additional experiments in other illiberal contexts are required to fully test 
whether and where tolerance exerts effects on political participation and the attitudes that 
facilitate it in a manner suggested by the costs-consistency theory. 
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7.0  CARRIERS OF THE CREED? CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Political tolerance may be the only democratic value that is also extolled as a virtue (Moreno-
Riaño 2006). In theory, citizens who countenance ideas and interests they oppose not only 
enhance free expression and promote democratic competition, but they also pass what Polish 
philosopher and Member of European Parliament, Ryszard Legutko, describes as the “ultimate 
and almost the only generally accepted litmus test of morality” (Legutko 1994). This is perhaps 
because, in practice, tolerance is extremely difficult. It means, for instance, protecting radical 
Christians’ right to protest military funerals and neo-Nazis’ right to march near synagogues. It 
means allowing Muslims to wear burqas where society defends women’s rights, and protecting 
Holocaust denial and Mohammed mockery with equal vigor. Such forbearance has been central 
to liberal conceptions of democratic government and citizenship. But it has not been clear how 
extending procedural rights and civil liberties to offensive groups affects individuals who 
tolerate.  
This is so for at least three reasons. First, tolerance research has primarily focused on its 
sources, nature, and distribution in mass publics. Only a few previous studies have examined its 
micro-level effects, either on other attitudes (e.g. Gibson 1992b, 2002, 2008) or on political 
participation (e.g. Gibson and Bingham 1985; Gibson 1987; Marcus et al. 1995). Moreover, 
nearly all extant studies rely on cross-sectional data that render the directions of these 
relationships difficult to decipher or (quasi-) experimental procedures that obscure causal 
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inferences regarding the downstream effects of political tolerance judgments. Third, political 
science generally lacks a theoretical framework for conceptualizing political tolerance as a cause 
or contributor to actual political judgments and behavior.  
This dissertation revisits each of these elements in order to scrutinize the consequences of 
political tolerance for political participation. It models political tolerance explicitly as an 
independent variable and employs advanced techniques designed to strengthen the causal 
inferences that can be made using observational and experimental approaches. It creates 
connections across deep basins of knowledge about political tolerance and civic engagement to 
develop a causal theory of how tolerance may in fact stimulate political activism. And it tests 
these propositions across Western and post-communist democracies with disparate experience 
with authoritarianism and repression. Based on these new data and methodological innovations, 
findings from this dissertation paint a new portrait of political tolerance, its consequences for 
civic engagement, and whether tolerant individuals may verily be hailed as “carriers of the 
creed” of liberal democracy.  
Recent research has raised important questions about unintended, negative consequences 
of tolerance for civic engagement. These accounts suggest that tolerant individuals cannot be 
entrusted to “carry the creed” of liberal democracy. On one hand, tolerant individuals might just 
as well abdicate their commitment to civil libertarian norms because tolerance for highly disliked 
groups is often at odds with other beliefs, like anti-racism and desires for public order and 
security (Sniderman et al. 1996) and is hence weak, dissonant, and readily convertible into 
intolerance (Gibson 1998). Intolerance is robust and rigid, by contrast, and therefore more 
behaviorally efficacious than tolerance (Gibson 2006). In addition, frequent exposure to diverse 
political opinions – a contributor to tolerance – generates ambivalent political preferences that 
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stymie participation and causes tension within heterogeneous social networks when members of 
these networks do participate. Tolerance may be a virtue in itself, but not necessarily one that 
contributes to the viability of the political system as classic accounts suggest (e.g. McClosky 
1964). 
The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that political tolerance indeed matters 
for political action potential, but not in a way that conforms to conventional expectations. 
Tolerance is a democratic orientation not only towards which ideas may be expressed 
legitimately in a society, but also toward how those ideas may be expressed. Independently of 
both the traits that lead one to put up with her political opponents and also the resources, interest, 
and opportunities that drive her participation, practicing tolerance stimulates greater civic 
engagement – especially through collective and conflictual modes of action that aim to alter the 
status quo through dramatic means. And this effect is attributable in no small part to the act of 
toleration itself. In other words, extending expressive rights to others drives tolerant individuals 
to exercise rights of political expression for themselves.  
This finding casts the notion of tolerant activists as “carriers of the creed” in new light. 
Plamenatz (1956) remarked that “There are people whose passion for freedom and justice is 
sincere and strong and yet who are not good democrats…It is one thing to desire freedom and 
accept the democratic ideal; it is quite another to have the moral preferences and habits that make 
democratic institutions function properly” (116). To the extent that putting up with the rights of 
unsavory groups contributes directly to the participatory habits that strengthen democratic 
institutions, tolerance contributes to a democratic political culture that supports participation 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Gibson 1992b) and tolerant individuals sustain this culture through 
participation (McClosky 1964). But herein lies is an important revision to the classic perspective: 
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whereas the original view was that activists were carriers of the creed because they became 
tolerant, I have provided a bevy of evidence to suggest that by individuals become active by 
virtue of their tolerance.  
This main finding further suggests further support for the idea that democratic values 
matter for democratic activism in liberal democracies. Over the past two decades, mounting 
scholarly evidence indicates a significant role for abstract democratic values in shaping politics 
on-the-ground. Thousands of Russians thwarted Soviets’ attempt at authoritarian reversal in 
1991; support for democratic processes and institutions directly contributed to individuals’ 
participation and confidence in anti-coup protests (Gibson 1997). Political trust can stimulate 
political involvement and commitment to a broader constellation of democratic beliefs (Mishler 
and Rose 2009), and such trust can be taught through civic education programs and in turn kindle 
activism in embattled democratic contexts (Finkel 2002). Where publics’ commitment to these 
values erodes, civil society weakens, citizen influence wanes, and democratic backslide becomes 
a real possibility (e.g. on Hungary, see Jenne and Mudde 2012). Moreover, the notion that 
applied democratic values can fortify society during antidemocratic crises can also be a deeply 
comforting belief. Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, found in this idea a silver 
lining following the Utøya massacre in July 2011: “What we have seen is that membership in 
youth organizations has gone up sharply. We have seen that intentions to vote in the regional 
elections of the 12
th
 of September have gone up sharply…I’m happy to see that because that is a 
democratic response to a highly undemocratic challenge” (PBS Newshour 2011).  
This dissertation reports that tolerance, too, has important and positive consequences for 
democratic activism. This finding contrasts with earlier empirical accounts proposing that 
tolerance would suppress or be unrelated to political action potential. It also furnishes an 
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important justification for further work to develop tolerance and civic engagement through 
international aid programs. Governments and NGOs have dedicated copious effort and resources 
to civic education programs that aim to “teach” tolerance where it is in shortest supply (Finkel 
2003, 2006). These programs are often successful in the world’s most inchoate and unstable 
democracies (e.g. Finkel and Smith 2010), though civic education has been less effective in 
longstanding liberal contexts, like the U.S. (Green et al. 2011). Their success notwithstanding, all 
these efforts are based on the same “consequentialist” assumption that tolerance yields benefits 
for democracy and for liberal democratic political culture. This dissertation supports that 
assumption.  
From a democratization perspective, the Hungarian case is particularly instructive. 
Although tolerance does not contribute directly to overt political behavior, it increases 
individuals’ confidence in their own rights to self-expression by augmenting perceptions of 
political freedom. And, as the mediational analysis in Chapter Six reveals, these perceptions 
create important preconditions for the sort of contentious political action that is often necessary 
to effectuate pro-democratic change in authoritarian and illiberal polities. In other words, 
practicing tolerance may have important downstream consequences not only for individuals’ 
civic engagement and democratic outlook, but also for the ultimate democratic quality of 
political systems.  
In this sense, my work here also furnishes an important empirical response to several 
critiques of tolerance in normative scholarship. According to the radical Hegelian, Herbert 
Marcuse, “the prevailing theory and practice of tolerance [turns] out on examination to be in 
varying degrees hypocritical masks to cover appalling political practices” (Wolff, Moore Jr., and 
Marcuse 1965: vi). Modern governments ask citizens to tolerate intolerance, which strengthens 
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the tyranny of the majority that classic liberals protest, such that “stupid opinion is treated with 
the same respect as intelligent one…[and] all contesting opinions must be submitted to ‘the 
people’ for its deliberation and choice” (ibid: 85). This may smack of the “elitist theory,” but for 
Marcuse and his Marxist ilk, governing elites are concerned only with furthering their own 
affluence. Hence, self-serving elites can act as a repressive force that refuses recognition to weak 
groups, keeps strong groups in power, and the uninformed public tolerates this intolerance. 
Brown (2006) echoes Marcuse to argue that tolerance hides “inequality and regulation” of 
political subjects. She believes tolerance represents an act of unwarranted moral superiority that 
“posing as both universal value and impartial practice, designates certain beliefs and practices as 
civilized and others as barbaric” (7).  
The post-modernist or “New” left believes that tolerance is anachronistic. Italian political 
philosopher, Anna Galeotti (2002) insists that minorities do not just need to be tolerated, but also 
respected, whereas those who use “hate speech” against them can be censored and silenced. 
Tolerance is challenged because of its negative connotations – judgment; “putting up” with 
“wrong” or “inferior” views – “it is frequently rejected as a political principle in favor of loftier 
ideas of equality, liberty or respect” (Griffin 2010: 27). Tariq Ramadan regards tolerance as a 
form of paternalism towards the objects of tolerance – “intellectual charity” of the powerful 
(Ramadan 2010: 47). People want more than tolerance: “the demand for more than mere 
toleration is the demand that what one is or does no longer be the object of negative valuation 
that is an essential ingredient of toleration” (Horton 1996:  35). Instead, the post-modernist left 
advocates moving beyond tolerance altogether toward values of recognition and respect for 
difference: “When it comes to relations between free and equal human beings, autonomous and 
independent nations, or civilizations, religions, and cultures, appeals for the tolerance of othres 
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are no longer relevant…[because] when we are on equal terms, it is no longer a matter of 
conceding tolerance, but of rising above that and educating ourselves to respect others” 
(Ramadan 2010: 48).  
Whereas the New Left bemoans the lack of unconditional affirmation for minority 
groups, the conservative right blames tolerance for being too accepting of competing values and 
norms. The latter is concerned with the loss of identity of the tolerator, while the former is 
concerned about the status of the tolerated. These cultural rightists assert that tolerance 
encourages unwholesome attitudes, beliefs, and practices. As Caldwell (2009) writes, “in the 
name of universal liberalism…tolerance became a higher priority than any of the traditional 
preoccupations of state and society – order, liberty, fairness, and intelligibility – and came to be 
pursued at their expense.” Moreover, “false tolerance”32 has entered the lexicon in several 
European countries. It targets tolerant liberals who are believed to have gone too far in 
accommodating minority practices that the majority deems unacceptable and in need of 
regulation (Yıldız 2011). When used to indict the political left, “false tolerance” is understood as 
motivated by social liberal agendas, like multiculturalism and antidiscrimination, rather than 
classic liberal laissez faire principles (van der Veer 2006; Mudde 2010).  
Finally, some normative theorists now criticize tolerance for its detrimental effects on 
individual citizens. The concern, summarized by Oberdiek (2001) is that citizens lose confidence 
in their own convictions and judgments about the values of what they believe and do: “We lose 
that which gives our life meaning and substance. We will become jaded and rootless. Tolerance 
is just a genteel way for liberals to undermine the solidarity that comes with utter commitment to 
                                                 
32
 This is translated from the German falsche Toleranz and may also be understood as 
“misguided tolerance” (falsche verstandene Toleranz).  
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one’s religion, ethnic community, sexuality and so on. Tolerance is fine for liberals, because they 
only celebrate abstract principles.” These criticisms are particularly relevant for Gibson’s view 
of tolerance’s salutary effects on democratic political culture (1992b). Can tolerance truly erode 
the culture of conformity that mass political intolerance nourishes? Or does tolerance for others 
render individuals uncertain, unwilling, or unable to engage in political life in a manner that 
serves the broader political cultural good?  
This dissertation suggests evidence for the former. In this sense, it supports the more 
classical view of tolerance and participation which work together, in the work of John Stuart Mill 
and other classic liberals, to develop and advance citizens. Tolerance toward unusual 
“experiments in living” promotes individuality and autonomy and allows society to progress by 
helping individuals to discover the good and bad aspects of different ways of life. A liberal polity 
theoretically should “encourage in all individuals the development of the capacity for autonomy 
as rational deliberation, critical scrutiny, and reflection on the projects and goals that we adopt” 
(Gill 2001: 3), an end requiring both tolerance for nonconformist opinions and exposure to new 
views through civic engagement. This dissertation 
Tolerance is a crucial, and highly contested, democratic value. It is conceptualized as 
both a virtue and a vice. It continues to be prescribed as a foundation for liberal democracy, and 
governments and non-profit continue to encourage and impart tolerance to democratic publics. 
This dissertation justifies these efforts by demonstrating that forbearance affects individuals who 
tolerate in a manner that prepares them to participate in the political life of plural societies.  
To what extent can we be confident with this conclusion? Of course, certain limitations in 
the analysis call for further research into the tolerance-participation relationship. In particular, 
although I have demonstrated that tolerance carries direct and indirect consequences for political 
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participation, I have not empirically addressed the possibility that these two democratic 
orientations are co-dependent. It is possible, for instance, that tolerance and participation are 
connected in terms of a positive reciprocal causal relationship. Testing this relationship requires 
a combination of multi-wave panel data and experiments in political action. Longitudinal models 
would provide excellent leverage over the “cross-lag” effects of each orientation on the other 
over time, while experiments would help rule out unobserved factors that may confound the 
relationship. Moreover, large scale field experiments using “encouragement” designs to 
randomly mobilize individuals to attend protests or vote or contact their representatives would 
offer strong tests of the propositions originally developed my Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) 
for comparison against those offered in this dissertation.  
Furthermore, this dissertation raises certain questions about how individuals practice 
tolerance or intolerance and how this relates to participation. For instance, are the effects of 
intolerance on participation more robust if, say, an individual attends a demonstration to oppose 
a minority group’s rights – will a person’s civic engagement benefit or suffer when they exercise 
their own expressive rights to demand that the rights of others be revoked? Once again, 
randomized field experiments with encouragement designs could exogenously mobilize such 
behavior for the purposes of rigorous analysis.  
Such questions require additional theorizing and more careful tests of the assumptions 
underlying the micro-mechanisms that shape the tolerance-participation relationship. This 
dissertation sacrificed precision in the analysis of the micro-theoretical framework to facilitate a 
fuller presentation of the independent effect of tolerance on participation across countries and 
across avenues of action. In doing so, I generated hypotheses that were implied by consistency 
theories in social psychology without directly evaluating those theoretical foundations at their 
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assumptions. The empirical relationship at the core of this dissertation is robust to various 
specification and robustness checks, and also to some extent variation in political context. But 
the psychological microfoundations of this relationship merit further consideration.  
But the contributions in this dissertation also lead to new research directions. The self-
persuasion experiment – whose ability to convert tolerance to intolerance and vice versa I 
demonstrated three times, using three separate samples in two very different countries – may be a 
source of much fruitful empirical and theoretical work. On one hand, the manipulation at the 
core of the self-persuasion experiment raises questions about how different individuals 
conceptualize tolerance and understand the rationale for extending rights and liberties to diverse 
groups. Several unique definitions of tolerance can be gleaned from respondents’ essays. It is 
possible that different patterns of behavior depend in some part on whether tolerance is grounded 
in a principled defense of democratic principles, or a more visceral “anti-intolerance” such that 
abstract norms matter less to tolerant action than attitudes toward those individuals who would 
deny others their rights. On the other hand, the self-persuasion experiment can presumably be 
applied to other important democratic orientations that are traditionally difficult to manipulate 
(e.g. interpersonal trust) in a more cost- and time-effective manner than alternative approaches in 
the behavioral economics tradition of experimentation.  
Finally, the ability to exogenously manipulate political (in)tolerance provides an 
important tool with which to examine the wider effects of tolerance and intolerance for political, 
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes; to render these consequences less enigmatic (Gibson 2006) 
and increasingly plain. 
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A.1 MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES 
The U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy (USCID) survey and the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) survey included several questions relating to political tolerance and 
political participation. Although substantial similarities exist in question themes and also often in 
measurement, some degree of difference is inevitable. Variable construction took into account 
differences across question-wording and scaling in each survey to enhance comparability across 
surveys. I discuss question wording and variable construction in thematic groups, below, and 
account for substantial differences across surveys where necessary. These groups include: 
Political Tolerance items, which measure respondents’ willingness to countenance ideas they 
oppose through both content-controlled and traditional, “general social survey” or “Stouffer” 
items (Stouffer 1955); Political Participation scales, which are based on several activities 
through which respondents may express their political views; Predictors of Tolerance, which 
include questions about the major predictors of tolerance attitudes; and Predictors of Civic 
Voluntarism, which include items designed to measure respondents’ resources, psychological 
engagement with politics, and mobilization potential.  
Tolerance toward ideas and interests one opposes is conventionally measured in one of 
two ways. Classic studies (e.g. Stouffer 1955) present respondents with a series of pre-selected 
groups and activities that are presumably objectionable. Such items continue to appear in 
General Social Survey questionnaires and may be termed “GSS items.” According to Sullivan et 
al. (1982), this measurement strategy is open to criticism by virtue of the fact that it cannot 
ensure that the group in question is equally objectionable to all respondents. The principal 
alternative to GSS tolerance measurement is the “content controlled” methodology, in which 
respondents first select a political group that they dislike more than any other and then answer 
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questions about their willingness to extend basic rights and liberties to that group. GSS items are 
included in both the USCID and ISSP survey, and therefore constitute the main basis for 
comparison. Although Gibson (1992a) has demonstrated that substantive conclusions based on 
GSS and content controlled items do not differ greatly, content controlled items are also 
available in the USCID and offer a useful specification check for findings in the United States.  
GSS tolerance in the USCID is measured with four questions that ask whether 
respondents would strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose a ban by the authorities 
of a public demonstration by 1) radical Muslims, 2) those against all churches and religion, 3) 
U.S. Communists, and 4) religious fundamentalists. In the ISSP, respondents are asked whether 
they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that 1) religious extremists, 2) people 
who want to overthrow the government by force, and 3) people prejudiced against any racial or 
ethnic group should be allowed to hold public meetings. In the USCID, respondents determine 
whether members of their most disliked group should be allowed to 1) make a speech in our 
community, 2) to hold public rallies and demonstrations, or 3) should be banned from running 
for public office. All indices are constructed first by averaging responses and are subsequently 
dichotomized by splitting at the mean of each scale to permit the binary grouping necessary for 
coarsened exact matching. 
A.1.1 Political tolerance 
Tolerance toward ideas and interests one opposes is conventionally measured in one of two 
ways. Classic studies (e.g. Stouffer 1955) present respondents with a series of pre-selected 
groups and activities that are presumably objectionable. Such items continue to appear in 
General Social Survey questionnaires and may be termed “GSS items.” According to Sullivan et 
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al. (1982), this measurement strategy is open to criticism by virtue of the fact that it cannot 
ensure that the group in question is equally objectionable to all respondents. The principal 
alternative to GSS tolerance measurement is the “content controlled” methodology, in which 
respondents first select a political group that they dislike more than any other and then answer 
questions about their willingness to extend basic rights and liberties to that group. GSS items are 
included in both the USCID and ISSP survey, and therefore constitute the main basis for 
comparison. Although Gibson (1992a) has demonstrated that substantive conclusions based on 
GSS and content controlled items do not differ greatly, content controlled items are also 
available in the USCID and offer a useful specification check for findings in the United States.  
GSS tolerance in the USCID is measured with four questions that ask whether 
respondents would strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose a ban by the authorities 
of a public demonstration by 1) radical Muslims, 2) those against all churches and religion, 3) 
U.S. Communists, and 4) religious fundamentalists. In the ISSP, respondents are asked whether 
they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that 1) religious extremists, 2) people 
who want to overthrow the government by force, and 3) people prejudiced against any racial or 
ethnic group should be allowed to hold public meetings. In the USCID, respondents determine 
whether members of their most disliked group should be allowed to 1) make a speech in our 
community, 2) to hold public rallies and demonstrations, or 3) should be banned from running 
for public office. All indices are constructed first by averaging responses and are subsequently 
dichotomized by splitting at the mean of each scale to permit the binary grouping necessary for 
coarsened exact matching.  
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A.1.2 Political participation 
Each survey included questions on whether the respondent engaged in any of several activities in 
the past year. In the ISSP, these included 1) donated money or raised funds for a social or 
political activity; 2) contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your 
views; 3) contacted or appeared in the media to express your views; 4) joined an internet forum 
or discussion group; 5) signed a petition; 6) attended a political meeting or rally; 7) boycotted, or 
deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons; 8) took part 
in a demonstration. The two contacting items (items 2 and 3) were collapsed into a single 
“contacting” variable and whether the respondent voted in the last election was included in the 
count of total political actions in which an individual could engage. 
 The USCID included several items that were collapsed into a scale of comparable size.  
Three items – whether the respondent had, in the past year, worked in a political party or action 
group, for the campaign of a candidate for office, or in another political organization or 
association – were collapsed into a single “volunteering” variable (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). 
Another three items constituted an “internet politics” variable: whether the respondent had 
visited websites of political organizations or candidates, forwarded electronic messages with 
political content, or participated in political activities over the internet. In addition to 1) 
volunteering and 2) internet politics, USCID respondents could indicate that they had 3) voted in 
the most recent election; 4) contacted a politician or local government official, 5) donated money 
to a political organization or group, 6) boycotted or deliberately bought products for political, 
ethical, or environmental reasons, or 7) taken part in protest activities.  
A factor analysis showed that these items tended to “load” on two different dimensions, 
one corresponding to private participation (voting, donating, contacting, and internet) and the 
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other corresponding to public participation (petitioning, volunteering (USCID)/attending rallies 
(ISSP), boycotting, and protest). These are analyzed using count variables in Table 4. For the 
final analysis on which Figure 1 is based, I dichotomized public political activity such that 0 
represents participation in no political activity and 1 indicates participation in any political 
activity. 
A.1.3 Predictors of tolerance 
The most robust and theoretically grounded predictors of tolerance include perceived sociotropic 
threat, dogmatism, and support for democratic values and procedures. The dogmatism scale is 
based on five Likert-scale items: 1) Of all the different philosophies that exist in the world, there 
is probably only one that is correct; 2) There are two kinds of people in this world: those how are 
for the truth and those who are against it; and 3) to compromise with our political opponents is 
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. Dogmatism scale reliability is 
0.67. Sociotropic threat – which is only available in the USCID – is measured using 7-point 
antipodal scales on which respondents locate their most disliked group as either 1) American or 
un-American; 2) Dangerous to society or Not dangerous to society; 3) Unwilling to follow the 
rules of democracy or Willing to follow them; and 4) likely to “change everything” or “nothing” 
if they were to come to power in the United States. The reliability of the threat scale is 0.66.  
Support for democratic values and procedures, in the USCID, is measured using 
respondents’ average support for individual freedom over public order and a firm belief in 
multiparty competition. Freedom vs. Order is measured as respondents’ willful rejection of three 
statements: 1) Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put pu with the danger 
to society of extremist political views; 2) Society shouldn’t have to put up with those who have 
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political ideas that are extremely different from the majority; 3) It is better to live in an orderly 
society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive. Multipartism 
support is tapped by three statements: 1) what our country needs is one political party which will 
rule the country; 2) The party that gets the support of the majority ought not to have to share 
political party with the political minority; 3) Our country will be better off if we just outlaw all 
political parties. Coding of these items was reversed and they were averaged to produce the 
support for democratic values and procedures scale (reliability = 0.71). In the ISSP, questions are 
available that permit a scale of support for civil freedoms (democratic values) and rule of law 
(democratic procedures). For the former, respondents were asked “On a scale of 1 to 7…how 
important is it: “That the government authorities 1) respect and protect the rights of minorities; 
2) that government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society.” 
For the latter, respondents were asked “as far as you are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 
7…how important is it: 1) always to obey laws and regulations; 2) never to try to evade taxes.” 
The composite scale, based on average importance of these principles to each respondent, carries 
a reliability of 0.65.  
Finally, two additional concepts with ties to tolerance – perceived political freedom and 
discussion network heterogeneity – are measured as follows. Perceived political freedom is the 
average trust that the government will not repress or otherwise interfere with citizens’ political 
expression (Gibson 1992b). It is based on this question: “suppose you felt very strongly that 
something the government was doing was very wrong and you wanted to do something about it. 
Do you think that the government would definitely allow, probably allow, probably not allow, or 
definitely not allow you to: 1) make a speech in public criticizing the actions of the government; 
2) organize public meetings to oppose the government; 3) organize protest marches and 
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demonstrations to oppose the actions of the government.” I constructed the perceived freedom 
scale (reliability = .88) by averaging responses for each individual across these items. Network 
heterogeneity is the average of all political opinion diversity within respondents’ networks of 
family, friends, coworkers, and neighbors, measured as respondents’ estimated percentage of 
individuals in these networks who “have political different political views from yours.” 
A.1.4 Predictors of civic voluntarism 
Political participation is responsive to three particular individual-level dimensions – resources, 
psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization potential. Among resources, education 
level is measured as respondents’ highest degree or extent of schooling, ranging from 0 – 6 in 
both the USCID and ISSP. Free time in both data sets is the total number of hours a respondent 
does not spend working (subtracted from total hours in the week), and efficacy is measured as 
respondents’ average belief that they grasp political matters and that politicians are concerned 
with their political opinions. Political interest is respondents’ average frequency of political 
discussion and general interest in political matters, while associational involvement is a count of 
memberships in voluntary organizations. 
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A.2 TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 26. Tolerance and Levels of Participation in Europe, with Country Fixed Effects 
 
Coefficient SE 
Tolerant 
 
0.197 (0.040) 
Education 0.281 (0.018) 
Income 
 
0.006 (0.016) 
Free time 
 
-0.001 (0.001) 
Political interest 0.537 (0.039) 
Efficacy 
 
0.367 (0.032) 
Associational involvement 0.399 (0.020) 
Institutional trust -0.045 (0.015) 
Social trust 0.102 (0.030) 
Strong Party ID 0.356 (0.127) 
Female 
 
0.013 (0.048) 
Age 
 
-0.001 (0.002) 
UK 
 
0.330 (0.064) 
Austria 
 
0.109 (0.082) 
France 
 
0.727 (0.071) 
Ireland 
 
0.172 (0.071) 
Netherlands 0.737 (0.093) 
Denmark 
 
-0.026 (0.024) 
Finland 
 
0.051 (0.094) 
Sweden 
 
0.257 (0.054) 
Czech Republic -0.532 (0.083) 
Slovakia 
 
0.105 (0.088) 
Slovenia 
 
-0.710 (0.059) 
Poland 
 
-1.688 (0.127) 
Hungary 
 
-1.749 (0.075) 
Bulgaria 
 
-1.334 (0.111) 
Latvia 
 
-0.349 (0.986) 
Cut 1 
 
3.178 (0.418) 
Cut 2 
 
4.338 (0.430) 
Cut 3 
 
5.315 (0.445) 
Cut 4 
 
6.233 (0.446) 
Cut 5 
 
7.139 (0.453) 
Cut 6 
 
8.074 (0.451) 
Cut 7 
 
9.155 (0.461) 
Cut 8 
 
10.732 (0.449) 
Log pseudolikelihood -24619 
  Obs 15198 
  Pseduo R-squared 0.1422 
  Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Boldfaced entries significant at p≤0.05; robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Norway as referent 
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APPENDIX B: Appendix to Chapter Five 
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B.1 SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction:  
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study is to learn how people 
persuade each other in politics. You will be asked to write a short and strong argument that 
could be used to persuade someone like you to change their political opinion. You may not agree 
with what you are asked to write, but we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument 
anyway – this is very important for our research. If you feel like you will not be able to do so, 
please use this opportunity to exit the survey now. Thank you for taking this task seriously.  
 
Least-Liked Group: 
Here is a list of some political groups that are active in American society today. Please select the 
group that you dislike the most:  
- Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life 
groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; 
Christian fundamentalists; atheists; gay rights supporters 
 
Group Affect:  
Using the following scale, please rate the degree to which you sympathize with the beliefs of the 
following groups. On this scale, “1” means that you fully oppose the group and “100” means 
that you fully support the group.  
- Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life 
groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; 
Christian fundamentalists; atheists; gay rights supporters 
 
Sociotropic Threat 
To what extent do you believe that {least-liked group} are… 
- Dangerous to American society 
- Likely to take away your freedoms if they came to power 
- Unwilling to follow the rules of democracy 
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Political tolerance (pre- and post-test measure) 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:  
- {Least-liked group} should be banned from your community 
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community 
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to stand in elections for public office 
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community. 
 
Support for Individual Liberty over Public Order and Security 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
- Freedom of speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the things 
they say are dangerous or insulting to others in society 
- It is better to live in an orderly society than to give people so much freedom that they can 
become disruptive 
- Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society 
of extremist political views 
- Society shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from 
the views of the majority 
- Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist 
groups should not be allowed to demonstrate 
 
Political Conservatism 
Selecting from the categories below, how would you describe your political views in general? 
- Extremely liberal; Mostly liberal; Somewhat liberal; Purely moderate; Somewhat 
conservative; Mostly conservative; Extremely conservative 
 
Dogmatism 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
- There are two kinds of people in this world: Good and Bad. 
- A group cannot exist long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own members 
- Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct 
- Compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the 
betrayal of our own position 
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Treatment lead-in:  
- In this portion of the study, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument that 
you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: we 
politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with what 
you have been asked to write. If you feel that you must refuse to write such an 
argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey without loss of payment. 
But your participation is very important to our research and would be of great help 
to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously.  
 
Treatment Condition Scenario:  
- Imagine that a large group of {GROUP members} wish to hold a public 
demonstration in your community. Some people openly hate this group while many 
others find what the {GROUP} believes to be very offensive. In the past, members of 
this group have not cooperated with the authorities and have sometimes violated the 
conditions of their parade permits. Other recent demonstrations by this group have 
led to property damage and open conflict with counter-protesters and the police.  
 
Control Condition Scenario: 
- Imagine that you are in charge of a media campaign to promote the use of renewable 
energy sources – such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric power. Your goal is to 
convince the public that it is better for American industries to develop and invest in 
these new sources of energy and that Americans should stop using fossil fuels like 
oil, coal and natural gas. Some people believe that a shift to renewable energy could 
badly damage the economy, while many others believe that new energy sources are 
all that necessary. 
 
Tolerant Treatment Elaboration Task:  
- Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should not be allowed 
to hold their demonstration.  Please write a short but strong argument that can help 
convince this person that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold its demonstration in 
your community,   
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Intolerant Treatment Elaboration Task:  
- Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP) should be allowed to 
hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help 
convince this person that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold its demonstration 
in your community.   
 
Control Condition Elaboration Task:  
- Think of someone you know who would think that Americans and American industry 
should not try to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. Please write a 
short but strong argument that can help convince this person that developing 
renewable energy sources is the more sensible policy. 
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B.2 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 27 Excerpts from Nonsense, Anti-Treatment, and Compliant Elaborations 
 
Alphanumeric Strings 
-----//------- ------/- -/------ ----//-- -/-----  
Sdfkajsdf \ \ adfadj fd afa / / adf a/ / /dfa 
dfkfa;kdfjadfadpfia vak;nv a;d hva;  
 
Repetition / 
Copy-Paste 
Please write a short but strong argument that can help 
convince this person that these Ku Klux Klan 
members should be allowed to hold a public 
demonstration in your community. 
Because we want to/because we want to/because we 
want to/because we want to/because we want 
to/because we want to.  
 
Irrelevant 
Look around you and see all the people walking 
around feeling like they own the place. Sure they look 
good in their new jeans, but we don’t have a GAP 
around here.  
The Legend of Zelda. In our premiere episode of the 
Timeline, we delve into the Legend of Zelda series’ 
realm of Hyrule to connect the dots! 
Anti-Treatment 1:  
subject rejects tolerant 
essay  
I do not agree with the KKK or the principles that 
they promote. I have not grown up knowing anything 
good about the KKK. I am a believer of individuality. 
The KKK doesn’t really appeal to what I want in life. 
I just seek to find happiness. They should go away. 
My community is not accustomed with acceptance as 
communities that would accept it to happen so I 
disagree with it ever to happen. 
Anti-Treatment 2:  
subject rejects intolerant 
essay 
Even though I am opposed to the views espoused by 
Islamic Fundamentalists, I cannot argue that they 
should be denied their right to demonstrate. I believe 
it is more important that a person or group’s right to 
freedom of speech be guaranteed than silencing views 
I don’t agree with. This is a principle our country was 
founded on. 
The demonstration should be allowed, but it must be 
peaceful. Freedom of speech should always be 
protected. Violence does not always solve the 
problem. Be brave to support from the front not in 
the back. 
Compliant with  
Tolerant Condition 
Freedoms are essential for a democracy in order to 
survive within itself. A democracy allows groups 
within its domain the right of free assembly and 
speech. As long as this assembly is peaceful we must 
allow freedom of speech in our community even if we 
disagree with what this group says or disagree with 
what they stand for. 
I myself am against gay rights. All Americans 
though have the right to freedom of speech and 
assembly. Once we take that right away from one 
group that sets us on a slippery slope to losing those 
same rights ourselves. Though we do not have to 
agree with all groups, we have to defend everyone’s 
right to free speech and assembly 
Compliant with 
Intolerant Condition 
This group has demonstrated in the past that it is 
incapable of adhering to the laws during its 
demonstrations. If they are allowed to hold public 
demonstrations, it is likely that there will be property 
damage and it should be prevented. I suggest that they 
hold an event online or through another method.  
It just seems like the Tea Party is looking for trouble. 
My community would not allow them to come to a 
place that is completely against them to ask for 
trouble. My community will not allow this 
demonstration or there will be hell to pay 
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APPENDIX C: Appendix to Chapter Six 
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C.1 HUNGARIAN SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
MAIN INTRODUCTION 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in these research studies. In what follows, you will 
respond to two separate surveys about politics and current events in Hungary. You will be paid 
for both. Research Now has adopted this two-survey format to improve the survey experience for 
you, the respondent. In particular, you will be asked only once to answer basic questions about 
yourself – such as your age, education, gender, and so on – as this information is relevant to 
both research studies. Separate instruction sets have been provided for each study, so you will 
know when you have completed one and have begun the other.   
 
 
QUESTION 1 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the 
extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. You should rate the extent to which 
the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.  
 Extroverted, enthusiastic 
 Critical, quarrelsome 
 Dependable, self-disciplined 
 Anxious, easily upset 
 Open to new experiences, complex 
 Reserved, quiet 
 Sympathetic, warm 
 Disorganized, careless 
 Calm, emotionally stable 
 Conventional, uncreative 
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QUESTION 2 
Suppose the government did something you believed was wrong and you wanted to do 
something about it. Would you be willing or unwilling to take the following actions? 
 Put a sign in front of your home or apartment 
 Join  a peaceful protest 
 Contact an elected official to express your opinions 
 Donate money to an organization that supports your views 
 Vote more frequently 
 Create a local organization to oppose the government’s actions 
 Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions 
 Sign your full name to a public petition to oppose the government’s actions 
 
QUESTION 3:  
Here is a list of some groups that are active in Hungarian politics and society today. Please select 
the group that you dislike the most:  
 Romani Groups 
 Jobbik supporters 
 Jewish Groups 
 Homosexual rights groups 
 Communists 
 “Milla” supporters 
 Fidesz Party supporters 
 Catholic Nationalists 
 
QUESTION 5:  
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:  
 {Group} should be banned from your community 
 {Group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community 
 {Group} should be allowed to compete in elections for public office 
 {Group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community 
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QUESTION 6:  
To what extent do you believe that {GROUP} are:  
 Dangerous to Hungarian society 
 Likely to take away your freedom if they came to power 
 Unwilling to follow the rules of democracy 
 
QUESTION 7:  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?  
 Freedom of speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the 
things they say are dangerous or insulting to others in society. 
 It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they 
can become disruptive. 
 Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to 
society of extremist groups. 
 Society shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different 
from the views of the majority. 
 Because demonstrations frequently become disruptive, radical and extremist groups 
shouldn’t be allowed to demonstrate.  
 
QUESTION 8:  
Selecting from the categories below, how would you describe your political views in general?  
 Far left of center 
 Mostly left of center 
 Somewhat left of center 
 Purely centrist 
 Somewhat right of center 
 Mostly right of center 
 Far right of center 
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QUESTION 9:  
Which policy goal would you say is MOST important to you right now?  
 Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition 
 Protect government-funded subsidies for college tuition 
 Protect anti-government protesters’ rights to free assembly 
 Increase public order and security at anti-government protests 
 
QUESTION 10:  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
 There are two kinds of people in the world: Good and Bad. 
 A group cannot exist for long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own 
members. 
 Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct. 
 Compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the 
betrayal of our own position.  
 
QUESTION 11:  
People sometimes talk about what the goals of this country should be for the next 10 years. Here 
is a list of some of the goals that different people would give top priority.  
Which one of these goals would you say is most important to you? 
 A high level of economic growth 
 Making sure Hungary has a strong military 
 Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their 
communities 
 Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful 
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QUESTION 12:  
In general, how interested are you in politics?  
 Very interested 
 Interested 
 Neither interested nor uninterested 
 Uninterested 
 Very uninterested 
 
QUESTION 13:  
What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
 Less than High School 
 High school 
 Some College 
 College 
 Master’s Degree 
 Doctoral Degree 
 Other advanced Degree 
 
QUESTION 14:  
What is your annual income range?  
 Below €20,000 
 €20,000 – €29,999 
 €30,000 – €39,999 
 €40,000 – €49,999 
 €50,000 – €59,999 
 €60,000 – €69,999 
 €70,000 or more 
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QUESTION 15:  
How often do you participate in activities that are organized by groups you belong to, such as 
churches, sports clubs, political organizations, volunteer or charity groups, unions, professional 
associations, etc.?  
 Never 
 Less than once a month 
 1-3 times each month 
 Once each week 
 2-3 times each week 
 4-5 times each week 
 More than 5 times each week 
 
QUESTION 16: 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
QUESTION 17:  
What is your current age?   
 18 to 24 
 25 to 34 
 35 to 44 
 45 to 54 
 55 to 64 
 65 or older 
 
QUESTION 18: 
Would you describe yourself as an ethnic minority?  
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“STUDY 1” CONCLUSION 
 
“STUDY 2” INTRODUCTION & INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study is to learn how ordinary 
citizens persuade each other in politics. You will be asked to write a short and strong argument 
that could be used to persuade someone like you to change their political opinion. You may not 
agree with the argument you are asked to write, but we politely ask that you try to write strong 
arguments anyway – this is very important for our research.  
Thank you very much for taking this task seriously.  
 
TREATMENT INSTRUCTION SET: 
Next, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument that you think could persuade the 
opinion of someone like you.  
PLEASE Remember: We politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you 
disagree with what you have been asked to write. This is very important for our research and 
would be of great help to us.  
 
TOLERANCE TREATMENT: 
Imagine that a large group of {Group} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community.  
 
Some people openly hate this group and many others find what the group believes to be very 
offensive. In the past, their demonstrations have led to property damage and open conflict with 
counter-protesters and the policy.  
 
Think of someone you know who would want to prevent {Group} from holding their 
demonstration.  
 
Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that these {Group} 
should be allowed to hold a public demonstration in your community.  
 
Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below.  
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INTOLERANCE TREATMENT: 
Imagine that a large group of {Group} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community.  
 
Some people openly hate this group and many others find what the group believes to be very 
offensive. In the past, their demonstrations have led to property damage and open conflict with 
counter-protesters and the policy.  
 
Think of someone you know who think that {Group} should be allowed to hold their 
demonstration.  
 
Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that these {Group} 
should not be allowed to hold a public demonstration in your community.  
 
Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below. 
 
CONTROL:  
Imagine that your local market plans to start selling tomatoes that are grown in a laboratory 
instead of tomatoes that are grown on a farm. These “laboratory tomatoes” are perfectly healthy 
and are cheaper than natural tomatoes, and many people are concerned that this trend will hurt 
farmers. But the market’s owners report that people from other communities think laboratory 
tomatoes taste better and are perfectly happy with them.  
 
Imagine that you work for a group that supports natural tomatoes.  
 
Please write a short but strong argument that might help convince the market owners that 
natural tomatoes are better for business and for the public than laboratory tomatoes. 
 
Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below. 
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POST-TEST TOLERANCE 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements 
 {Group} should be banned from your community 
 {Group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community 
 {Group} should be allowed to compete in elections for public office 
 {Group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community 
 
POST-TEST SUPPORT FOR DISSENT 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 It is very good that people have freedom to protest against issues they dislike 
 Most disagreements undermine society 
 You have to be ready to accept new ideas; new ideas are needed for the advancement of 
society 
 Challenging ideas held by the majority of people is essential to democracy 
 
POST-TEST PERCEIVED POLITICAL FREEDOM 
Suppose you felt very strongly that something the government was doing was very wrong and 
you wanted to do something about it. Do you think THE GOVERNMENT would definitely 
allow, probably allow, probably not allow, or definitely not allow you to… 
 Organize a nationwide strike 
 Organize public meetings to oppose the government’s actions 
 Organize protest marches or demonstrations 
 Make a speech criticizing government’s actions 
 Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions 
 
POST-TEST RISK AVERSION 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 I do not feel comfortable about taking chances 
 I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules 
 Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure about how things will turn out 
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 I would like to explore strange places 
 I prefer situations that have foreseeable outcomes 
 I feel comfortable improvising in new situations 
 I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain circumstances 
 I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable 
 I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes 
 I like to do frightening things 
 
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS LEAD-INS: 
 
Issue 1: Student Subsidies (Pro) 
As you probably have heard, the government has decided to cut the number of free and 
reduced-rate university places to around 10,000, down from over 50,000 in 2010. These reforms 
have sparked many protests around Hungary, even though the government has now promised not 
to cut education subsidies. 
Several groups maintain that this unfair policy hurts Hungarian young people and their 
chances of becoming well-trained professionals. The Citizens Initiative Group is now circulating 
a petition around the country to demand that Prime Minister Orbán government maintains its 
promise and does not cut education subsidies for Hungarian students.  
Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important 
issue? 
 
Issue 2: Student Subsidies (Con) 
As you probably have heard, the government has decided to cut the number of free and 
reduced-rate university places to around 10,000, down from over 50,000 in 2010. These reforms 
have sparked many protests around Hungary, even though the government has now promised not 
to cut education subsidies. 
Several groups maintain that education subsidies hurt the Hungarian economy because 
Hungary cannot afford the luxury of training doctors and other professionals to go and work in 
Germany, Norway, or Britain. The Citizens Initiative Group is now circulating a petition around 
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the country to demand that Prime Minister Orbán and his government cuts education subsidies 
for students.  
Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important 
issue? 
 
Issue 3: Anti-Government Protests (Pro) 
As you probably have heard, opposition groups will not be able to hold anti-government 
rallies over the 15 March bank holiday weekend after the government has reserved 12 large 
squares for official celebrations.  
Some groups believe the government has preemptively blocked freedom of assembly and 
the Citizens Initiative Group is circulating a petition around the country to demand that the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Justice protect free speech by allocating at least one 
square for the Milla anti-government protesters.  
Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important 
issue? 
 
Issue 4: Anti-Government Protests (Con) 
As you probably have heard, opposition groups will not be able to hold anti-government 
rallies over the 15 March bank holiday weekend after the government has reserved 12 large 
squares for official celebrations. The fear now is that protesters will march in the city streets.  
Some groups believe the anti-government protests have the potential to become 
disorderly, disruptive, and dangerous. The Citizens Initiative Group is circulating a petition 
around the country to demand that the government increase policy presence and ensure public 
order and security.   
Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important 
issue? 
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PETITION INSTRUCTION SET:  
Feel free to download and fill out the petition by clicking this link: {link} 
 
Save it to your computer and, when you are finished, you may upload your signed petition by 
clicking {“Choose File”} below.  
 
Upon exiting this survey, your signed petition will be automatically forwarded to the specified 
recipients, and the Citizens Initiative Group will receive a copy for their permanent records.  
 
Your signature to this petition will be published with other signatures, unless you elect to remain 
totally anonymous (do this by selecting the appropriate box on the petition itself).  
 
When you are finished, please click “>>” 
 
SURVEY CONCLUSION: 
Thank you for your participation!     
Please click >> one last time to exit the survey. 
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TRANSLATION OF HUNGARIAN PETITION TEXTS: 
PETITION 1:  Support Educational Subsidies! 
To: To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
Hungarians desire change!  
It is time for the government to keep its promise to maintain or expand current education 
subsidies for college tuition. Young Hungarians and the future of Hungary depends upon them! 
Please move immediately to secure these subsidies for all students.  
Signed,  
 
PETITION 2: Cut Educational Subsidies! 
To: To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
Hungarians desire change!   
It is time for the government to keep its promise to cut education subsidies for college tuition. 
Government pays for expensive education and training, but students only leave to work in other 
countries. We cannot afford to pay for young people who protest what they have been gifted and 
then leave Hungary behind.  Please move immediately to cut these subsidies.  
Signed,  
 
PETITION 3: Protect Freedom of Assembly on March 15! 
To: To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
Hungarians desire change!   
It is time for the government to protect freedom of speech and assembly for all Hungarians. 
Hungary is a democracy and we demand that the government allocate at least one public square 
for protests by Milla and other critics of the government on 15 March.  Please move immediately 
to protect this fundamental right to protest.  
Signed, 
 
PETITION 4: Protect Public Order and Security on March 15! 
To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner 
Hungarians desire change!   
It is time for the government to protect Hungarian cities against protesters! Hungary is an orderly 
and peaceful democracy and we demand that the government allocate more police and resources 
to prevent damage at protests by Milla and other critics of the government on 15 March.  Please 
move immediately to protect public order and security.  
Signed, 
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Figure 17 Petition Sample 1 
 
 275 
 
Figure 18 Petition Sample 2 
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Figure 19 Petition Sample 3 
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Figure 20 Petition Sample 4 
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Figure 21 Petition Sample 5 
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Figure 22 Petition Sample 6 
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Figure 23 Petition Sample 7 (Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition) 
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Figure 24 Petition Sample 8 (Protect Government-funded subsidies for college tuition) 
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Figure 25 Petition Sample 9 (Protect Protesters’ rights at March 15th rallies) 
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Figure 26 Petition Sample 10 (Increase police presence at March 15
th
 rallies) 
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